

West Irian
and
Jakarta
Imperialism



KEES LAGERBERG

New Guinea is perhaps best known in the West for its Stone Age mountain tribes which remained beyond the reach of white men until only a few years ago. It may also be reasonably well known that the eastern half of the island recently ceased to be an Australian colony and became the independent republic of Papua New Guinea.

What of the western half, now known as Irian Jaya or West Irian? Vast, sparsely populated and with a forbidding terrain, it was the cinderella of the Dutch colonial empire until the Second World War. But after the war, when the Dutch East Indies (not including New Guinea) became the republic of Indonesia, development was stepped up, especially in education and administration. Indonesian attempts in the 1950s to obtain support at the United Nations for its bid to obtain sovereignty over New Guinea all failed dismally. But in 1962, exposed to invasion threats from President Sukarno, diplomatic pressure from President Kennedy and lobbying by big business at home anxious not to lose friends in Jakarta, the Dutch government ceded that sovereignty to Indonesia—subject only to a U.N.-supervised “Act of Free Choice” in which the people were to vote for or against Indonesian rule seven years later in 1969. (The manner in which this crucial test was conducted will long be a subject of debate.)

So a rich and experienced *colonial* overlord, intent on a rapid but controlled progress to self-determination for the Papuans, has been replaced by an *imperialistic* one who has no such benevolent intentions, besides being a victim to chronic economic and political instability. New discoveries (by multinational companies)

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PREFACE

After the take-over of West New Guinea in 1962 by U.N.T.E.A., the temporary organisation, one book after another was published in the Netherlands on the most diverse New Guinea topics. Seemingly it was some sort of self-justification after the act. My thesis on the administrative 'reshaping process' in the last Dutch overseas territory was one of them.

And then there was silence. No book, no article, no broadcast was devoted in the 1970s to the fate of West Irian and its inhabitants, the Papuans. Admittedly the reason was obvious. Indonesia had frustrated the course of the Dutch development policy to self-determination and at the same time offered a new opportunity to the former overlord to take part in the development process of the huge Indonesian archipelago. The restoration of this relationship, which had centuries of common history behind it, swept away the New Guinea nostalgia.

Then came an invitation from an English publisher: 'It is not high on my priority-list but ...', and I was asked to write on the New Guinea topic again. I do not believe that this was mere chance. Later on it appeared that a clerk in the office of the former Dutch Colonial Office had saved for years a number of New Guinea photographs which should have been destroyed, and in obscure pamphlets anonymous correspondents told some of the West Irian stories. New Guinea still existed.

So I was forced to go back there, to the former New Guinea — Irian Jaya as it is called now. And again outsiders guided me to the spot and to the people, trusting that I should see and report the truth. So this is not my book; the book is due to the truth of people who feel more responsible to the Papuans than I and most of my colleagues did.


I am indebted to those very few people, and I feel relieved and grateful to have written their book. Only the mistakes are mine, and for them I apologise.

February 1979

C.L.

EAST INDONESIA: geographical, floral and faunal divisions

(based on *Atlas van Tropisch Nederland*, 1938)



INTRODUCTION

In May 1978 the Indonesian Government had to admit that the military commander of Jayapura, General Ismail, the General's chief intelligence officer and a clergyman had been kidnapped by members of the organisation known as *Operasi Papua Merdeka* (O.P.M.), the liberation movement of West Irian. The act had taken place at Tuna, on the border between West Irian and Papua New Guinea, south of Jayapura. Its perpetrator was Martin Tabu,* who some weeks before had seemingly surrendered. But at the peacemaking ceremony he took all the Indonesians prisoner. The retaliation of the Indonesian army was violent. A battalion of crack troops moved in, while another 1,500 men were held in reserve. The villages were strafed from the air.

The kidnapping and its repercussions were among the more striking in a long series of events which started fifteen years earlier in May 1963, when the Dutch left West New Guinea and the Papuan flag was no longer allowed to be raised in West Irian. That flag had been designed by Nicolaas Jouwe, who was seen nearly seven years later standing before the United Nations building in New York, demonstrating in the rain with a few of his fellow-Papuans. On 19 November, when the Assembly accepted with eighty-four 'yes' votes and thirty abstentions the resolution that the Dutch-Indonesian agreement, the so-called Act of Free Choice,** had been fulfilled under the auspices of the United Nations.

*Martin Tabu, born in Fakfak, and formerly in Dutch government service, is now fighting in Markas Victoria, a secret hiding-place in the district of Jayapura. Since the leader of the 'revolutionary provisional government of West Papua New Guinea' was arrested in Papua New Guinea in October 1978 near Vanimo, Martin Tabu has been named as the leader of the provisional government in West Irian by Nicolaas Jouwe in the Netherlands, who represents the movement in Europe.

**The Act of Free Choice, resulting from the New York Agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands in 1962, is translated in Indonesian as *Penentuan pendapat rakyat* ('Pepera'), literally 'Declaration of People's opinion'. The Netherlands never objected to the Indonesian interpretation and it is difficult to say whether the American chairman of the New York Conference, Ellsworth Bunker, saw any reason to make an absolutely clear distinction about the difference.

The Act of Free Choice was the completion of the Ellsworth Bunker proposal, which provided the opportunity for the red and white Indonesian flag to be hoisted in West Irian on 1 January 1963, one of the inflexible demands of President Sukarno in the struggle over the territory. That was the implementation of President Sukarno's revolution. In the last days before the Dutch-Indonesian treaty was signed on Indonesia's Independence Day, 17 August 1962, tension had risen to boiling-point over Sukarno's immovable determination to tear down the Dutch flag before 'the cock would crow' on 1 January 1963. President Kennedy's personal intervention prevented the outbreak of a war in the final stages of the struggle over the underpopulated island: 'Such a conflict would have adverse consequences out of all proportion to the issue at stake.' But in attaching such value to the symbolic significance of a flag, President Sukarno was not so wrong after all. However, he was fighting the wrong flag; what was really at stake was not Dutch prestige, nor was it the strategic or economic significance of New Guinea, but the longing of the Papuans for independence. That only gradually became evident as the Indonesians showed contempt for their feelings, and left out of consideration the fact that the newly discovered natural riches of the land were seen by the Papuans as the inalienable heritage of their forefathers, not as a contribution to the Indonesian treasury.

In many *kampongs* in West Irian, Nicolaas Jouwe's flag still lies hidden. President Sukarno did not accept the compromise proposal of U Thant that three flags should be flown in West Irian during the interregnum of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA): those of the United Nations, Indonesia and the Netherlands. He had his way, but he underestimated and tried to suppress what happened in 1961, when the Netherlands Foreign Minister Joseph Luns initiated his plan to safeguard the Papuans' right of self-determination. The first important step on that road was the convening of the New Guinea Council. The establishment of the national council was seen by the Papuans as the first step to independence; for this reason they insisted that during the opening session in the presence of international representatives the Papuan flag should be placed next to the Dutch tricolor. However, they did not fully appreciate the ominous significance of the absence of the United States representative from that ceremony. Only after the outcome of the Act of Free Choice did the truth become

apparent: from the very beginning of the American intervention, the solution of the New Guinea dispute was expected to consist of transferring sovereignty to Indonesia and saving the faces of the Dutch. The Act of Free Choice, mockingly called the Act of No Choice, was a way of soothing the conscience pangs of the Dutch, who would not fight to uphold the moral obligation they professed.

The Papuans misjudged the political situation. The United States, caught in a dilemma between Communism and self-determination, decided to give in to President Sukarno's tenacity, although there was tension in the final days of its intervention, with the mediator Ellsworth Bunker being brought to the brink of anger by the evasive tactics of the Indonesians and the haggling over the flags. The Indonesians used their nuisance-value to the utmost. Their determination to gain possession of the whole of the Dutch colonial empire was much stronger than could be justified by any advantage to be gained by the poor, under-populated territory of West Irian. But the dream of the old Mojopahit empire including East Timor and North Kalimantan (Borneo) was still alive and the policy of confrontation towards Malaysia was more than mere tactics to divert attention away from internal problems. It was the pursuit of an imperialist ideal. When the confrontation policy with Malaysia under President Sukarno misfired, the take-over of East Timor was a means for a new President to implement the dream.

The Dutch feelings of paternalistic responsibility towards New Guinea after centuries of neglect and the newly-discovered moral obligation to the Papuans were no match for Indonesian ambitions as the Netherlands was not willing to risk a war in defence of New Guinea. In fact every Dutch soldier killed in a New Guinea ambush caused headlines in the newspapers at home. At the same time, the Papuan will to independence was still so immature that no Papuan party demanded that they should take their fate into their own hands.

Moreover the so-called Bilderberg group* in the Netherlands,

*The Bilderberg group was an informal group of influential people both in business and other activities such as Paul Rijkens of Unilever, who conferred at the Bilderberg Hotel in Holland under the chairmanship of Prince Bernhard, who actually promoted Dutch multi-nationals. It can hardly be surprising that business interests, especially in Indonesia, were difficult to combine with the Dutch New Guinea policy. The Bilderberg group was certainly no pressure-group, but exerted an influence.

consisting of international businessmen under the chairmanship of Prince Bernhard, had always been in favour of restoring good relations with the Indonesians and looked back with regret to the missed peaceful transfer of sovereignty in 1949. That group could not raise its voice so long as public opinion and the political parties were still in favour of the Papuans having the right of self-determination — a policy which seemed feasible because of the tacit support of the United States, Australia and Great Britain. Over and over again during the 1950s Indonesia lost its case in the United Nations General Assembly, where it never won the two-thirds majority to enable the *status quo* to be changed. So the Dutch silently accepted their losses, when their property was alienated and their nationals were expelled; the Indonesian breach of the union with the Netherlands had made them stubborn. But even if the Dutch kept silent, their arguments were still valid and they were bound to be voiced again when the climate had changed. It was under the direct threat of an Indonesian invasion and under American pressure that the Dutch remembered their traditional friendship with Indonesia and the material interests they had there, and accepted the American offer of mediation.

Papuan leaders sought refuge in the Netherlands, setting up a government-in-exile and hoping that in the future their hope of an independent nation would somehow be realised. They did not expect much from an act of choice under Indonesian rule, but they had faith in the integrity of the United Nations and in the interest of Australian New Guinea.

The Australians had been very much in favour of the Dutch policy of self-determination for West New Guinea. They needed a shield between themselves and Indonesia, with whom they wanted a distant partnership, but although very paternalistic in their attitude to the East Papuans themselves, they soon learned their lesson. They realised that the Netherlands would never again belong in the South-East Asian hemisphere, but that Indonesia was there to stay and intended to have Irian, so they applied the Dutch recipe to their own territory and made Papua New Guinea independent within a few years. Now, after the independence of Papua New Guinea, the Australian army is standing guard and carefully watching incidents on the New Guinea border. No Papuan in West New Guinea ever expected the eastern neighbours to be the first to become a nation.

The role of the U.N. possibly caused the greatest offence to

the Papuans' primitive feelings about justice. Self-determination after all was seen as the invention of the U.N., born out of the Second World War, from resistance to dictatorship, and it seemed unbelievable that the U.N. would sacrifice its own principles at the behest of a megalomaniac dictator.

And the Papuans misjudged themselves as well. At that time the Papuan nation, as they proudly call themselves, consisted of a very small sophisticated westernised élite; 525,000 village people under colonial rule split up into numerous tribes, bands and clans; and 250,000 more living in a Stone Age culture in isolated mountain areas such as the Baliem valley and the Paniai lakes, barely touched by civilisation and evangelisation, poor, weak and disorganised. In 1961 the inhabitants of the towns, partly politically conscious, voted by ballot to elect members of the New Guinea Council. Except for the people of Serui on the island of Japen and some near the international boundary with Indonesia, they generally displayed a remarkable aversion towards the Indonesians from the Moluccas and the Kei islands, who were sent to New Guinea as teachers and middle-level government staff.* The Papuans disliked them; they had experienced too much discrimination during the war in the absence of the colonial ruler, and they had understood the significance of independence, *merdeka*, in 1962 as well as the Indonesians had done in 1945. But there was not yet a national consciousness, born of common suffering and oppression.

The Papuans had migrated to their huge island some 25,000 years ago from the west, when the island had drifted to the Asian and Australian continents, and adapted themselves to the inhospitable country in different places. The territory had moulded the woolly-haired race into pygmy-type people in the mountains and tall seafaring tribes near the coast, self-sufficient and self-conscious, but it had never become a nation. The mountain and coastal Papuans of Dutch New Guinea were strangers to each other; there was not only the language barrier, as there were some 400 different languages and dialects, but the

*The Netherlands Indies Government used to have East Indonesian sub-district officers and teachers, both from Ambon (now called the South Moluccas) and from the Kei islands. In that position of power the East Indonesians showed a rather contemptuous attitude, especially during the Second World War. They are usually called by the Papuans 'Amberi', and since ancient times they have tried to migrate into the West Irian mainland (by Cape Amberi on the Bird's Head in the north-west).

community was split up into more than 2,000 villages. The Dutch rulers introduced Malay as the trade language, but after the war they introduced Dutch as a language of culture to open the door to the modern world, neglecting the fact that English should have been the language of culture for that part of the world. In the minds of the Dutch rulers the idea lingered that some historical monument should be left, and so the capital was called Hollandia. Hollandia-binnen, Hollandia-Noordwijk — it is double-dutch. The names merely indicate the fact that Papuan nationalism was not very acute, least of all in the rulers' minds. (Today Hollandia is re-named Jayapura.)

There was sound reasoning behind the choice to aim at self-determination only after Indonesia had been disloyal in breaking the Dutch-Indonesian union and abandoned the idea of a federated nation, but the obvious choice was not independence, but rather autonomy in some form, preferably in a kind of Melanesian confederation. Economic independence for New Guinea was not thought to be feasible at the time, and fragmentation of all sorts could not easily be overcome. In the 1960s few people could foresee how the Papuans would unite in face of the sufferings of neo-colonial rule, and how international capital, once political stability was established, would simply exploit the resources of the country — the copper, the oil, the timber and the fish — although there was superficial exploration only.

In 1977 West Irian's total exports amounted to about \$410 million; under the Dutch in the post-war period the amount never exceeded a few million dollars. And more is to come, when the resources of the western islands, Gag and Waigeo near Sorong, are exploited; the exploitable quantity is four or five times greater than what is being tapped at present. Exploration is still going on in the Central Mountains. Even though the costs of administering such an inaccessible country are high and land communications are virtually non-existent, an annual budget of \$50 to 75 million can easily be obtained.

Although the country is now a target for foreigners, the Papuans are patient. In recent history they have seen Dutch, Japanese and American forces come and go, and in earlier days they resisted the tentative influx of Chinese and East Indonesian people. If only because of its inaccessibility, they feel masters of their own bush. The Dutch anthropologist Held has called the Papuan a 'culture improviser' but, however many elements he

might have taken from different cultures, in religion, language or clothing, he did not change his basic attitude to the resources of his own land: they are his. As a Papuan recently told me, 'The resources under the earth, on the earth and above the earth are ours', which means that generations of exploitation will not wipe away the feeling of injustice that is being done to the true owners of the land. So the Indonesians are in for an endless resistance, which can only be overcome by partnership.

President Suharto, understandably, is forging the unity of the Archipelago by strengthening the economy, and in an inconspicuous way has succeeded in forcing back inflation and stagnation. His anti-Communist ideology has guaranteed support from the Western world; also from Javanese Islam, although all provincial interests had to be subordinated to the universal goal of a centralised Indonesia.

The Papuans do not see themselves as Indonesians, and the use of their resources for the common interest is felt to be theft of their heritage. They have learned to live with the '*Papua bodoh, Papua binatang*' (stupid Papuan, Papuan pig) attitude, but they have never given in, even when being robbed; so at the moment injury is added to insult. On the other hand, as is the case in other Melanesian cultures, there is a strong belief in a Messiah cult, the Koreroi movement. During the Second World War, an eruption of the movement took place and the Japanese could suppress the movement on Biak only at the expense of a tremendous sacrifice. In a sense, the Koreroi movement triumphed, because when the Allied (especially American) forces landed, the ideals of the cargo cult had literally come true. The Dutch, in bringing some kind of heaven-state to the Papuans, inherited the exalted reputation of the Americans to some extent. The Messiah belief is not diminished by the Christian faith and the Catholics are now especially popular, because the Dutch or Western missionary staff are still there, and the Catholic church is not considered to be part of Indonesia, but rather part of the Netherlands. So also the strategic value of Papuan leaders in exile in the Netherlands is still high. The Indonesians have tried again and again to persuade Nicolaas Jouwe and Marcus Kaisiepo to co-operate with them, but the opposite has been the result. The few Papuan leaders joining the Indonesian government feel discriminated against in their own country, and even the few seemingly pro-Indonesian Papuans with whom I talked in

Jakarta in 1978 put their hands on my shoulder and said: 'We will never, never become Indonesians, not us, nor our brothers in Irian, nor our fathers in the Netherlands.'

While these leaders stay abroad, the feeling is strengthened that the promise is still alive, and even if contact is difficult, news, letters and gifts reach the Papuans by way of the international airport on the island of Biak.

The old antagonism between Papuans and East Indonesians, the South Moluccans and the people of the Kei islands, explains why the Papuan government-in-exile and the movement for an independent East Indonesia do not unite. '*Door de eeuwen trouw*'* tried to establish that unity, but it never became a real success, although such a scheme would be a serious threat to the central Indonesian Government.

In August 1978 Indonesia is accused of having captured for interrogation some hundreds of Moluccans, members of the Republic of the South Moluccas (the R.M.S.), who visited Indonesia at the beginning of that year. These visits, though made with the consent of Indonesian authorities, revive the old Moluccan dream of independence. A merger between the Papuan republic and the Moluccan republic in the Netherlands could be a real headache to the Indonesians, because the Moluccans in the Netherlands number over 30,000 and are militarily organised with an ethical attitude comparable to that of the Baader-Meinhof terrorists in Germany. If the scene of the struggle against authority, at present being waged in the Netherlands, were transferred to Irianese territory, it would be hard to control without effective co-operation from Papua New Guinea (P.N.G.).

The effective counter-policy of the Indonesians is to populate West Irian with Indonesian military and officials, followed by wild immigrants from Makasar and other poor areas. The newcomers number between 10 and 20 per cent of the population, but it stands to reason that whole areas remain inaccessible and therefore free from Indonesian influence.

The real threat to a united and centralised Indonesia lies in the independence of Papua New Guinea. In ancient times the

* '*Door de eeuwen trouw*' (Eternal Truth) is an Ambonese movement in the Netherlands, true to God (they are Christians), Queen and homeland. This movement is the backbone of the South Moluccan government-in-exile under the 'presidency' of Ir. Manusama.

Negrito-Melanesian population drifted into the island from east to west. They first populated the northern corderilla from the Bird's Head to the south-east point, but then as the Central Mountains both in the east and the west rose (and they are still in continuous movement), the Papuans moved into the east-west-running valleys, spilling over the crests of the mountain ranges and populating the long, flat swampy plains to the south and north. The cannibalistic, headhunting tribes of the coastal plains prevented mongoloid invasions. Even the fauna from the Asian continent did not penetrate the New Guinea jungle; only seeds and plants reached the huge island, with the result that the flora is the most intriguing mixture of Australian and Asian types. But the huge island as such has a biology of its own, developed during its drifting course till it came to a halt north of Australia bending in the north into the East Indonesian archipelago.

From the first moment that the idea of self-determination was inseminated, political parties in Netherlands New Guinea mentioned a unity with their 'brethren' in the east. But in 1960 the Australians hardly considered the possibility of an independent P.N.G., although it cannot escape anybody's attention, how natural is the unity between the two parts. The straight border between them is a result of a gentleman's agreement between Great Britain and the Netherlands in 1848, confirmed when the Berlin conference of 1884 asked for effective occupation.

In the scramble for pieces of Africa, the nations became concerned about the different claims, especially those of the new German empire. The new wave of colonialism, which was not motivated by the desire for trade but by the need for resources and possession of fertile land, captured the world to establish the definite dominance of the European nations. Germany got a foothold in the north of New Guinea and expanded its influence along the coasts and rivers of that part of the island; England, alerted by the Queensland colony in Australia, negotiated a division of the eastern part of the island and then the east-west border was drawn according to the Berlin principle of effective occupation. In 1886, even the Pope supported that principle because it seemed the lesser of two evils. The Dutch established their government posts first in Manokwari and Fakfak, later in Merauke in 1892 under pressure from Australia, which complained of intrusions by Papuans across the border,

although the intruders were invading their own tribal or war areas.

So in recent times it is not surprising to find that at least 500 West Papuans have found a place of refuge across the artificial border, and it is even less surprising to find that Australian patrols and P.N.G. officials allow Indonesian patrols to hunt the Papuan guerillas across the border, because the border is an invention of colonial rulers and the ingenious invention is still today used to the disadvantage of the natives.

On the other hand, in spite of the attitude of Michael Somare's government, which inherited the problem of having Indonesia as a neighbour, the voice of brotherhood across that straight border gets stronger and stronger, and it is again the border between Papua and New Guinea that stands in the way of P.N.G. having an outspoken attitude. So the natural ally of West Irian is divided within itself.*

Apart from the fact of P.N.G.'s independence, other new factors have arisen since the Dutch under American pressure left West New Guinea to its fate. During the negotiations on the transfer, in the final days of sovereignty the Dutch succeeded not only in securing the Act of Free Choice, but they also presented a one-year budget of about 100 million guilders as a farewell gift. The gift was ignored by President Sukarno, who always preferred national pride to common sense, and it was entrusted to the safe keeping of the U.N. — who, after years letting it lie dormant, decided to spend it in co-operation with President Suharto. He tried to restore the necessary infrastructure and at the same time, by a decision made in 1967, opened the country to foreign capital, so changing President Sukarno's anti-capitalist, anti-Western policy. One of the last acts of the Dutch New Guinea Government on behalf of the island was a contract with the multinational Freeport for the exploitation of the minerals on the islands of Gag and Waigeo.

Suharto's new policy of inviting foreign capital and foreign experts to revitalise the Indonesian economy at the end of the 1960s — and then the energy crisis and the doomsday predictions of the Club of Rome — persuaded foreign capital to look

* As will be seen in chapter 6, Papua New Guinea has a colonial history of its own and it is still a very fragmented territory; especially Bougainville, an island of the Solomons, where copper-resources are exploited, does not fit in easily.

for resources in West Irian, which were explored to some extent after the departure of the Dutch but have not yet been exploited. Ores like copper in Tembagapura, nickel in Waigeo and oil in the south-west of the Bird's Head have attracted mainly American investment. Timber and fish aroused the interest of the Japanese. In short, West Irian appeared rich in resources, and the influx of thousands of East Indonesian immigrants, unskilled or semi-skilled but prepared to put in hard and cheap labour, made exploitation possible, because labour has always been a bottleneck in both parts of the island.

At that moment West Irian became integrated into the economy of Indonesia, and the main task of the military and the civil government has been not so much to suppress any uprising for the sake of political prestige, but to safeguard that part of the Irianese economy that was vital to the central government. From that time on, harbour activities in Sorong increased, air traffic in Biak and Nabire returned to life and near the Carstenz mountains the hidden town of Tembagapura has buzzed with activity. At the same time, the Papuan gradually disappeared from the scene, and the nepotism of the Indonesians and the bush people's fear of civil and military government alike stopped the rapid emancipation of the native people altogether.

The Indonesians have admittedly wanted the Papuans to take part in Indonesian life; students could get scholarships to study in Jakarta, members of the New Guinea Council were admitted to government posts, young Papuans became policemen or soldiers but only to the extent that they would adapt themselves to the new situation. Even their common language, Malay, was regarded with contempt unless it evolved to the Javanese-impregnated Malay that became '*bahasa Indonesia*'.* The disappearance of the Papuan from public life meant the simultaneous forging of a mental and political resistance. The Papuans had gone underground. That is the situation at the moment in West Irian. It was no longer a matter of dreaming about a utopian Melanesian union; it was the naked experience of feeling humiliated and robbed by a foreign power. As one former political leader and civil servant, now deposed as disloyal,

* Malay has been the *lingua franca* for centuries. East-Indonesia and West Irian have their own version, but the version is not the same as the official '*bahasa*', developed since independence.

phrased it in his own way: '*Kalau kami tidak bergerak, nanti kami hilang*', 'If we do not resist, we shall disappear.'

During Lumumba's revolution in the Congo in 1960, the Papuan leaders hesitated to demand 'independence now' for fear of bringing chaos, but when the West African state of Guinea was liberated, Ben Tanggahma accepted the assistance of President Senghor of Senegal in establishing an office in Dakar. The independence of P.N.G. in 1975 induced the desire to become free and live '*seperti manusia lain*', 'as other human beings'. When the Dutch left New Guinea in 1962, a small number of Papuans also left. The most outspoken leaders — Marcus Kaisiepo, Nicolaas Jouwe and Herman Womsiwor — were among them; they had already become national figures. They still had particular influence in their native areas Biak and Jayapura, but other provinces were represented too: Fakfak by Ben Tanggahma, Biak by Dick Sarwom, Merauke by Jufuway. After some time they were even joined by F. Kirihio from the anti-Dutch Serui. The most prominent ones had been in the New Guinea Council and in the Dutch delegations that lobbied for support of the Luns plan in 1961, mainly among the so-called 'Brazzaville states' and some South American countries.

In the Netherlands, Marcus Kaisiepo kept up his relations with the '*Door de eeuwen trouw*' foundation, the Moluccan liberation movement, that was tacitly allowed by the Dutch to have its own government-in-exile, its military trappings in the form of guards of honour and even its own weapons (by *force majeure*). After the kidnappings and killings of Dutch civilians, even women and children, the Dutch may have repented of their tolerance of the Moluccan cause, but it is not surprising that the Papuans too have their government-in-exile, with Marcus Kaisiepo as President and Jouwe's flag openly displayed at gatherings and fund-raising meetings in the Netherlands. But mainly under Jouwe's guidance, the Papuans took a different line of action from the South Moluccans. Their numbers were much smaller, but they certainly showed vision in organising their support. Despite or thanks to differences of opinion, there are at least three centres of action: Jouwe continued to keep up a pro-Western international lobby, Kaisiepo still maintained close ties with the South Moluccans, and young Tanggahma took the road of neo-Marxist resistance: he set up the bureau in Senegal and later one in Sweden, and his are the closest ties with the liberation movement in West

Irian. The groups are splintered and badly co-ordinated, but they are also imaginative and daring. As could have been expected, they have established a link with P.N.G., and it is easy to recognise some external influence in the guerrilla tactics of the Free Papua Movement.

The Indonesians, unable to conceal the unrest, destruction and kidnappings that are taking place in West Irian, try to explain it all away by emphasising the tribalism and backwardness of the country, but it is clear that the sufferings of the Papuans have made them at least passive co-operators in a national liberation movement which is co-ordinated from outside; and which, clumsily organised though it may be, is of international allure, both near the border and abroad. It therefore cannot be treated lightly, nor can it be fought by military force or by propaganda.

So the time-bomb, left by the Dutch after the transfer of sovereignty in 1962 and handed over in 1963 by the UNTEA, was not defused by the Act of Free Choice in 1969. On the contrary, it continues to tick because of Indonesia's inability to bring a just rule that integrates the Papuans, who have sensed the feeling of freedom, into the economic and cultural development of the world's most backward territory.

Like the Japanese in the Second World War, the Indonesians are guarding the enclaves of development by surrounding them with military divisions and Indonesian migrants, but they still feel themselves in occupied territory. This situation was possibly foreseen by President Kennedy, who forced it upon the Dutch to prevent President Sukarno driving Indonesia into the Communist camp. But, not for the first time, the United States acquired the support of an unjust régime, and it underestimated two consequences: Australia set up a weak independent state in P.N.G. to safeguard its borders, and at the same time the resistance of the Papuans in West New Guinea became a threat to those same borders. So a dangerous compromise has given birth to greater dangers still.

Of the following chapters the first is devoted to Indonesia to demonstrate that the expansionism did not depend on the appearance of a charismatic leader in Sukarno, but on the nature of the Javanese situation. So the annexation of New Guinea had the same logic as the take-over of East Timor during the presidency of General Suharto. And when the process of removing him—in the same silent manner as President

Sukarno was removed by the action of the Golden Spear (*Lembang Emas*) — has been completed, then the possibility of North Borneo (or any other territory) being taken over is as real as it was in the days of confrontation with Malaysia. Chapter 2 however seeks to explain that New Guinea is a land in its own right, occupied by the Negrito-Melanesians (the woolly-haired Papuans who invaded the island in different waves at least 25,000 years ago). How it has been moulded in different ways, by different colonial policies in the western and eastern parts, is described in Chapter 3. The colonial powers, in their turn, had their own ways of approaching the indigenous people, in the west (Chapter 4) and in the east (Chapter 6), but both sought to move, at different speeds and urged by different motives, towards self-determination, i.e. independence. This did not come off in the western part (Chapter 5), which was left to be handed over by a United Nations authority, the UNTEA, to become West Irian (Chapter 7). Then in Chapters 8 and 9 we compare the western part Irian Jaya, ruled by the new overlord, and the eastern part, independent but still under influence of the old colonial ruler, Australia.

1

INDONESIA AND WEST IRIAN

The all-dominating actor on the West Irian scene is of course the Indonesian nation. Although, seemingly, President Sukarno was the decisive factor in Irian's recent history it becomes more and more clear that events did not depend on the whim or will of a single person. On the contrary Indonesia's take-over of East Timor under the rule of its second President, General Suharto, is a sure sign that the President is only at the top of a wave that has a very deep undercurrent, which is visible in Indonesia's past and predictable in its future.

But other nations besides Indonesia played a role too: Australia, the most important neighbouring state and its dependency Papua New Guinea; the United States and, at least in the 1950s, its cherished organisation the United Nations; and other actors, some of them of increasing importance. The weight of the South-East Asian, Communist-oriented nations became increasingly evidence in the East Timor conflict, which has not yet reached its conclusion. And in the background are still the European states and Japan, which try to preserve Indonesia's resources for the Western sphere of influence. Among these is the Netherlands, which regained a place in the Indonesian scene because of its traditional ties, its cultural agreement and religious involvement, its multinational commercial and industrial interests, and its world orientation in development aid.

So the situation in West Irian cannot be understood without an analysis of Indonesia before and after it acquired New Guinea. And it is impossible to analyse Indonesia without making a comparison between the old empire of Mojopahit, which reckoned New Guinea as its adherent, and the new nation-state, consisting of different streams that have so little affinity with New Guinea, yet led on ineluctably to its final conquest and confinement in the huge archipelago.

It seems that the transfer of sovereignty over New Guinea was the ultimate goal of Indonesia, and in particular of President Sukarno, from the very beginning. Over and over again Sukarno repeated the old Dutch slogan indicating the unity of the Netherlands East Indies: '*Van Sabang tot Merauke*'. Sabang is a

town in the north of Sumatra, where the rebellious Aceh people fought tenaciously for their freedom, and Merauke is the most southerly town on the eastern border with Papua, an outpost of the huge archipelago, where political prisoners used to be held in isolation. But when Sukarno made his historic speech of 1 June 1945, when he developed the philosophy of *Pancasila*, the territory of the future Indonesia had not yet been defined; there was strong disagreement among the sixty-four Indonesians who, stimulated by Japan, had taken the initiative for independence. A clear majority of thirty-nine, which included Sukarno, were of the opinion that the new nation-state of Indonesia should be co-terminous with the old empire of Mojopahit. This empire which originated from the agricultural state of East Java, with a gateway to the sea where Surabaya is today, included Makasar, North Borneo, New Guinea and all the surrounding territory, which in Sukarno's time was called Greater Indonesia. Only a minority of nineteen people stuck to the limits of the Dutch East Indies and a mere six wanted Malacca included but New Guinea excluded. From these numbers it is clear that not all saw New Guinea as an intrinsic part of Indonesia. And it is a fact that in the famous proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945 the territory was defined as stretching 'from Aceh to Ambon', a slogan that excluded New Guinea or West Irian.

So the first proclamation was not decisive for the tiresome process that ultimately ended in the transfer of New Guinea, but also caused a policy of confrontation with Malaysia. Even the *anschluss* of East Timor in 1977 under President Suharto can be seen as a result of the idea of Greater Indonesia, which is the more remarkable because Timor Timur (East Timor) was part of a different colonial system — the Portuguese. The confrontation policy against Malaysia was not directed only against the old foe Malacca, but aimed at parts of North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei, possessions of the old British empire.

It is even a question whether the fight over New Guinea also included Papua New Guinea, because the old empire of Mojopahit had no definite borders. It was strikingly similar to the colonial empires of Europe, rather loosely confederated spheres of influence, based on contracts rather than on armed domination. So the basis for President Sukarno's demands was not exactly the proud memory of an ancient empire, but the dream of a powerful South-East Asian state, on a par with other

great nations. It is a statesman's dream and in its essence was very similar to Sukarno's concept of the United Nations — the 'family of nations', as he put it. That family of nations is based again on the construction of the Javanese *desa*,* where consensus (*mupakat*) is reached by a process of discussion (*mushawara*); a peaceful community, where people help each other (*gotong royong*) under the guidance of a 'just prince'.

The 'just prince' is undoubtedly Hero Chokro, the raja of Kediri in East Java, from whom Sukarno's father was descended. Can one say that the Javanese type of democracy is in essence an aristocracy? Apparently Hero Chokro was more than a secular leader, and there is little doubt that Sukarno's reign was compared to his. Sukarno's easy way with women was not only approved of by Islamic law, but Hindu Javanese kings could 'dispose of every woman as they liked'. Sukarno's fondness for building monuments was something that was expected of the man who personified the greatness of the Indonesian nation. He was the President for life, and nobody else, not even the rector of a university, was allowed to have the title of 'president'. Sukarno was solemnly accorded the titles '*Waliyyul amri*', messenger of Allah and '*Sesupub Agung*', the Grand Old Man, and '*Bapa Indonesia*', the father of Indonesia. Hence the Indonesian people and their President were one in a sacred union; Sukarno was Indonesia and as such he was almost super-human, an incarnation of Vishnu. He had to fight the evil colonialism in West Irian and after that the neo-colonialism of Britain in the Federation of Malaysia. After all, during the reign of Mojopahit the Strait of Malacca belonged to Java. If Malacca were to become Indonesian again, then Indonesia would become self-sufficient, '*berdikari*'. And the age of Mojopahit would have returned. Indonesia was substituted for Mojopahit, and Jakarta for Jogjakarta or Kediri.

When President Sukarno started his rallying of the new emerging nations and made Jakarta into a centre for the Third World's struggle for emancipation, basically he was proposing

*The Javanese *desa* is not comparable to the *kampung* elsewhere, if only because the *desa* is the centre of a rice-growing community, where for instance irrigation has always been a matter for close co-operation. A *desa* requires a certain hierarchy, unknown in any New Guinean village. However it is possible to appreciate the concept of the *desa* as an organisation of almost cosmic order. This is exactly as President Sukarno saw it: as a sublime combination of countervailing powers.

a revival of the old Javanese ideal of a community where people work together in harmony under the guidance of the just prince. The fact that Sukarno saw himself as personifying the just prince (at least in Indonesia he was accepted as such) not only explains his attitude in national and international affairs, but it also explains why he fought the old colonial enemies with such tenacity and why he could so easily switch to the friendly attitude which was also his trade-mark. Sukarno's enmity towards the Netherlands ceased at the moment when the Dutch dominance over Indonesia also ceased.

The concept of the Javanese *dessa* to build first an empire and then the family of nations, and to promote the unity of new emerging states, was flying too high. It fitted the aggressive nationalism of the first years after the 1945 revolution, but then it gradually lost its grip. After all President Sukarno moulded the idea to his liking, when it did not suit him as it was. In the process of negotiations with the Dutch in the years 1945-9, the nation-state was thought of as a confederation of states, a construction very attractive not only to leaders of the outlying provinces (*de Buitengewesten*), such as Sultan Hamid II of Pontianak, but also to prominent revolutionaries like Sutan Shahrir and Mohammed Hatta from Sumatra. The balance of power, so typical of harmonious communities, was built up within the federal structure; and the Republic of United Indonesia, the *Republik Indonesia Serikat* (R.I.S.), was again embedded in a united kingdom of the Netherlands in the same way as the Dutch West Indies were united with the old colonial power. One of the first acts of President Sukarno after obtaining independence was to throw away the federation and build a centralised Indonesia with Jakarta as its centre. This automatically caused a break with the Netherlands whose idea the confederation had been. After all, the Netherlands had brought the archipelago to unity over a period lasting more than three centuries with a very complicated web of treaties, in a system of direct and indirect rule. The Aceh war, called a pacification war, was rather recently won, only half a century ago. And Fort de Cock, the fortification that dominated the sultanates of Central Sumatra, is no more than a century old.

So the colonial system of rule was not as rigidly unitary as one might superficially assume, nor was it built according to the adage '*Divide et impera*'. It was basically the result of a trade colonialism that had replaced Amsterdam as the home base for

the activities of the O.I.C. (Oost-Indische Compagnie) with Batavia. The latter became the heart of a national administrative power presiding over an archipelago, and ruled according to the '*batig saldo politiek*',* the policy of extracting profits from the country, made mainly by multi-nationals and plantations. These profits were used for the benefit of the home-country in Europe first, and after the First World War for the profit of the colony itself.

But President Sukarno did not follow the colonial Dutch example of founding an empire, but he re-established instead the old empire of Mojopahit with Java as its head, and Jogjakarta as a capital. There, in East Java, the real battle with the colonial power was fought, both militarily and politically. The second police action (*politioenele actie*), a euphemism for a belated colonial war, was a success for the Dutch; in a few days they captured both the capital and the leaders of the rebellion, but they did not succeed in stopping the guerrillas, so while in daylight the countryside was under Dutch rule, at night it was under the reign of nationalists or freedom fighters. Outside Indonesia, except in The Hague, Sukarno's revolution was considered to be the national uprising of a suppressed people, and the fifteen autonomous provinces that wanted to negotiate the conditions of independence were seen as puppets of the Netherlands. It was true however that the revolution, inspired by the Japanese and proclaimed on 17 August 1945, had a national character, if only because of the Sumatran leaders who took part. Sukarno always carefully picked a Sumatran as his second man, but essentially it was a revolution to establish a unitary state under the chairmanship of Java. Nobody afterwards contested the Javanese General Suharto's assumption of the presidency, and Hamengku Buwono,** the Sultan of Jocja more or less automatically became vice-president.

The aftermath of that ill-fated episode — the negotiations of the Round Table Conference in 1950, when New Guinea was excluded from the transfer — is still visible in the Netherlands, where 35,000 South Moluccans still cling to the promise of a Confederal Indonesia. By an irony of history Java had promoted

*Net profit. Under colonial rule the Netherlands East Indies were supposed to produce a profit, to be used first in the Netherlands, and later on in the Netherlands East Indies. Only after the Second World War did a consciousness develop that some sort of aid for the colonies was justified.

***Hamengku Buwono* means the navel, the centre of the earth.

the Ambonese folk hero Pattimura as the provincial freedom fighter against the Dutch colonial ruler; at the same time Pattimura* is the symbol of Ambonese activists in the Netherlands who fight the so-called neo-colonial rule of the central Indonesian government by trying to force the Dutch to put an end to development aid and to relinquish the chairmanship of the intergovernmental group for aid to Indonesia.

Sukarno's political victory after the military defeat of the second police action had a very special significance. It meant that the rebellious East Java became the representative and the voice of the whole of Indonesia. The 'flight forward' of Dr. Louis Beel,** who tried to exclude Java from a prominent role in the process of gaining independence by a speedy transfer of sovereignty to a confederal Indonesia, misfired because of international pressure to recognise Sukarno as the true representative of the Indonesian people and the declaration of 17 August 1945 as the basis for independence. So even the results of the Round Table Conference in 1950 were to be swept away in the course of the years; the unitary republic (R.I.) would take over from the federal R.I.S. and the exclusion of New Guinea from the transfer treaty would cause the break-up of the union between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

The main reason for the exclusion of New Guinea was remarkable. During the dispute in the years after the Round Table Conference, the Dutch emphasised more and more the difference between New Guinea and Indonesia. Historically it is true enough that New Guinea never was a part of Indonesia, and President Sukarno's claim that in ancient times the sultans of Ternate and Tidore had reigned over New Guinea is a very dubious one, because some of the rajas of the islands west of Sorong (the *Raja Ampat*, the four kings) were tributaries to

*Pattimura has become the symbol of resistance to any oppression; hence the coin has two sides, but there is little doubt that people remember how Pattimura died in the days of early colonialism — not so much to beat the foreigners as to defend Ambonese independence.

**Dr. L.J.M. Beel was Prime Minister of the Netherlands after the Second World War and subsequently became the first High Commissioner in Indonesia. He was in favour of the much-criticised second *Polititionele Actie*, a semi-military action to suppress the guerrillas in East Java and elsewhere. Because of international pressure he decided to outwit Sukarno's rebels by giving early and complete independence to federalists in Indonesia. Back in the Netherlands again, he became Vice-Chairman of the Council of State, of which the Queen is Chairman.

Ternate and Tidore. The sultans collected the tributes, which were given either voluntarily or involuntarily in *hong*i-raids, and slaves were certainly a major contribution. They went to the west as far as Manokwari, but the tribe of Biak, on the islands of Geelvink bay, * used to do the same to the east and so Biak has a certain right to claim parts of Indonesia. It is possible to see that some miscegenation has taken place on the Indonesian and New Guinea islands, but on the whole it is remarkable how Melanesian the New Guinea tribes are, even near the coast.

The Papuan languages and dialects, even in the Bird's Head, show a strong cohesion and a basic pattern with definite differences from the Austronesian languages. So the Indonesians had a very weak defence against this argument, but they stated also that their slogan 'Unity in variety' was applicable to the whole of Indonesia and it is certainly true that a multitude of races live together in the archipelago, where important sea routes meet. The Chinese, in particular, have invaded the islands and only very recently there was a disagreement with the People's Republic of China over 'foreign' Chinese and Indonesian-Chinese citizens.

Sukarno's argument that New Guinea was part and parcel of the Netherlands East Indies was much stronger, but as we have seen, when the revolution was proclaimed on 17 August 1945, a very strong minority did not wish to include New Guinea. Even as late as 1948, Mohammed Hatta, one of the fathers of the revolution, let it be known that New Guinea could be left out. On the other hand, the Dutch were hypocritical in playing the role of defenders of the poor backward Papuan, because it was only in 1898 and 1901 that the first government posts were established in Manokwari, Fakfak and Merauke under some pressure from Australia, which saw its region of Papua being invaded by Papuan raiders from the Dutch part. Even then, a huge sign had to be put up near the coast to make it clear that this territory belonged to the kingdom of the Netherlands, as a result of the 1884 Berlin conference, thus proving that the island was under effective rule. However, the flag used to follow the cross: missionaries—and they alone—had been active there for years, and they were... German. A more valid

* Geelvink bay is now called Cendrawasih bay. Geelvink was the Dutch captain who discovered the bay. *Cendrawasih* means bird of paradise, but in Dutch *geelvink* also means a bird.

argument for not transferring sovereignty was that the government of the East Indies wanted to reserve a place where Eurasian colonists could settle in a tropical environment after the transfer of sovereignty to the new Republic. Most of them had emigrated to their 'fatherland' in Europe, but the Netherlands at that time was not very keen on having still more immigrants from Indonesia; it had already had to absorb at least 200,000 who had been in Japanese camps or living inconspicuously in Indonesian villages; and these gradually showed increasing signs of 'being rooted in Indonesia', as the official term went. (After all the Dutch were themselves emigrating to Canada, New Zealand and to any country willing to accept them.) The argument against transfer that was given in the 1960s — self-determination for the Papuans — had not yet become valid in the late 1940s; the first governor who seriously carried out the policy, outlined in 1950, to realise self-determination, was Dr. J. van Baal, appointed in 1954. It was not the Department of Overseas Territories but the Dutch parliament that was behind this decision.

A number of influential people in the Netherlands, both in business and administration, who originated from the Netherlands East Indies had been very much against retaining New Guinea, while others wanted to retain it so as to have a last foothold in South-East Asia. The Bilderberg group (see page 3, above) lobbied for years for the transfer of New Guinea, because it was certainly not beneficial to Dutch commercial and industrial interests in Indonesia that it should remain sovereign Dutch territory. Only the churches (at least, the Catholic church*) had some interest in a Dutch-ruled New Guinea, because after all the missions were staffed by Dutch missionaries and the education system had a similar basis to that in the Netherlands. After the lessons of the Second World War it was clearly in the interest of the West to have a foothold in South

*The Catholic missionary church has a different strategy from the Dutch-oriented Protestant church. The former had already established an Indonesian Protestant church, and the New Guinea church was an affiliation of that Indonesian church. However, the Catholic church relied heavily on the Dutch missionary staff and is only now heading for a take-over by non-Dutch staff. This staff will certainly be Indonesian, because there are not yet any Papuan priests, only evangelists. The Papuanisation programme was slowed down by the take-over of sovereignty. Even at the office of the Bishop of Jayapura there is no Papuan administrator, nor even a Papuan labourer.

East Asia such as the international airport of Biak. But none of these interests was so overwhelming that the outcome of the Round Table Conference had to be endangered.

A new element was the *volte face* made by Australia in its attitude to Indonesia. After 1945, the Labour government of Dr. Evatt strongly endorsed the Indonesian revolution, but then after having established good relations with the new neighbour, the conservative government of Robert Menzies changed its course altogether and did not want an expansionist Indonesia next to their weak colony of Papua New Guinea. The main point, however, was that Australia changed its course and followed the lead of the Dutch in making self-determination the cornerstone of its policy. The weapon was so deadly because the United Nations had interfered in the New Guinea dispute from the first, and Indonesia had been defeated in the U.N. General Assembly over and over again. Although no ex-colonial country believed a word of the Dutch justification in terms of moral obligation to the Papuans, the Dutch with Dr. van Rooyen* as spokesman had defended their attitude in the debates on Indonesia's independence so brilliantly, and President Sukarno's measures after his defeats had been so draconian, that the plan of Dr. Luns, the long-serving Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, to internationalise the problem at least got the benefit of the doubt.

After all, the U.N. were the defenders of the rights of states and so the appeal to self-determination was a valid one. The Australians then followed the lead; a Dutch-Australian conference was held in Hollandia in 1960 to co-ordinate the development activities of the two governments. The different systems were more or less harmonised; the Dutch admired the Australian approach with a strong emphasis on exploiting the natural resources, and the Australians paid more attention than before to the political awakening and education of an élite which the Dutch had been promoting for several years.

So sovereignty over the Netherlands East Indies was transferred in two phases: in 1949 Indonesia was transferred and the

*Dr. J.H. van Rooyen, Netherlands ambassador in Washington, negotiated the agreement with Indonesia both in 1950 and in 1962. The day after the take-over of sovereignty by Indonesia, the most vehement opponent of the Netherlands, the Indonesian daily newspaper *Merdeka* wrote of him: 'As long as one freedom fighter is alive, the name of van Rooyen will be recalled in golden letters.'

New Guinea dispute was postponed; then in 1962 a settlement was reached over New Guinea and in 1969, by the carrying out of the Act of Free Choice, West Irian formally became part of Indonesia.

In the meantime President Sukarno abdicated in favour of General Suharto, who had planned his downfall. The situation in Indonesia had drastically changed. President Sukarno was regarded as a traitor and Suharto's government of law and order (*Orde Baru*) paid close attention to the neglected economy, which had reached an all-time inflation record in the last years of Sukarno's reign. Only in 1978, did a policy of revaluing President Sukarno slowly start to emerge, mostly as a counter-attack on President Suharto, who in spite of having restored the shaky economy could not put a stop to corruption and became contaminated himself. Indonesia's post-independence policy can be understood only if one analyses different streams, such as the undercurrent of different interests of the provinces — in the first place of course Sumatra, but also Borneo, Sulawesi and the Moluccas, and also West Irian and Timor.

The archipelago is still a fragmented unitary republic, and only the genius of Sukarno could bring it together and keep it together. One of his major traits was his capacity to be, as he called himself, the personification of his people. In Javanese fashion, he typified his policy in acronyms, which cannot possibly be wiped out. Indonesian unity and independence were based on the *Pansha sila* doctrine, the five rules that appealed to all Indonesians and went beautifully together with the policy of *Nasakom*: nationalism, religion and communism. Nationalism was meant to keep the different parts of the empire together and eventually to enlarge it according to the 'Greater Indonesia' concept. Religion in practice was Islam, although the Christian religion, both Catholic and Protestant, was held in high esteem. Islam had a highly political significance because of the difference between the *pesantren* — the orthodox, feudalist *santri* — and the *abangan* — the simple peasant, the worker on the red (*abang*) earth, who tended to be socialist or even communist.* Communism as an ideology was one of the dearest

*The Indonesian small farmers, mainly farming on *tanah abang*, reddish land, are naturally more inclined to a socialist or communist doctrine than are the adherents of Islam, the *pesantren*. This does not mean that they are not religious or adherents of Islam, but only that their social position is different from that of the more orthodox.

concepts of Sukarno; not the atheist doctrine, but the socialist, humanitarian ideal. It was also, politically, a highly sensitive concept, because the mighty Communist party—already founded in 1920 by the Amsterdam Communist Hendrik Sneevliet, banned by the Dutch in 1928, but revived and skilfully led by the Moscow-educated Aidit—kept the rightist military in check and *vice versa*. In any case President Sukarno displayed in *Nasakom* considerable brinkmanship in dealing with the main political forces.

These streams or *aliran* did not always have the same significance. The Communists, heavily protected by President Sukarno, became the ultimate cause of his downfall. Their *coup d'état* of 30 September 1967 misfired, and brought President Suharto to power. This triggered off killings on a scale unknown in Indonesia's history. General Edy Sarwo was responsible for inspiring civilians to kill civilians, and it is no secret that under the disguise of the Communist hunt many ordinary killings took place. The same man was later responsible for suppressing the Papuan resistance. President Sukarno, still a folk hero of mythical proportions, had two years' grace to distance himself from the Communist plot to overthrow the state, but he firmly refused to condemn the Communist movement. In his nine-point apology for what happened, he never admitted the truth.

The students of Jakarta were one of the main forces behind the change in leadership; they would again be the *aliran* who year after year, would accuse President Suharto and his wife Ibu Tien of corrupting the state of Indonesia. President Suharto however took the initiative in an anti-corruption drive, headed by Admiral Sudomo, but seemingly Sudomo was stopped repeatedly when he reached the top officials of the country. The Pertamina scandal, which could not pass unnoticed because there was a loss of some \$12 billion, was solved by replacing the men at the top, but one never has the impression that President Suharto is after the big fish.

So the inconspicuous President Suharto prevented the Communists from coming to power and restored order, fought inflation and invited Western capital and technocrats to invest in the country, but was not capable of keeping the military or his wife in hand. Even his skilful manoeuvring with elections and the free press could not give his government sufficient authority or trust to make Sukarno disappear from the memory of the Javanese people. So the main *aliran* in Indonesia—the

military, the provinces, the religious groups, the political parties and the students' emancipation movement — won. The youth have had differing importance under the different presidents, but in relation to each they have been a decisive factor.

The main destructive force in the state is without any doubt the confluence of different *aliran*, such as the one of 'provincialism, Communism and student protest'. There have been separate outbreaks of all three, such as the Malari movement in January 1975, when the students protested against corruption and mismanagement in government. This happened again in 1977 and 1978. The student movement is important in Jakarta for its numbers but in Bandung for its direction. Separatist movements were important and dangerous under Sukarno, as they have been also under Suharto; Sumatra and the north-east of Borneo have revolted many times, but the most recent struggles were influenced by Communism. The still continuing resistance in East Timor is a neo-Marxist movement strongly endorsed by Vietnamese Communism.

But the *aliran* of provincialism — the force to break away from Java and from Jakarta as the capital of a Javanese-dominated empire — cannot be analysed by reference to the adroitness of a President engaged in a balancing act. And the counterbalance to the confluence of different streams does not depend on a President only. The centrifugal forces can be counteracted only by a centripetal state-concept appealing to all subjects. In describing the necessity on the Indonesian side to take over West Irian, not only as the last remnant of the Dutch colonial empire but as a piece still missing from the utopian salvation-state, one meets the state-concept which not only was President Sukarno's cherished dream, but coincided with the old Malay Javanese ideal of harmony.

If Sukarno's state had been limited to the old Dutch empire, whether as expressed in the slogan 'From Sabang to Merauke' as is pretended, or in 'From Acheh to Ambon' according to the proclamation of 17 August 1945, then the take-over of East Timor would have taken place in a different way. It is true that President Suharto did not display the land hunger typical of an expansionist dictator, and not even an easy victory to smooth out some internal troubles was in his line of thought, yet the outcome was the same: despite a considerable loss of international prestige, Indonesia could not resist the opportunity to annex another piece of land into its unitary state structure. It

has been argued that East Timor was separated from Indonesia by three and a half centuries of different tradition and by a different *lingua franca*, and allegedly it had the wrong doctrine: it could become a focus of unrest in the Indonesian archipelago. But of course there was the inescapable fact that it fitted easily into the territorial structure (a fact for the East Irianese to remember). And Indonesia has a moral obligation to East Timor, as was aptly put by Samsi Abdullah, a senior Indonesian diplomat, in the *New York Times*: 'Indonesia has no territorial claim on Portuguese Timor (despite the fact that it is the heart of Indonesian territory) [...] The Portuguese exploited their colony thoroughly; there is nothing for Indonesia to "exploit"'. However, there is plenty for Indonesia to give to a people that is ethnically and culturally Indonesian. Indonesia will not take over Portuguese Timor but will accept integration, should the people of the area, democratically and without terrorists' guns pointed at their heads, choose this course.'*

A short enumeration of the main events makes clear in what a peculiar way the democratic process is seen according to the Indonesian, or rather Old Malay concept. There is always at one end the just prince, the authority who knows what is good for the people, and on the other hand the people, willing to be persuaded and eventually pressured in a process of *mushawarah*, till *mupakat* is reached in the opinion of the sacred leader.

It all started on 25 April 1974, when the old régime in Portugal was taken over by the socialist Junta of National Salvation, which made clear its firm intention of relinquishing all the country's colonial territories. Apart from the fact that a policy inspired by a doctrine that has had 450 years of continuous life is appalling, realism demands some kind of interregnum to prepare the way to the future status. At the beginning of 1975 two Timorese coalition parties separated and the break-up of this coalition opened up the opportunity for a Peoples Assembly in the capital of East Timor, Dili, in May 1976, sponsored by Indonesia, to request integration with Indonesia. It was the Apodeti party (*Associação para Integração de Timor na Indonésia*) that asked for 'an autonomous integration into the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with international law'.** The two other parties were Fretilin (*Frente*

**New York Times*, 11 January 1976.

**Manifesto of Apodeti. Dili, 27 May 1974.

Revolucionaria Social Democrata Timorese), which wanted independence, and the U.D.T. (*Uniao Democratica de Timor*), which wanted progressive autonomy under the Portuguese flag.

Apodeti was certainly not the most popular party; it was neither conservative nor radical, but it had at least one peculiar trait, namely that it wanted autonomy. Therefore the ingenuity of the party could be proved when it became apparent that the unitary Republic of Indonesia wanted full integration only, i.e. that East Timor should become a province of Indonesia. However, Apodeti did not cling to the demand for full autonomy, and in reaction to the more radical attitude of Fretilin, which set up 'revolutionary brigades' consisting mainly of students who promoted literary campaigns and agricultural co-operatives according to the familiar neo-Marxist concept, U.D.T. sided with Apodeti. At that time reports came in that people from East Timor were crossing the border into West Timor to evade harassment by Fretilin. Fighting broke out between Fretilin and others merged into the *Movimento Anti-Communist (M.A.C.)*. Fretilin by then was already so strong that it had set up a transitional administration and not only Adam Malik, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, but Abdul Razak, Malaysia's Prime Minister, also issued statements about the Communist danger threatening from East Timor. Indonesia took to armed intervention by bombarding Balibo, Bancan and Atabae on the East Timor coast from warships and by supporting the M.A.C. forces. The announcement of independence by Fretilin was rejected by Portugal, but accepted by Mozambique, Angola, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, China, Albania, Vietnam and others. Then Malik declared on 1 December 1975 that the decision 'lay on the field of battle'. To avoid legal difficulties, Indonesia stated that it could not withhold its volunteers from interfering in the anti-Communist struggle across the borders after the withdrawal of Portugal. Portugal again invited the U.N. Security Council to intervene on 6 December, and it met five times in the second week of December, and called for the withdrawal of the Indonesian troops. Malik acknowledged that Indonesian marines had landed, but he denied that he could withdraw the Indonesian volunteers. So in the first half of 1976 fighting continued; in the meantime Indonesia, together with M.A.C., installed the Provisional Government of East Timor and raised the red and white flag. Malik visited East Timor and declared that it could be integrated by a presidential decision,

a special session of the Indonesian parliament or a people's consultative assembly. 'Consultative' is here the best translation of *mushawarah*.

When on 31 May the Provisional Government called together the ambassadors of twenty-three countries in Jakarta and invited them to make a short trip to Dili, only seven accepted, the United States, Australia, Papua New Guinea and Singapore being among the absentees. But despite international disagreement President Suharto signed the bill incorporating East Timor on 17 July 1976. So Indonesia added a new province to its empire and introduced a new way of legalising this procedure: by *mushawarah*. But on East Timor the guerrillas still continued to fight.

The East Timor adventure has again increased the centripetal forces in the archipelago, and the tactics used have decreased Indonesia's credibility as a modern, democratic state. The United Nations—or at least the Security Council—proved again that it has no authority when it comes down to intervention in support of its own principles, such as self-determination.

2

A CONTINENT IN ITS OWN RIGHT

The dispute as to whether or not Indonesia had the right to become overlord of New Guinea focused mainly on the colonial aspects. After all it took place in the decades of decolonisation and the problem came to the fore at the United Nations, a platform for the new emerging nations.

But history is longer than the colonial period, and so underneath the political debate there was always (brought forward by the Netherlands) the separate past and peoples of New Guinea. The similarity of the eastern and western parts of the island and the singularity of the island as a whole have been stressed more often since the eastern part became independent. So there is ground for the hypothesis that in the long run these factors will outweigh the politics of the post-war period. If that is a possibility, then the historic past of New Guinea as a whole becomes highly relevant.

The largest island in the world after Greenland lies less than one degree south of the Equator between the 130th and 150th parallels; it stretches over fifteen hundred miles from west to east and has an area of 312,329 square miles. It can be seen as part of a discontinuous bridge between Asia and Australia, demonstrating a gradual change from Asian to Australian types of flora and fauna.

During the debates in the United Nations in the 1950s, the Dutch defended their withholding of New Guinea from the transfer of sovereignty over the Netherlands East Indies by pointing out that geologically New Guinea belongs to Australia, from which it is only separated by the Torres Strait. The deep Arafura sea demonstrates the cleavage between, on one site, the Sahaul shelf with New Guinea and Australia and, on the other, the Sunda shelf with Sumatra, Borneo and Java. Alfred Russell Wallace drew the famous biological line in accordance with this geographical difference: 'New Guinea, the entire Philippine Archipelago and all of the Indonesian islands to the West of Borneo and Bali share the distinction of being to the west of the limit for typically Asian zoological types as

drawn by Wallace.* Wallace drew the boundary indicating the median point between the eastern extension of Asian fauna types and the western extension of Australian types just west of Lombok and Celebes, but Weber to the west of Halmahera and Buru.

Most of New Guinea's flora resembles that of Indonesia east of Sulawesi; of its fauna it shares a wide range of marsupials and horny anteaters with Australia, but the birdlife, especially the many varieties of paradise birds, is characteristic of New Guinea itself. Nevertheless some elements in the western part show an Asian character, while there are other elements in the eastern part that have Australian traits; those can be explained away by the possibility that there was once a dry land connection and hence long-distance migration. Still, some questions remain. For instance how is miocene vegetation, which is typical of New Zealand where it originated some 20 million years ago, possible in the mountains of New Guinea? Also noteworthy is a different biological line, drawn by Ronald Good,** delineating the Torres Strait. Good and many others point out that the Torres Strait causes a floristic break and a disparity in biota. In his opinion, this floristic break proves that New Guinea and Australia do not belong together. Both had their origin in Antarctica, but they have drifted north along different routes and at different speeds. Originating from a continent that comprised New Zealand and South America, they went their own ways until from the north New Guinea clashed with the most northerly tip of Australia or rather the Merauke ridge. The Merauke ridge partly still clings to New Guinea, and being partly flooded, became the Torres Strait. Leon Croisart† supports this view of drifting continents but believes that the greater part of Melanesia has sunk, leaving only New Guinea's main northern cordillera sticking out and, well to south, young volcanic mountains have been pressed up out of the ocean. This variant of Good's theory explains the marine sediments on mountain tops of New Guinea and the presence of fish in the mountain lakes that are otherwise known only from the sea.

*R.W. van Bemmelen, *The Geology of Indonesia*, The Hague 1949, vol. 1A, p.4. Borneo and Celebes are now renamed, respectively, Kalimantan and Sulawesi.

**As mentioned in Peter Hastings (ed.), *Papua New Guinea*, Sydney 1971, p.36; see also Ross Robins, 'Plants, birds, animals' in Hastings, op. cit., p.23. †Op. cit., p.37.

Only part of the northern coast and the northern islands formed part of the original Melanesia. Both Wallace's line to the west and Good's line to the south explain why the biotas, including birds and land animals, of Halmaheira, the Aru and Sunda islands, and the islands in the Torres Strait and north of New Guinea have so much in common.

If man is included in the theory that New Guinea is a centre of evolution in its own right, then it appears that the cohesion of about 500 languages can be explained. Not so long ago one referred to these languages negatively because there seemed to be no cohesion among them. Now we know that they are part of one coherent system spreading from the central cordillera, and we recognise the connection between different languages that are spoken as far apart as the Bird's Head, the northern part of Halmaheira, Timor and the Aru islands. Some languages of the northern part of New Guinea have not yet been located, but it is assumed that some elements go back to an ancestor language spoken some 60,000 years ago. However, one assumes that the majority of Papuan languages have existed for roughly 10,000 years. About 150 languages in the New Guinea area are Austrasian, i.e. considered to be an offshoot of proto-Oceanic and of Indonesian languages. These languages are spoken on the islands near New Guinea and on the coasts and peninsulas such as Bomberai, the Bird's Head and Moroke, and even in the southern part of the Central Mountains. They are spoken also in Halmaheira, Timor and the Aru islands. The distribution of the Papuan languages shows that the Papuans have migrated from Halmaheira in the north-west to the south-east of New Guinea, but the migration stream seems to have been reversed near Huon and from there to have penetrated the Central Mountains; and later in the narrower parts of the island there was a spillover to the coasts and across the watersheds.

The theory of continental drift and the line of the floristic break and the Papuan languages can obviously be strengthened by other arguments. According to Kleiweg de Zwaan,* physical-anthropological surveys illustrate that 'the Papuan element gradually decreases from New Guinea to the more westerly-lying islands in the Indonesian Archipelago ... Lamars concludes that a blood type occurs in the eastern part of the Archipelago

*P.J. Kleiweg de Zwaan, *The Papuans of Dutch New Guinea — Antiquity and Survival*, The Hague 1956, p.322.

which forms, as it were, a link between the Australian and Malayan types.'

And there are also cultural anthropological traits that indicate a reciprocal influence between New Guinea and the western islands. The Karoon population of the Bird's Head and the Bomberai peninsula have an economy based not on shells but on *kain timur*, cloth from the eastern part of Indonesia (*Indonesia timur*) or even from Timor. Their language is partly Austronesian. The cloths are centuries old and have a sacral significance, since they are central in a number of ceremonies, and are stored in special secret houses. Tobacco and glass beads, which are parts of bridewealth, etc., are of clearly East Indonesian type, but they only prove that trade has existed between the interior and the coast. East Indonesian influence is also clearly visible in Mandewasi and Mansinam, where according to travellers' accounts, women have worn sarongs and *kabaya* for centuries. These phenomena are pointers to the close connection which has existed in trade and exchange since ancient times between New Guinea and islands that are supposed to have been parts of a Melanesian area, and which clearly differ from the Indonesian and Austronesian hemisphere. The small people of the Central Mountains area probably represent the most untouched type of this Melanesian race. Proof lies in language and culture, but mostly in the whole biota — which becomes clear only when the relationship between human beings and flora and fauna has been taken into account. Hence the pig-culture in the Central Mountains is the essence of the whole destiny, and Dani people without pigs are as inconceivable as Eskimos without fish.

If New Guinea is a continent of evolution in its own right, the Papuan is also a human being in his own right, capable of determining his identity.

It is clear that the unwritten history of the different parts of New Guinea — the islands, West Irian and Papua New Guinea — is the same. There might be a difference between the Merauke ridge, the central cordillera, the northern mountains and the mountainous islands because of their origin, but the history of the Papuans is essentially the same: they have penetrated the island, have taken root in the centre and built up a culture *sui generis* until they spilled over the coastal plains of the big rivers, where in alliance with diseases and physical inaccessibility

they have prevented migrants from intruding into their territory.

Some elements of material culture have been found — as for instance in 1955 by Dr. Klaas Galis near Lake Sentani, a desalinated arm of the ocean. Bronze axes had been left there by Indonesian or Polynesian, or even Chinese seafarers and traders, because for centuries some trade contact must have been established. After all, New Guinea's singular biota and its exotic animals, birds and people must have attracted some trade. The sultans of Ternate and Tidore exacted a tribute mainly of slaves and birds of paradise, but in general one can say that contact has been very rare. Apparently the interior was so isolated and trade so secretive that shells, which are very common near the coast, play the role of ceremonial money in the mountains.

The name of the island from the beginning has been Irian, which was used by the Portuguese governor of the Moluccas in 1536, clearly in a derogatory reference to the fuzzy hair of the Papuans, but then in 1545 governor de Retes uses the name Nueva Guinea, indicating the similarity to black Guinea on the West coast of Africa.

The first Europeans to pass the island were the Portuguese d'Abreu and Serrano in 1511, but then the Portuguese, firmly rooted in the Moluccas to obtain the monopoly of spices, never cared for Nueva Guinea, and they were later chased out of East Indonesia by the Dutch governor-general Jan Pietersz. Coen, who claimed the right of overlordship, *suzereiniteit*, in 1660 when the island was nominally under the jurisdiction of the sultan of Tidore.

The Dutch East India Company tried to regulate the vassal relations of Tidore by defining the domains of the sultans of Tidore, Ternate and Batchan. The text of the treaty says:

The lands which would belong to each of the three kings, were specifically distributed ... under the king of Tidore (various areas on the nearby island of Halmaheira) ... so also with the Papuans or all of their islands. By this contract the Papuan islands in general were placed under the king of Tidore without being specifically enumerated but on this question it is noted by the Government in a letter of 15 January 1671, that the Papuans begin with the corner of Onin westward along the land, further that the chief islands consist of Waigamo, Salawati, Batanta, Masowal or Misool, Wigoe or Poelo Wardjoe.

Haga* comments:

We know that the Netherlanders at that time from their own observations knew nothing or almost nothing... of the Papuan islands. Actually, therefore, they did not know what territory it was that they placed under Tidore nor on what grounds Tidore's right stood...

Robert Bone** remarks:

For the East India Company New Guinea's sole function was that of serving as a barrier against unwanted intrusions into the jealously-guarded Dutch preserve of the Moluccan Spice Islands. And within the sea area of Western New Guinea and the Moluccas the Company was equally concerned with the maintenance of peace and order for the profitable transaction of its business affairs. Yet, like all commercial concerns with stockholders anxiously awaiting their annual dividends, it was confronted with the problem of achieving the maximum results at the minimum cost. Both in connection with the utilization of New Guinea as a barrier against intrusion by other European powers into the Indies and the curbing of piracy in the Moluccas, the Company found a useful instrument in the new vassal state of Tidore. And the second of these efforts to make use of Tidorese services, seems to have flowed logically from the first. For the chief bases of the pirates which infested the archipelago were precisely those same 'Papuan islands in general' which had been assigned to Tidore under the treaty of 1660. Indeed, clause seven of that same treaty stipulated that '... the King of Tidore pledges, in [the interest of] doing good, that his dependent Papuans in every respect will definitely be restrained in their raids on the lands and peoples of Ternate or of the dependencies of the Honourable Company'. Consistently refusing to learn from disillusioning experience, first the Company and then the Netherlands Indies Government for almost two centuries incorporated variants of this clause in treaty after treaty with Tidore.

So here it is stated that the seafaring Papuans from Biak certainly went to the west, just as the East Indonesians sailed east, and the Islamic religion had penetrated some of the coastal areas and islands of the western tip of New Guinea, but the contact cannot possibly have been very intensive, although it was certainly not a period of warfare and *hongi*-raids only. The interest

*A. Haga, *Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinea en de Papoesche eilanden, Historische Bijdragen 1500-1883*, Batavia/Den Haag 1884.

**Robert C. Bone, Jr., *The dynamics of the Western New Guinea Problem*, Ithaca (N.Y.) 1958, p.12.

in the seventeenth century of the sea captains Carstensz, Tasman and Dampier was only in passing the huge island in the course of their search for gold and trade in the 'Southland'. Carstensz noticed the snowy top of a mountain 30 miles inland from the south coast, and this was named after him.

Not only the Dutch but the British also were very reluctant to settle permanently in the inhospitable country. In 1845 the British government denied Yule the right to take possession of even a part of the eastern half of the island and the same befell Captain Moresby; so, like Mount Carstensz, Port Moresby also got its name from a man who merely passed by. Even when the New Guinea Company was established in 1867 it collapsed for lack of interest on the part of the Colonial Office. In the western part of the island at Mandewasi in Doré bay, the British East Indies Company, the competitor of the Dutch East Indies Company tried in 1793 to establish a nutmeg plantation, for it was only the spice monopoly of the Dutch in that part of East Asia that was profitable, but the endeavour misfired.

Bone* comments:

For much the same reasons as had motivated the company in the eighteenth century, the Indies government also was reluctant to assume direct responsibility for a territory which seemed to offer such meagre possibilities. Hence, as in the previous century, the convenient fiction of Tidorese sovereignty was utilized as offering the most expedient and cheapest means of fore-stalling any annexionist ambitions by other European powers, above all England. And it was precisely such fears which led to the most significant actions taken in connection with the defining of sovereignty over New Guinea by Dutch authorities during the course of the nineteenth century. This was a secret proclamation by the Netherlands Indies Government in July, 1848, the effect of which was to lay claim to the whole of Western New Guinea from the 141st parallel in the name of the Sultan of Tidore and thus, in the customary indirect fashion, to include it within the boundaries of the Netherlands Indies. [...] The myth of Tidorese rule over the western half of the island furnished the basis for the boundary agreements of 1885 and 1910 with Great Britain and Germany which finally brought New Guinea into the power system of the modern world.

Dr. Galis:

Great Britain staked its claim on Eastern New Guinea with a notable lack of enthusiasm for the project, but London's hand was forced by

*Op. cit., p.16.

Australian fears (not unjustified) over Germany's intentions. Even at this early period, Australia — even before it had ceased to be a geographical expression and become a nation — was acutely sensitive as to what power was in the possession of New Guinea — or any portion thereof.*

Religion has shown more eagerness, because it cared about people, or at least their souls. In 1855 German missionaries founded a post on Mansinam, a very small island in Doré bay near Manokwari, but despite their heroic efforts, there was very little result. At a certain moment the number of dead on the side of the missionaries was higher than the number of converts — who were not even members of the Manokwari tribe, an offshoot of the Biak people, but people from the mountains, possibly slaves of the coastal people. A few years earlier, in 1849, French Marist missionaries established a post in the eastern part on Woodlark island, and in 1855 two Italians also tried in vain. The Christian faith has only very slowly penetrated the island, but there has been no old religion — Hinduism, Buddhism or Islam — blocking the way. It has mainly been Catholicism and Protestantism in a fierce mutual struggle for dominance, and in the western part even a gentleman's agreement was needed to draw a line between the competing Christian religions. Apparently religion has been part of the trading relations that penetrated the island, since the Papuan saying 'No tembaco, no halleluyah' has acquired a kind of fame.

The only nation that really tried to colonise New Guinea was Germany, which never succeeded in becoming a significant colonial power. German whalers and hunters of birds of paradise were active in the Torres Strait and they traded with New Ireland, New Britain, New Hanover, the Loyalty islands and the Solomon islands. The first genuine settlement was established in 1873 on the Gazelle peninsula by the German firm Johann Caesar Godefroy. Others followed in New Britain, which caused uneasiness on the part of the Australians, who already felt threatened by tentative settlements by Russians and even Japanese. In Germany pressure was building up to annex the northern part of New Guinea. In the western part, where

*K.W. Galis, *Geschiedenis, Nieuw Guinea Studien I*, The Hague 1957, p.23-4.

the Dutch were building the political entity of the Netherlands East Indies, New Guinea was still economically an unattractive province; in the south the presence of Australia was too near, but the north, where whalers tracked inward along the enormous rivers starting from their homebase on New Britain, was a German hunting ground and, following the British New Guinea Company, the Deutsche Neu Guinea Kompagnie was established. This alerted the British, who safeguarded the southern part by proclaiming it a British protectorate, the Territory of Papua. The British flag was raised in Port Moresby on 23 October 1884, and on 5 November Commodore J.E. Erskine visited Port Moresby with H.M.S. *Nelson* to emphasise the point. Three days earlier the Germans hoisted their flag in New Britain, with their battleship *Elisabeth* lying off-shore.

In that year, 1884, the Berlin conference imposed rules of some sort on the assignment of other people's territories in a shaping process that was to last far beyond the process of decolonisation. The end of the nineteenth century saw the final colonisation of the world, the twentieth century saw decolonisation; will the next century see the reshaping of the world in manageable units? Anyway, in 1884 New Guinea acquired artificial boundaries as rigid as the Berlin Wall but they were to show only some decades later. In the process of possession-taking, the Netherlands understandably lagged behind: there was no threat whatever to the Moluccas, the safest province of the East Indies with the South Moluccans or Ambonese the most trusted, most Protestant pacification forces; there had been no claim to their sovereignty since Raffles had left Java and started to build Singapore. Until 1898 the Dutch had not even sent district officers to Manokwari and Fakfak, and only in 1902 was a post established in Merauke in the south, because Australia felt threatened by raids of Papuans from the western border. In 1910 there followed Hollandia on Humboldt bay, as a warning to the Germans.

Modest as the settlements were they were still of historic significance. In the northern part the Germans founded Finschhafen, Stefansort (1892) and Wilhelm Friedrichshafen (1897). The British protectorate of Papua became in 1888 a British Crown colony called British New Guinea, and the governor William MacGregor was responsible to the Crown via the government of Queensland. It had a budget of £15,000,

supported by Queensland, Victoria and New South Wales. Then in 1906 it became Australian territory under the lieutenant governor Hubert Murray, the one and only Australian colonial governor, who was to remain in charge till 1940. At about the same time the German *Kaiserreich* became overlord of the northern part, where the German Trading Company incurred the tremendous loss of 4 million marks. Rudolf von Benningen became the first governor in 1898, founding Rabaul in 1910, and was succeeded by Dr. Albert Hahl. At the outbreak of the First World War, the Australians took over by occupying Kokopo; it was a mandated territory till 1921.

In 1942 the Japanese invaded the territory till they were stopped near Kokoda. The tables were turned with the arrival of the Allies in their island-hopping to Japan. A number of islands off the north coast became stepping stones for the Allied forces and even though the occupation of Japan was a very thorough affair, it was the liberation by the well-equipped American military and then the civil government of Angau for the eastern part and Nica for the western half of the island that introduced a new era. This was to end for one part in independence and for the other in subjection.

3

THE DIFFERENT COLONIAL POLICIES

The similarity of the two parts of New Guinea at the point when they emerge out of the darkness of unwritten history is striking, but this was no longer true when they met the daybreak of modern times after the Second World War. The colonial system affected the different parts in different ways, not because the systems were so different, but because things happen at different phases in history and the eastern part was behind the western part politically.

But even in the independent country, which was fortunately able to exert the right of self-determination and could build up its own identity, shielded by its former overlord Australia, the fact that the northern and southern parts had had different colonial backgrounds was still an impediment to progress. The difference between the mandated territory and the territory of the crown colony is clearly visible, and it is strange to see how Papua the former crown colony, the country governed for a single long stretch of time (1906-40) by a single mildly paternalistic governor who really cared about the people, was at a disadvantage.

The motives behind colonisation are simple: the developed countries look for more trade, for markets and resources, and as a rule end up with sovereignty over territories. These territories are searching for their own identity in the building of nation-states, and often remain fragmented in the struggle between the forces competing for possession. Southern European and Western European colonialism had a different smell in so far as the early colonialism of Portugal and Spain had the official seal of the Pope to bring the true faith to the exploitable territories, and it had a more thorough way of fraternising with the subjugated peoples; but on the whole the main objectives were the same.

The early voyages of Francis Xavier in search of China left few traces of conversion activities in East Indonesia, and New Guinea was never touched by Christianity until the second half of the nineteenth century, three centuries after the island had been discovered and with it the fact that it lacked resources and

cultivated people. But then the missionaries had little or no relations with the colonial power, although they had an important function in opening up the country not only because of their own civilising activities but also because the flag follows the cross if it has nothing else to follow.

This happened in the 1850s in both parts of the island and it happened again a century later in 1955 when Governor van Baal reluctantly opened the Baliem valley 'Shangri La' where the American mission was to bring the good message. It is true that nothing valuable was expected except an anthropological or rather scientific hunting-ground, but even by the coast such hunting-grounds were still in abundance.

Western New Guinea had no function in the process of colonisation; but after the suppression of the Communist revolt of 1926-7 its leaders were rounded up and, as Wertheim* aptly put it: 'The government reacted to these disturbances by exiling over a thousand Indonesians to Boven-Digoel, a dreaded detention area in Western New Guinea. For the first time the Netherlands had a use for its colonial power over half of that huge island.'

But after the Second World War had involved the stepchild of the Netherlands Indies in world history, and colonialism in its materialistic form had disappeared under the disguise of paternalism, an impressive amount of money was spent on West New Guinea. The first administration posts were established in 1898 on a budget of 115,000 guilders but the New Guinea budget was 34 million guilders in 1950 and 142 million guilders in 1962. The budget for Papua New Guinea — the routine expenditure — was more or less the same. In 1959 the figures were: New Guinea 133 million and Papua New Guinea 121 million guilders, but a different policy was visible:

	<i>Netherlands New Guinea</i>	<i>Papua New Guinea</i>
	%	%
General affairs	6.2	5.2
Internal affairs	21.3	17.1
Finance	5.3	5.8
Health	11.5	18.6
Education	14.2	10.9
Economic affairs	9.5	12.0
Traffic, energy	17.9	14.7
Housing	14.1	15.7
	<hr/> 100.00	<hr/> 100.00


*W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesian society in transition*, The Hague/Bandung 1956, p.71.

We will come back to the differences in native policy in the two parts in a subsequent chapter, but it is evident that education received more emphasis in the western part, health in the eastern, internal affairs (expansion of the administration and traffic) in the west, economic affairs in the east.

The development policy was different, but actually one has to distinguish between the pre-war and the post-war situation. At the beginning of the century, in 1906, the so-called Military Exploration had given little proof of resources; only in 1935 had the *Nederlandsch Nieuw-Guinea maatschappij* (N.N.G.P.M.), an offshoot of Shell, started its oil-drilling activities in the Bird's Head; Sorong became the capital, providing labour for some 5,000 people, and production of crude oil reached 500,000 tons at its peak in 1956 valued at 30 million guilders, but thereafter the results gradually decreased and in total the production probably amounted to no more than a quarter of the investment. In 1960 the N.N.G.P.M. even gave back its exploitation permit, except for an area of 617,300 hectares near Klamono, where oil still trickled. So if there was negligence on the side of the Netherlands or rather the Netherlands East Indies, it can be explained by the lack of resources. Even the will for exploitation was absent; the New Guinea government permitted the Pacific Nickel Company to exploit the resources in Waigeo and the Cyclop Mountains near Hollandia (Jayapura) on 16 April 1962. But 'although a country may be poor in resources, it is entirely possible that in the future it may become rich as a result of the discovery of presently unknown resources or because new uses may be found for the known resources' * and, we would like to add with regard to the newly-exploited resources of crude oil in Irian, because new techniques of exploration and exploitation have been found and the prices of the resources have rocketed.

In the pre-war period, the economy of New Guinea was no more than a matter of collecting what nature offered; in the days of Tidore it was not much more than slaves and birds of paradise, even exported as far as the kingdom of Sriwijaya in South Sumatra and Mojopahit in East Java. But in the days of the indirect rule of the Dutch East India Company and the more direct rule of the Netherlands East Indies, most products were shipped to the ports of Sulawesi and Makasar, and although in

* Meyer, G.M., Baldwin, R.C., *Economic Development*, as cited by Bakker, New York 1963, p.292.



1, 2. Papuan men and women: traditional ways.






3, 4. Health and education under Dutch rule.






5. The Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, R.G. Casey, received by Governor Jan van Baal (in white jacket) on a visit to Netherlands New Guinea in the 1950s.

6. Trial of eight Indonesian infiltrators, 1953.





7. Inauguration of the New Guinea Council, 5 April 1961.

modest quantities, Chinese and Indonesian traders succeeded in extracting, as they do now, an immense variety of products: damar and copal (types of resin), crocodile skins, shells, dried fish, masoi, pala, nutmeg and mace. Some products have always been promoted in the line of tradition and from the time of the Dutch '*batig saldo*' policy of the nineteenth century: timber, cocoa, copra and sago. This modest way of promoting an economy oriented on local trade with Makasar through Indonesian traders in products that can be produced by the Papuans on a small scale according to the vision of the first post-war administrator Jan van Eechoud, was not inconsistent with overall Indonesian sovereignty.

Still, the results of an economic development policy based on agriculture and horticulture gradually increased, and by the end of the 1950s the prospects were such that on that basis the actual budget of some 150 million guilders annually could have been financed from New Guinea's own income in a few more years. The production of copra, nutmeg, timber, copal, etc., from 1956 to 1960 increased from 6,340 to 21,526 tons in volume, and that was only the beginning. Moreover a slipway was constructed to turn Manokwari into an important harbour in the South Pacific; a rice estate near Merauke would make New Guinea self-sufficient in rice production and a sawmill in Manokwari had sufficient capacity for a reforestation scheme in the Bird's Head, especially in the Kebar plain. Exporting to Japan and Singapore became more and more usual. As is mentioned elsewhere, communication was one of the main points in the infrastructural provisions, and coastal connections, both between the two parts of the island and the different towns, were good. The number of registered labourers, enrolled in the modern economic process had in 1962 increased nearly to 20,000, mainly in construction and government works. In the agricultural sector another 10,000 people were active in the market economy, and this number increased at a rate of about 1,000 per year. So on the whole it can be said that a policy of self-sufficiency in the 1950s proved viable, even though on a somewhat narrow economic base.

The situation in Papua, the Australian (before 1906 the British) part of the island, was not much better. Before exploitation, of course, exploration was needed, and as Governor Murray needed means to develop the aborigines, he was eager to find some. The German part of the island had had modest gold

rushes already, and after birds of paradise gold became the attraction that led men to penetrate into the jungle. Bad luck prevented the Australian prospectors from finding a single nugget of gold south of the artificial straight boundary between the two halves on the eastern part. Even though Murray would not accept that strange quirk of fate, and continued prospecting, his humanitarian rule never had the capitalistic luck of finding gold, copper or any resource whatever. It was the same in the western part, where the Dutch did the exploring and the Indonesians got the results.

In the western part the Dutch started their exploration at the beginning of the century with Colijn's military expedition traversing the Bird's Head. The famous Dayaks of Borneo were used as bearers, and the military, as nearly always in difficult undertakings in the Netherlands East Indies, were the Ambonese from the South Moluccas. But apart from this early activity, there was further exploration in the process of expanding civil government. Still, the main results came in well-known areas such as Waigeo and the Cyclops Mountains in 1956. The Ertberg in Mimika was already discovered in 1936.

As has already been stated, at the beginning of the century there were only four government posts, where a European district officer, the '*controleur*', was located. The sub-districts were manned by East Indonesian administrative personnel. West New Guinea as a whole was part of the *Residentie Oost-Indonesië** and it was District Commissioner, or Resident, A. Haga who collected reliable information about the population and about possibilities. The title *controleur* had a special meaning deriving from the early days of the plantation colonisation, when the government used to send out controllers to inspect the coffee plantations and make sure that the indentured aborigine labourers were being well treated.** In that sense of the word the only controlling still left concerned the educational activities of the missionary societies. And some check on the East Indonesian 'gurus' or teachers was necessary.

*As this institution gradually developed into a civil administration, the district officer was called *controleur*. In the Netherlands the Universities of Utrecht and Leiden and in Batavia the Bestuurschool had faculties of administrative law, where *controleurs* were trained. The same system was being developed in Hollandia at the end of the Dutch period.

** '*Residentie*' is a district, and '*resident*' is a commissioner. In Dutch '*residentie*' means the place where the authority resides.

Although the situation at the beginning of the century did not differ much from the neglect that typified the nineteenth century, at least there was more direct rule than when Tidore was overlord, a situation which legally came to an end in 1860, at least over south-west New Guinea. Differing from the English colonial system, at least in India, where a whole system of indirect rule had developed by means of treaties, the Dutch used two systems of rule, both direct and indirect. In Java, where sultans had ruled for centuries and Dutch sovereignty was based on contracts with sultans, rajas and the like, the best a central government could do was to place a European assistant alongside the Javanese local ruler. This system was also used in East Indonesia where the Resident of Amboina had to co-exist with the sultans of Ternate and Tidore. The Commissioner or Resident was head of the province, but he had to rely for direct rule on the local rulers, assisted by '*assistent-residenten*'. In 1902 Merauke was the first district to come under direct rule. In 1904, when the sultan of Tidore died, the central government considered the possibility of bringing New Guinea as a whole under direct rule, but only after the First World War in 1920 did this become a reality in *Residentie Nieuw-Guinea*. The first and last Resident was Lulofs; he committed suicide in Manokwari in 1923, and that was sufficient reason to bring New Guinea under the authority of the Resident of Amboina. This situation changed yet again when at the end of the Second World War the head of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (the 'Nica'), Van Eechoud, proclaimed himself '*Resident van Nieuw-Guinea*'. Although this was never disputed, he had no right to do so; nevertheless, in an unobtrusive way New Guinea acquired a status of administrative freedom as it never did before or after.

Till then New Guinea had been a good place for a detention camp and for the migration of a few thousand farmers from over-populated Java to the hinterland of flat, flooded Merauke to introduce rice growing. Only once or twice did a *controleur* volunteer to go there, such as Dr. Vic de Bruyn, who managed to stay in the hinterland of the newly-discovered Wissel lakes during the Second World War and was nicknamed 'the Jungle Pimpernel' by repeatedly eluding the Japanese, and Dr. Jan van Baal, the future governor, already at that time a renowned anthropologist who regarded the Papuans not only with an administrator's eye but also as a scientist and almost as a

fellow-human being. And maybe the best of all was the one-time police commander Jan van Eechoud, the self-proclaimed Resident, who escaped to Australia and returned secretly behind the invading Japanese forces. Besides Van Eechoud and De Bruyn, there was also an Indo-European named Kokkelink, who managed to stay hidden from the Japanese in the Bird's Head near Manokwari despite an unremitting hunt for him. The story of these Dutchmen demonstrates the near impossibility of penetrating the jungle without the co-operation of the local people. Large parts of the island were therefore not occupied at all. Similarly, the Japanese units were stopped near the Kokoda trail in the eastern part as much by nature as by force of arms.

Van Eechoud was dropped again in the Meer plain near the Mamberamo river at the moment when the Allied forces returned, island-hopping in leaps of 300 miles, and turning Biak and Hollandia into major war centres. He transmitted messages about the retreating Japanese forces, who were being harassed by the Papuans. Having joined the forces as a militarised head of the civil administration, he simply restored the *Residentie Nieuw-Guinea*, although until the day the Dutch left there was never a government decision restoring New Guinea as an autonomous part of the Netherlands East Indies. But remnants of the typical dual administrative system were continued, which was important since pacification, justice, education, etc., were intensified. Experiments in democratisation were going on and it made a difference in what context this took place. Direct rule was certainly much more beneficial to the Papuans, because it was better, for instance, to be dependent on a Dutch *controleur* acting as a judge, who was a consummate anthropologist as most were, than on a court, where the so-called 'native' assessors were in fact Indonesian administrative staff who despised the barbarous indigenous inhabitants. Anyway Van Eechoud's independent action as a Resident made New Guinea once again a separate case in the Netherlands Indies administration. More important still was his choice of a capital.

One result of the Allied strategy of island-hopping was that some places roughly 300 miles apart were taken while others were by-passed. Thus Hollandia and Biak in the western territory were main stations, where a tremendous quantity of war material was stockpiled, while the former capital Manokwari and the oil town Sorong on the westernmost tip of the island were simply by-passed. So history drew some new lines that

still have significance for the present West Irian.

Van Eechoud considered it useful to have an important city in the most easterly part of the island, because what the Resident feared most was not Indonesian interest but neglect. In his opinion New Guinea had always been 'the last wagon of the Indonesian train'. Batavia, the centre of the colonial administration, was a very great distance away and communications with points so far from the centre were scarce. It was not unusual in many ports of New Guinea for a K.P.M. steamer to lie in the roads no more often than twice a year. So the site of Hollandia on the impressive Humboldt bay and maybe the distance from Batavia made van Eechoud decide to exchange Manokwari for Hollandia as a capital. The moment that Manokwari was liberated in the mopping-up operations of the Allied forces, Hollandia was on the road to predominance in a New Guinea that would go its own way. Still it was not the intention of the former police chief to cut New Guinea loose from Indonesia. On the contrary, he was convinced that New Guinea had to be part of Indonesia and could not possibly be an autonomous entity. However, he, the police officer who had lived for years in the bush with Papuan subordinates and had experienced how they were discriminated against by Indonesians of low rank, defended the qualities of the Papuans, the *orang bodoh* and *binatang*.

Economically he was aware that New Guinea could not go much further than what he called a 'gathering economy', i.e. collecting the timber, resin, hides and fish that nature provided. He wanted to exploit the possibilities for agriculture and livestock rearing, but then it became very clear from his book *Vergeten aarde* (Forgotten country) that he had Indo-European settlers in mind to do the difficult job of pioneering. So he was a worthy representative of the Netherlands Indies development school, which outlined migration schemes for Javanese farmers who had run out of land and Indo-European settlers in search of a homeland. The first defender of the Papuans certainly did not propagate the slogan 'New Guinea for the Papuans', and even freedom fighters like Nicolaas Jouwe, one of his most cherished pupils, never had the idea of pushing the Indonesians out from New Guinea. On the contrary, New Guinea was considered to be part and parcel of the Netherlands East Indies, and if that attitude changed in the years 1945-50, part of the reason was envy on the side of the Indo-European upper stratum which was losing its status.

In the meantime, the arrival of the Allied forces and the return of the Dutch in the person of the 'Nica' officers under the energetic leadership of Van Eechoud made the Papuans aware of their identity. The landing itself, as is aptly described in Kamma's book *Koreri*, was seen as a return of Manggeren Manggundi and an apocalyptic redemption from the enemy, ushering in an era of happiness for the elected people, the Papuans. The black American soldiers, skilful pilots in impressive war planes, were tremendously popular. Papuans would pinch their skin or point to their woolly hair to make clear that they were very much the same. The easy association of white and black men together in the army made clear once and for all how well the different races could get on together. For this single reason only it may be that if the Americans had landed on the nearby island of Japen with its pro-Indonesian population, instead of on the competing island of Biak, the Papuans on Biak might have taken a mythological fancy to the whites in general. Even in the 1960s when these same Papuans felt threatened by an Indonesian take-over, they wrote letters to the American President. And I always had the impression that the Papuans regarded the Dutch as second-class Americans.

The merit of Van Eechoud consisted in more than giving New Guinea a capital that facilitated governmental care for a neglected part of the island; he also established a college for future native sub-district officers and collected pupils from all over the country, even from parts that were not considered to be even slightly civilised. In that first college he allowed a feeling of national identity to grow, which overcame tribal feelings. He earned himself the nickname '*Bapa Papua*', father of the Papuans, by which he is still remembered. He left New Guinea a rather disappointed man; in 1950, when New Guinea was excluded from the transfer of sovereignty and a governor had to be appointed, the first governor was Dr. L. van Waardenburg, a former Resident from the ranks of the Netherlands Indies civil service, capable but with no special interest in New Guinea.*

*Dr. L. van Waardenburg did not serve the usual term, because the Dutch parliament expected some crucial points of the '*Bewindsregeling Nieuw-Guinea*' of 1950 to be realised, such as representation of the Papuans in a national council. Civil servants from the Netherlands Indies Government had an excellent record in effective administration, but not especially in democratisation. Furthermore a policy of trial and error was requested in face of possible hostility in New Guinea, so even internationalisation proposals might not have been acceptable at an earlier time.

During his governorship the development of the island and the solution of the political problem were slowed down.

Van Waardenburg, a good commissioner from the liberal Indies school, most diplomatic in handling delicate matters of indirect rule, let things run their course, but because in New Guinea there was nothing but stagnation already, this approach was rather sterile. Only four years later when Dr. Jan van Baal, then a member of the Dutch parliament, vehemently and acidly criticised Dutch handling of New Guinea's development, the course was changed. Van Baal became governor and a three-year plan was drawn up to speed development in all senses, with the main emphasis on physical infrastructure and on a well-defined policy towards the Papuans. The weak point in his approach was the neglect of any economic initiative other than the traditional collecting economy. Hence the policy in Netherlands New Guinea was essentially different from development in the eastern half. Some economic enterprises incidentally made use of indentured labour, but very soon rather stringent limits were applied to the numbers, depending on village population sizes. Too easily the ore resources such as the copper ore in Mimika were supposed not to be exploitable.* A streak of narrow colonialism appeared when Van Baal maintained the name *Hollandia* for the capital and even labelled new quarters *Hollandia-binnen* and *Noordwijk*, possibly as an echo of disappearing names of that kind in the former Batavia, now Jakarta; more damaging was the decision to introduce Dutch as the *lingua franca* in the newly-discovered region of the Central Mountains. Till the day the Dutch left and afterwards it was a very strange experience to take a walk in the Stone Age environment of the Baliem valley and to be greeted by naked children wearing penis gourds, saying '*goeden morgen*'. But apart from that, education, medical care, small-scale horticulture, etc., were stimulated; blank spots on the map disappeared one after another, and district officers, doctors, policemen and missionaries patrolled the whole area in walking safaris which took weeks and sometimes even months.

*The so-called Cuba process, developed during the Second World War, was used to exploit low-grade copper resources (1%). The discovery of Mount Ertsberg dated back to 1936 and it was to be expected at that time that the idea of exploitation should be dropped; even in the 1960s the opening up of Tembagapura was a major undertaking. On the other hand, Van Baal was more interested in people than in the economy, in anthropology rather than administration.

In the mid-1950s the process of democratisation was stimulated. The nomination of an outstanding anthropologist as governor was a sure sign that the interest of the native people was receiving its proper attention. Although Van Baal did not return after the end of his first four-year term, partly because of classic differences of opinion between the administration in The Hague and the man in the field, the last governor, Platteel, inconspicuously but effectively steered the same course. But in his period of service the pace was speeded up and the burden of responsibility lay in The Hague. A special Secretary of State, Dr. Theo Bot, was appointed to the Minister of Internal Affairs, Dr. E. Toxopeus, and the Foreign Minister, Dr. Joseph Luns, decided that the best way to solve the New Guinea problem was by internationalising it.*

The eastern part of the island had seen the severe rule of the Germans and the milder touch of the British, followed by the paternalistic approach of the Australians, and then rather unexpectedly it found itself a free and independent state. The British régime was of a peculiar kind; it was an indirect colonialism, maintained by Britain as New Guinea's ultimate overlord in the interest of Australia, which consisted of British colonies in the true sense, i.e. settlements of British people. It was particularly in the interest of the colonies, later federated states, of Queensland, Victoria and New South Wales. It was merely by accident that the southern part of East New Guinea was not annexed as another state in the Australian federation. But for Captain Moresby, that would already have happened some years earlier, but Britain was not over-enthusiastic about adding another piece of territory to its abundantly large empire. But if it did not become a British colony through conquest by an adventurous pirate captain, it nearly did so by mistake. Britain's High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, Sir Arthur Gordon, who happened to be a friend of the Prime Minister W.E. Gladstone, had different views on the aborigines from those of the plantation owner-governor McIlwraith of Queensland, who

*The Foreign Minister was not strictly the author of the Luns plan, which was promoted in the late 1950s to internationalise the New Guinea problem. Dr. Theo Bot was its real author at a much earlier and more favourable time. In the early 1950s, when it was considered only a possibility, Australia was still very much in favour of the idea of self-determination for both the western and the eastern parts. On the other hand, one is justified in the suspicion that President Sukarno simply did not want to obtain West Irian by simple means.

recruited Papuans from the coast and aborigines in a way reminiscent of the slave-drivers of West Africa. Britain's conscience could not tolerate slavery or anything like it, and so H.H. Romilly, who inspected the coast as a representative of Gordon, to clean out British beachcombers, hoisted the Union Jack at Port Moresby on 23 October 1884, conscious of the fact that occupation had to be confirmed, and on 6 November Commodore Erskine officially took possession of the territory. Romilly probably expected to be promoted because of his interest in the well-being of the aborigines, but then he underestimated the detached British policy, which despised the Australian methods of labour recruitment but on the other hand did not want a clash with its partners in the Commonwealth and so appointed Peter Scratchley, a former engineer in Australian service, as the first governor. After his death and a short interregnum under Romilly, a former governor of Queensland, John Douglas, took Scratchley's place. This was a tactical move on the part of the British, but it broke a promise, made by Gordon to the aborigines at the time of the formal occupation, not to take away any land from the aborigines as the Germans had done. John Douglas was very keen on transferring land to white settlers. Only in 1888, when a Scottish doctor, MacGregor, became governor, was Gordon's policy realised. In 1898, however, he decided to sell land to the British New Guinea Syndicate, but he acted from necessity, being convinced that Australia had no intention whatever of supplying New Guinea with an acceptable budget. So he invited foreign capital, technical know-how and organisation to make use of the resources and potential of the country. This combination is at its most delicate when missionary bodies have big plantations to create an income apart from the people's contributions. It is a classic dilemma. MacGregor was not fully conscious of the implications of a native agriculture and a Western agriculture co-existing side by side, and the same was to be true of Governor Murray when he tried to combine the interests of white settlers and those of native farmers. This is possibly explained by his firm stand against intervention from the Colonial Office in internal New Guinea matters and also his aversion from the British colonial policy, but the question remains. MacGregor and Murray introduced a policy for Papua similar to that of the Dutch when they intensified their rule, with a particular emphasis on the interests of the natives, but because they

governed before the war, when budgets were thin, this approach was not in fact very beneficial to the population and even the safeguarding of its main asset, arable land, retarded development. Nevertheless Murray very hesitantly allowed foreigners to acquire land.

In German New Guinea this was totally different. German industry was permitted to own 400,000 hectares of land, but in general the rule was a lease of ninety-nine years. Papua and New Guinea were indeed both sparsely populated, but this land policy pushed Papuans out of favourable sites. The same happened in Western New Guinea, not so much in favour of industries, but in favour of Javanese and Indo-European migrants. Even then a Japanese cotton firm had a large plot of land near Ransiki a short distance from Manokwari. But in the west the German system was never followed, since no foreigner could own New Guinean land.

The German period of colonialism, which gradually imposed itself at the end of the nineteenth century but had already ended soon after the outbreak of the First World War, had more impact on the territory than the short period of actual rule would seem to justify. It became a 'C class' mandated territory in 1919 under the League of Nations, and this situation was formalised under the New Guinea Act of 1921. In practice this meant a civil administration by the Australians under Brig.-Gen. E.A. Wisdom, who continued the wartime military administration. Minority groups of Chinese and Japanese were not encouraged. The Chinese were an Asian group and the Japanese, although legally Europeans, were not welcome because Australia favoured a white policy. Expansionist Japan was not welcome at all. In the western half the Chinese were part of the population of the Netherlands Indies, and the number of people from the Asian mainland (mainly Chinese) was considerably higher. As has already been mentioned, the Japanese even had a huge cotton plantation on Doré bay and the immigration policy was totally different.

The Germans opened up Northern New Guinea from the islands, where they had copra plantations and founded towns. Bougainville is even part of the Solomon islands. After the first discovery of gold near Bulolo, the hunt for gold by Germans later picked up again, and they penetrated the territory as far as possible by boat. Because birds of paradise, crocodile skins and

labour were trade matters, conflicts could not be avoided and the government had to expand its influence: the flag followed trade. The search for souls penetrated the interior at the same time: the Neue Dettel Sau Lutheran mission was active, but it was a long time before it became to some extent Australian. In 1913, out of the total of 180 missionaries, 155 were German and their influence was very tangible, because the Australian administration used them as advisers in matters of justice and custom. In their opinion German rule was not unjust but it was hard: flogging was allowed if men refused three years' indentured labour on the plantations or did not show up on building sites or for road maintenance work. This kind of labour was considered to be a public duty of the same order as the payment of head tax. The same system was valid in Papua, but the Australians punished not by flogging, but by 'field punishment number one'; the difference, however, is not too clear. The Germans thought little of administering group punishment, and the Australians also were inclined to teach rebellious tribes 'one bloody good lesson'. It must be said both for the British and the Dutch, probably because of their tradition of indirect rule, that they were less rough than the Germans. On the other hand a punishment system consisting of fines and detention also has its disadvantages compared with customary law. Still there was a system of indirect rule by means of *kiaps* or district officers, who in turn used *tutul* (Papuan police constables) and *luluai* (chiefs) for assistance, but because these functionaries were in Australian service as policemen or administrative staff they were very dependent on the Australian administration. Under the sort of justice thus meted out, the Papuans have suffered severe injury; thus for instance extradition from their own local area was admitted as a punishment. In general one can say that the system of customary law mixed with Western law is a monstrosity. It is significant that out of seventy-seven laws; fifty-seven concerned the recruitment of labour, while the remaining twenty concerned customary matters (land, property, marriage festivities, etc.) in relation to economic expediency.

The main difference in the colonial systems lay in the treatment of the *kampung*, that vulnerable community. Dutch policy was careful only to permit labour recruitment of two young men per small *kampung*, but the Australian indenture system had, as Heather Radi notes, 'a minor component of native policy and a major component of

expediency'. 'Depopulation was a concrete phenomenon, readily observable, where other effects of contact were not.'

It has to be said that Hubert Murray clearly belonged to the British school of Governor Gordon, but then it is clear that no Gordon man was wanted for the northern territory. So the difference in systems comes down to the fact that Australia had an ambiguous attitude. The government of the southern part was remarkably disinterested; as Dr. Evatt remarked, 'Possession of dependencies should involve substantial economic interest by the metropolitan power.' In Papua that economic interest was for a long, long time practically nil. So Murray made a policy in his own right, even if it accorded with Gordon's type of native policy. The Australian grant-in-aid to Papua amounted in 1939 to \$90,000. Only when Australia showed interest did native policy change. Subsequently the grant-in-aid increased as follows:

	\$ million
1946-7	6.0
1951-2	10.5
1968-9	110.5

The last amount equals about two-thirds of the total public revenue. The importance of Australian influence can easily be read from the climbing scale of the grant-in-aid. The Murray policy was one with only limited possibilities.

The mandated territory was still ruled very much in the German tradition not only because of the tradition of empire-building (towns, roads) and economic interests, but because of the continued German presence in the persons of plantation-owners and missionaries. The Australian version of indentured labour was as harsh as the German version, and in the mixed economy the interest of the Australian settlers (ex-servicemen took over from German colonists) outweighed development of the native economy. But it is an irony of fate that a policy that treats resources as hardware and human beings as software in the end seems to benefit the people most; the economically advanced former German part of New Guinea had a more decisive effect in the move towards independence. Leaving aside the merits and demerits of colonial policies, the outbreak of the war was of decisive influence on the fate of Papua and New Guinea. When the war ended in 1945 an increasing tendency towards self-government and independence became visible.

Under the P.N.G. provisional administration act of 1945, the combined territories had between them one capital, one administrator, one supreme court and a united statehood. The act provided a legislative council consisting of representatives of several interest groups, but these changes were realised only because there had been a war. The outbreak of the war in Europe scarcely reverberated in the Pacific in 1939-40 as it had done in 1914 when the Germans were taken into custody and Australia became caretaker of the German colonies. A number of Australians had to go back to the metropolis to be conscripted in the armed forces, but that only caused a decrease of the administrative staff. But then in 1940 the Pacific Island Regiment was founded, which marked the beginning of a united Papua New Guinea, because members of the police of both territories were recruited for the Regiment. Even though the war period in P.N.G. lasted the relatively short time of four years, the event was as decisive as it was for West New Guinea. In January 1942 the Japanese took possession of New Guinea in a *blitzkrieg* reminiscent of the German tactics in Western Europe; first Rabaul and then the islands of New Britain and New Ireland were taken, and then they landed on the main island in Salamaua, Lae and Finschhafen. Port Moresby in the south was bombed on 3 February and in June there was a landing in Buna on the south coast.

Even though New Guinea was designated as the eighth military district of Australia, defences were very weak, with only one army battalion, two anti-aircraft guns and two coastal defence guns in Rabaul. In Port Moresby there were three Australian defence units on land, sea and in the air. The weakness in the air was especially obvious: there were a handful of outdated planes. Heavy fighting took place on the Kokoda trail, 32 miles from Port Moresby, but the counter-thrust was already under way, the Coral Sea battle took place on 6 May 1942 and the territory of Papua, still unoccupied, was transferred from Hubert Murray's nephew Leonard Murray to Major-General Morris. On 20 January 1943 the Japanese were beaten in Sanaanda in Papua by the Australian Seventh Division under Major-General Vasey. The Australians suffered heavy losses: casualties numbered 1,500 dead, 2,500 wounded and another 6,500 sick. During the action some members of Angau (the Australian New Guinea Administration Unit) who took an active part in the fighting, were killed. Angau had been

founded in 1942 under command of General Morris and Brig. D. Cleland. It became the umbrella for both Papua and New Guinea, and its staff at one point numbered about 2,000 men, a luxury compared to earlier years, when the Mandate and the Territory together had a staff that never exceeded 400. Their task, however, was now more complicated: administration, operations and production, all of equal importance. Operations was the most difficult task; forty-six men died in action, but then operations included fighting, espionage, reconnaissance, guiding and transport. Till today the Papuans are still remembered as the last resort for transporting wounded soldiers in the bush to field hospitals — the 'fuzzy wuzzy angels'.

Production included mainly copra and rubber, and in wartime it climbed as never before under the Production Control Board. In 1944 a few thousand Papuans were under contract; until the war the number had never exceeded 1,000. But of the most benefit to all was the system for guiding the struggle by the Allied Forces Directorate of Research under Colonel A.A. Conlon, who was responsible for the foundation of a college of administration in Canberra in 1945 (formalised in 1947 in the Australian School of Pacific Administration). So Australia got its first institute for overseas officials, even if not on an academic level as had been the case for decades in Britain, the Netherlands and even Belgium. But that was not all; the P.N.G. Provisional Administration Bill, introduced by E.J. Ward, had a significance for Papua New Guinea comparable to F.D. Roosevelt's New Deal in the United States. Declaring that in the past insufficient attention and money had been spent on the territories, Ward said when introducing his 1945 bill that the government planned expanded health and education schemes and the preparation of indigenes for participation in government. He conveyed the impression that such schemes would not now be dependent on local revenue. The system of indentured labour was to be abolished within five years, and in the meantime indentures would be limited to one year, immediate re-engagement would cease, repatriation of workers would be at employers' expense, sanctions would be reduced to fines (with imprisonment only for non-payment), an interim wage of \$1.50 per day would apply (twice the old Papuan rate and three times that paid in New Guinea), workers' rations would be improved, and hours would be reduced to forty-four a week (from fifty-five in New Guinea and fifty in Papua). On the

old issue of native versus expatriate rights, Ward said that 'in future the basis for the economy of the Territory will be native and European industry, with the limit of non-native expansion determined by the welfare of the natives generally'.

This policy was not very revolutionary, but it opened the door in time for closer co-operation between the different parts.

POLITICAL ACCELERATION IN WEST NEW GUINEA

In both parts of New Guinea the end of the Second World War marked a watershed. The Papuans in general became conscious of their own identity; in the eastern part P.N.G. became a unity, in the western half the territory broke loose from the old empire, and in both parts development began in the direction of autonomy. Meanwhile the old overlords were still there. One can say that the local rulers — the governors or 'Residents' — had their own say, mainly because of lack of interest and lack of sacrifice on the part of the motherland, but from 1950 onwards there was a totally different situation. In that year the political climate was changing: local interests became of less importance and external policy was exclusively in the hands of the colonial power. To begin with, the most important role on the Australian side belonged to the first Minister of Overseas Affairs, Paul Hasluck, passing later to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Percy Spender.

On the Dutch side, the part played by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Joseph Luns, was of great importance. In his person the conflict with President Sukarno was still very much alive. His anti-Indonesian attitude was reinforced by the Secretary for New Guinea, Dr. Theo Bot. Strangely, this Secretary of State belonged to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but he had been a member of the Netherlands civil service in Indonesia. Anyway, in cabinet meetings two important ministers, Dr. Luns from Foreign Affairs and Dr. Toxopeus from Internal Affairs, vigorously promoted a new policy for New Guinea which had been conceived in the early 1950s by Dr. Bot. This policy fitted into the design drawn for New Guinea's internal development and into the new pattern of world relations, with the emerging countries claiming their new right of self-determination. It only failed to fit in with Dutch self-interest in Indonesia.

It was not desirable that political consciousness in the two parts of the island should be communicated to the Papuans from the top downwards; ideally it should be done from the

bottom upwards, but that was impossible due to lack of time. This problem was most urgent in West New Guinea, because President Sukarno, as he admitted himself, was fanatical about New Guinea and his impatience regarding the unfinished revolution could only grow under the pressure of the poor economic performance of independent Indonesia. Inflation was rising at a tremendous rate, the rice situation was difficult, and the President simply had to look for a scapegoat, and as in the past the Netherlands fitted the bill perfectly.

Australia's Paul Hasluck was not in the least impatient; he had to follow the trends set in other parts of the world, but he was determined to follow a policy exactly opposite to that prevailing before 1950. Australia, which had so wholeheartedly supported the Sukarno revolution, decided to give the Netherlands all the support it needed to keep Indonesia away from Australia's shield against Asia. The support proposed even included military reinforcements, but the Dutch in 1950 were too empire-minded to accept that. In the years to come they would have to beg cap in hand for all the support and appropriate means they could get, and never more would there be a chance to receive military support. In a later phase, in 1962, the mighty United States for its part could only promise logistical assistance in case civilians had to be evacuated. By 1962 Australia had shifted its policy again in favour of Indonesia, as it is shifting now in favour of New Guinea.

The years between 1950 and 1962 form the most decisive period in the history of the Papuans. The process of nation-building had begun and its most successful aspect was regional democratisation. It is no co-incidence that in both parts of New Guinea the establishment of the regional councils was given preference over the national councils. Local councils were tried out in West New Guinea only, but without much success. On the one hand the population had its own traditional way of dealing with local problems, but on the other hand the central government would not allow the local councils to usurp the powers of district officers, because the country as a whole was still in the process of founding the *pax neerlandica*. The situation was such that some parts, mainly on the coastline, had been alphabetised for some generations but adjacent parts were still ungoverned. So Mimika, a central district of the south coast, had its own village councils in 1956 and the district officers had to prevent the local councils from also establishing their own

courts, but in the neighbouring Asmat area head-hunting and cannibalism were still in full swing. The difference could exist only because the Asmat area with its long, treacherous rivers had been a real obstacle to communication for any district officer or missionary. In primitive areas no contact is preferable to scarce contacts, and district officers were reared in the philosophy that no rule is better than a rule without sanction.

In Biak shortly after the Second World War, Dr. Vic de Bruyn, at that time a district officer there, had initiated the Biak council, the *Kankainkarkara*. But societies in New Guinea are so fragmented that in contrast to tribal organisations in Africa nature is an impediment to any larger organisation. Lack of communication proved to be as much a sociological problem as a technical handicap. So it can be said that notwithstanding the impossibility of indirect rule and the lack of experience on the side of the Papuans, the gamble of nation-building met with no problems from the Papuan population because of their consciousness of their own identity and desire for self-determination and autonomy or independence.

The *Kankainkarkara* was more than an experiment; it was a council ahead of its time. Dr. de Bruyn tried to restore the native village organisation — the *Mnoe* — and based upon that, by decree of the Resident of New Guinea (no. 418 dated 20 November 1947), he established a council consisting of twenty members, fifteen elected by local councils and five appointed by the district officer, who was chairman *ex officio*. In principle the council could administer justice, collect taxes and appoint its own constable, and the establishing of a co-operative or economic enterprise was not excluded. De Bruyn was convinced that the Biak *adat* (customary law) included basic democratic institutions; in practice, however, the only thing the council did was advise on matters submitted for judgment by the local government authority. It was more than ten years before the council could be formalised as a regional council, but it was significant that the Biak people took their identity seriously after the experience of Japanese occupation and American liberation. So, already at that time, did Dr. J.W.A. Kernkamp, the Minister of Overseas Affairs,* when questioned

*The title Minister of Overseas Affairs was used in 1952, but in the early 1950s the title for the old colonial office changed constantly, until the colonial problem was finally settled.

in Parliament in 1952 about the democratisation process in New Guinea. During that debate he pointed out that the New Guinea Council, foreseen in the decree arranging the status of New Guinea (*Besluit Bewindsregeling Nieuw-Guinea* 1949), could not be realised at that moment, but he made clear that the Netherlands government intended it to be realised later. Hence the councils, both national and regional, had an experimental status. It came down to the giving of advice when asked and it was composed mostly of appointed members, representing the Government, the missions, business and various groups of the population, a strange mixture of interest and race groups. The old principle of the colonial Netherlands Indies was clearly visible: in the state there was a division along race or colour lines. The right to vote and the right to stand for election were dependent on education and income. The first thing for Dr. van Baal to do when he took part in the debate as governor was to abolish that criterion. It is the irony of history that the abolition of that principal result of ages of colonialism at that moment is the main reason why Papuans cannot enjoy special status in Indonesia today. Van Baal also did away with the three regional councils, the reason being that the organisation of government according to regions — North, South and West New Guinea — was an artificial one. Unlike the *Kankainkarkara* of Biak, which was an area council, the regional councils did not cover natural units but organisational ones.

So Van Baal established provisional councils of a different type: they represented a so-called autonomous community, a town or an area. The most urbanised towns — Hollandia, Manokwari and Sorong-Doom — were considered to be such communities, as too was the area of Biak and Japen. They would be responsible for local affairs and have a say in budgetary matters at a local level. They were however not even partly responsible for the national government, for Van Baal was very much afraid that these institutions would become instruments of a centralised régime. All councils had a provisional and advisory status; their first duty was to advise on a concept of a definitive council, and it was very disappointing to see that each council advised that the tripartite division of the population in the political organisation should be maintained. In Manokwari it was even considered that *four* population groups existed: the Papuans made a tribal distinction between coastal and mountain people. The differences in numbers and education make

this understandable, but still they show how pluriform such an artificial colonial community is and the extent to which the majority — that is, the native people — are in fact a minority when criteria of education and income are decisive for the right to vote.

The break in events came when Van Baal launched his own ideas, mainly regarding the New Guinea Council, in opposition to the tentative arrangements of the *Bewindsregeling Nieuw-Guinea 1949* which in essence were based on the *Surinaamse staatsregeling*.^{*} Here it became clear how badly the centralised colonial arrangements of a totally different country fitted the particular circumstances of New Guinea, the backward situation of which made an easy scapegoat for an omission that went much deeper. Governor van Waardenburg, a good administrator in the colonial Netherlands Indies, argued — with the support of the district commissioners of the same school — that New Guinea was not fit for such a modern legislation, and with the utmost understanding ex-Netherlands Indies officials in The Hague complied with his objections. However, Van Baal, more an anthropologist than a colonial officer, stuck to a different concept and so it took nearly seven valuable years before an appropriate concept could be found. It needed first the so-called Lemaire commission and even then the process of construction was long and tedious. Thus it was that only on 4 April 1961, under the governorship of Dr. Platteel and on the very eve of the ending of Dutch rule, was the New Guinea Council realised. This was the most important event in New Guinea's history, for the western and perhaps also for the eastern part. Later, under Indonesian rule, Papuans were to refer to this event, saying 'At that moment we should have proclaimed independence', but that was only being wise after the event. Because of the psychological significance and impact of the Council, we should give close attention to the inconspicuous process whereby it was formed. It explains the permanent

^{*}Both *Bewindsregeling* and *Surinaamse staatsregeling*, the charters for dependent overseas territories, were based on a speech delivered by Queen Wilhelmina in London after the Germans had occupied the Netherlands. The Queen promised the dependencies the most radical autonomy that was possible at that time. The realisation, however, was slow and hesitant; in essence the contents are the same, and in my opinion are less generous than the speech made desirable.

rebellion that goes on in Irian Jaya and which will probably spread to the eastern part till a national consciousness awakes throughout the whole island which cannot be stopped.

The concept of the New Guinea Council, as presented by Van Baal and entrusted to the Lemaire commission for consideration, was agreeable to the Dutch minister, to the extent that the necessity for a new approach was recognised although its actual form was not. The commission came to the conclusion that Van Baal was too much on the conservative side; it pleaded for a direct, general voting system. Van Baal's proposals were regarded as conservative because he was in favour of indirect elections via regional local councils, but on the other hand he wanted more power for the Council to avoid even the appearance of it being a puppet council, a '*dewan boneka*'. The more radical attitude appealed very much to the Papuans; during the consultations the Manokwari representative, Obeth Manupapami, pleaded for voting rights for women, and Herman Wajoi criticised the absence of a 'budget right'* in the concept. It is humiliating for Papuans to read in a book published in 1978 by J.G. de Beus, who was present at the opening of the New Guinea Council in 1961 as Netherlands ambassador in Canberra and who was one of the most important advisors in the New Guinea conflict in Washington, how he underestimated Papuan political awareness at that time. Yet he was one of the men who convinced other emerging states of the feasibility of the self-determination approach. His book gives the impression that he did not believe in the sincerity of his government's intentions. But President Sukarno seemed convinced of the risks he would be running for his own part if he did not decide to take action in the New Guinea struggle.

The doubts expressed by De Beus could stem from the fact that the opening of the Council took place in a rather modest way in a rebuilt schoolhouse and in the poor setting of a capital, Hollandia, that had become a capital mainly because it contained a huge quantity of left-over equipment such as quonsets and Bailey bridges. Worse than the setting, however, was the absence of the American representative, which led Luns, the Foreign Minister, to let Washington know in very sharp words

*The 'budget right' is the right to vote down a minister's budget not because of the merits or demerits of the budget alone, but because of the policy involved.

that the Netherlands felt offended. It was a bad omen indeed. On the other hand, delegations from the Dutch parliament, from Australia and from Papua New Guinea were present. But it was not only the establishment of the Council as such that was important; the way it had come into being and its construction were of even greater importance. It remains unacceptable that the United Nations gave in almost ten years later to the Indonesian proposal to realise the Act of Free Choice by *mushawarah*, i.e. by palavering among a small number of representatives. After all, the election for the New Guinea Council had been conducted according to modern democratic procedure. The Netherlands Government is also to blame for its acceptance of Indonesia's proposal to follow the result of the Act of Free Choice by a deliberate fraud, but lack of conviction and, still more, lack of knowledge are responsible for the fact that after signing the New Guinea agreement the Netherlands, in the person of the Prime Minister J. de Quay, washed its hands of future responsibility as prayers were said for the Papuans.

The New Guinea Council would consist for its first session, beginning on 5 April 1961, of twenty-eight members, sixteen appointed and twelve elected. The election took place on a common roll and everyone could elect or be elected if he had Dutch nationality, had lived in New Guinea for three years and had reached the age of twenty-one to vote and twenty-three to stand for election. The ballot took place in districts, and in principle the election was direct, but the law allowed for one intermediate step, namely fifty voters could elect one representative to elect the member of the council. This indirect ballot could be done by the voter whispering his choice to the voting officer, if he could not read or write. A relative majority was sufficient to be elected. Sixteen members were elected from fourteen districts and twelve were appointed by the Governor; of the latter two were corrective nominations, for minorities that were insufficiently represented. The chairman of the Council was appointed by the sovereign on the Council's recommendation.

The New Guinea Council shared responsibility for laws regarding New Guinea, and had the right to advise on Dutch laws involving New Guinea. It had the right to initiate and to amend legislation, to ask for information from the Governor, but not the right of budget.

Election procedure was possibly even more important than

the Council's powers, because the level of participation and consciousness is decisive for political maturity. During the preparation for the first elections on 18-25 February 1961, many political parties and fractions presented themselves, with programmes that were both short- and long-sighted. The number of voters in fourteen districts was 109,864, of which 14,095 in Hollandia-stad and 10,461 in Manokwari cast direct votes.

The response of the population was good with voting levels of 85.1 and 80.9 per cent in Hollandia and Manokwari respectively. In the districts with indirect voting, all the final electors cast their votes. It was clear that for the next session the direct ballot could be extended to all the districts listed below, but this time it had been done by 'electors'. The percentage of votes was as follows:

Hollandia (District)	66	Sorong	55.5
Nimboran	83.5	Teminabuan	86
Schouten islands	84.5	Ajamaru	82
Japen-Waropen	53	Fakfak	55.5
Ransiki	73	Kaimana	70
Raja Ampat	75	Merauke	69

Why did the Netherlands government not allow the population to vote by direct ballot? Did it not believe that the people would show sufficient interest? If so it was wrong if one looks at the percentages of people who actually voted, although one must admit that the election was boycotted by districts with Indonesian or pro-Indonesian inhabitants, such as Serui, Fakfak and Sorong, with voting levels of 53, 55.5 and 55.5 per cent respectively.

And could Indonesia have overlooked the results of such a massive direct ballot nearly ten years later? Probably yes, because the will for independence was clear to any observer, and even if Indonesia had followed the indirect ballot system, it could never have corrupted about 2,000 representatives of the population in 1968 as was done with the smaller number which took part in *mushawarah*. And how could the United Nations accept an event contrary to its own principles, but covered with a face-saving device?

The development of political consciousness was even more interesting than that of political institutions. The emergence of political parties was very similar to what was to happen in the eastern part a few years later, and very alien to the political

choice that Indonesia was to present after becoming overlord.

To understand that consciousness it is necessary to go back to the Second World War, when the occupation and oppression by the Japanese evoked such resistance from the Biak people that the outburst came in the form of a pitched battle. This phenomenon became known in the eastern part as the 'Vailala madness' and in the western part as a Koreri movement, but it has happened many times since — in less vehement and obvious forms in both the Australian and Dutch parts of the island, but basically the same. It could be described as a short-circuit reaction to, or defence by magic against, events beyond men's control; but even if the movement does not come about by logic and has several illogical aspects, it is by no means irrational. It merely reveals the less conscious feelings of the population, and uses the means available to escape from a situation of stress. The movement has the name of cargo-cult because cargo (*barang*) goods always play an important role in relieving the people from their burden. But it is immaterial too, embracing power, life and sex.

The Biak people have been Christianised ever since the first encounters of New Guinea with the missionaries, and it is not surprising that the Koreri movement has very clear biblical overtones. Manseren Manggundi, the great Lord, would side with the Biak tribe, and a living Biak woman named Angganitha would become the Queen of Peace, the Golden Lady of Judea (*Bin Damai* or *Nona mas ro Judea*), because she was his daughter. The movement also has political traits: a flag (the Dutch colours in reverse) and an army. The movement had its beginning in 1938 in Meos Wundi, a small island near Biak, but had little significance until the Japanese took Angganitha prisoner in 1942, when a former teacher called Stefanus Simopyaref preached against the *Amberi*, the Indonesians who sided with the Japanese. He mobilised an army personally on 8 June 1942, named *Amentie Blanda* (*blanda* = Dutch) or *America Babo* (New America) that had to include all the peoples of New Guinea (therefore it is nationalistic in origin). But the Koreri movement was split. The true believers clung to the expectation that their ideals would come true through magic and so experienced 'speaking with tongues', visions and trances; they collaborated with the Japanese and among them was Steven Wanda, the '*Raja Supiori*'. But their opponents were more practical: they fought the police and pleaded with the

Japanese to have Angganitha released. In mid-1942, however, Simopyaref went into voluntary imprisonment to free Angganitha, and both of them were killed. In the course of that year relations with the Japanese grew steadily worse. On the island of Numfoor the Japanese commander mockingly invited the Numforese to a duel between the Japanese army and the population, and at the given date about 2,000 Numforese stood ready for the fight. The Japanese commander had to back out in embarrassment. In November the unjust rule of district officers in Bosnik, Serui and Numfoor caused active resistance, which recurred in January, August and December 1943. At the end of 1943 the peaceful Steven Wanda and his men were wiped out by the Japanese. But the fight went on, and in Mansau the Biak people showed their flag, the cross and the star, and hundreds of them were killed in a hand-to-hand battle. They saved the flag, but three leaders were executed, all with the name Rumkorem, and the village called Wops was destroyed. Kamma, the excellent chronicler of these events, notes: 'This was more than Koreri — one sensed freedom', and then 'the hopes of the Koreri had been smothered in blood'. One cannot fail to observe the similarity between the situation then and at present; even the name of the guerrilla leader, Rumkorem, is the same, and the reasons for rebellion are the same also: unjust government by the Indonesians, and the overall situation of oppression and deprivation.

Then the unexpected happened in a way and on a scale that even the most fanatical believer in Koreri could not have dreamed of. On the island of Manseren Manggundi, the island of the Messiah, in the bay of Meos Wundi, the Americans disembarked, not with one ship full of cargo but with hundreds of ships, planes, landing craft and trucks, and they handed out food, clothing, and every kind of good thing that one could imagine. They came in the night, in the morning, with clouds of ships and planes, fireballs and explosions—it was an apocalyptic event.

Is the Koreri dead? In 1945 on the initiative of the Nica commander Van Eechoud, a Biak teacher, who had been trained as a civil servant and sub-district officer, founded the first New Guinea party with independence as its programme, the *Suara Rakyat* ('voice of the people'). His name was Rumkorem. He wrote a letter to President Truman inviting the Americans to take over from the Dutch (is that letter now in the files of the

C.I.A. or was it thrown away?). Rumkorem founded another party, the *Partai Kemerdekaan Indonesia Irian*, and afterwards three Papuans, Karel Krey, Mattheus Indey and Nicolaas Jouwe founded yet another, *Komit  Indonesia Merdeka*. In 1946 Frans Kasiepo represented the Papuans at the Malino conference, where he agreed that New Guinea should belong to East Indonesia but had to back down under pressure from his home front.* In Serui in 1946 an Indonesian, Ratoelangi, founded a party to promote the idea of joining Indonesia. Under the leadership of Silas Papare, the *Partai Kemerdekaan Indonesia Irian*** was established with remarkable success in Serui and Waropen, many teachers and civil servants becoming members. The proposal to become part of Indonesia was accepted by acclamation, but another proposal to have their own flag and budget was turned down by the Sumatran adviser Ali Rahman. In 1949 Papare debated the political future of New Guinea with Jouwe and Marcus Kaisiepo, and during that debate he declared that he had a vision: 'I saw the heaven open and a huge crowd of people in white clothes came down, singing "*Merdeka, merdeka*". A stair was let down and an angel descended saying: "*New Guinea has to become part of Indonesia Timur*" [East Indonesia].' Opposite to that view the *Pergerakan Persatuan Nieuw Guinea* (movement for the unity of New Guinea) was established in 1950 to promote New Guinea's unity and independence; it was not confined to one region, but relied on support in Sentani, Hollandia, Biak and Merauke. The political commotion of the years 1949 and 1950 only died down after the departure of many Indonesians to their home country and the end of the Round Table Conference. It is interesting to note how intensely the population took part in the political struggle even at that early stage, and one can easily see how later political movements and the present guerrilla groups have their roots in that past.

The Indonesian struggle for independence influenced the

*The Malino conference was held in the south of Sulawesi in 1946. It was the first in a series of conferences, of which the Den Pasar conference in December 1946 was the most important. In Malino a token representation of Papuans is explained by the idea of an East Indonesian state. During the second conference (October 1946) in Pangkalpinang, the idea of a Eurasian homeland was paramount.

**The P.K.I.I. aims at independence both for Indonesia and Irian; so it is not so much pro-Indonesia as anti-colonial or anti-dependence.

political awareness of the Papuan population, but in general one could say that the Papuans had an outspoken preference for their own identity, whether within the framework of Dutch rule or as an autonomous entity within an independent Indonesia. The hearings of the so-called *Paritaire Commissie** activated this awareness, and the massive refusal to join Indonesia by the Wandammen population of Chendrawasih Bay — a group which had known Indonesian dominance for centuries — when consulted by the East Indonesian Sultan of Ternate via the Papuan district officer Cornelis Rumsayor, is indicative of the whole population's attitude.

The arrival of Indo-Europeans, the consultation of prominent Papuans by the Dutch government, the departure of Indonesians, the increasing number of civil servants, the founding of regional councils and the revaluation of the guilder — these were factors that contributed to a lively political climate; and in June 1950 Hollandia had its first strike when Thomas Bonay from Serui persuaded a number of waterfront workers not to unload the m.s. *Riouw*. A year later 120 labourers of the N.N.G.P.M. oil company — all from Serui — went on strike.

One notes that Papuan reactions to these developments have both a political and a social motivation. Political expression in letters, motions, requests or demonstrations had very concrete causes such as expropriations of land for government buildings in Hollandia, discrimination by Indo-European colonists towards the Papuans in Manokwari, land settlement procedures in Metauke, and the general land problem. The Indonesian freedom movement was typified by the expression *merdeka*, which expresses political aspirations; in the case of New Guinea, the keyword was the more down-to-earth *maju*, meaning 'progress' or 'forward'. At the moment the Papuan saw the jobs of the Indonesians becoming available to him, development gained preference over independence.

But although social problems, mainly the tension between Indo-European settlers and the Papuans over land rights and jobs, continued to exist and resulted in different organisations — not only political parties but also separate football clubs — the main accent was on opposition to the Indonesian

* *Paritaire Commissie* or committee that by equal representation tried to sound out the people's opinion. The only result was a further widening of the gap between Indonesian and Dutch views.

claim. One of the most primitive but, as would later appear, one of the most widespread and most tenacious movements was that of Lodewijk Mandachan in the Bird's Head. Under the command of Lodewijk, Barend and Nicodemus Mandachan, not only in the Tamrau mountains but extending from Manokwari in the north round the Bird's Head to Inanwatan in the south, even including the Raja Ampat islands, an unseen watch was kept on the coastline, and in both 1952 and 1953, infiltrating Indonesians in Gag and in Fakfak were duly reported to the district officers and the police. When I was transferred as a district officer from Manokwari to Kokonao on the south coast, I never again had that feeling of safety as when all the Mandachan (*mansibabēr*, naked people, as they were called by the Biak and Numforese peoples because they wore loin-cloths only) watched over me. In the late 1960s Mandachan had to surrender and was invited to Jakarta by President Suharto to receive the rank of colonel and even the honour of freedom fighter for Indonesia. So when he died he was buried in the military cemetery in Manokwari. But Dutch district officers who patrolled the Arfak mountains knew a different man. When I was back there two years ago by myself, I returned to a very familiar setting and very familiar people.

At that time the Papuans in that area were organised in a *Gerakan Pemuda Irian*, to be developed into a more leftist *Gerakan Pemuda Nieuw-Guinea*, which also had members in Biak. It spread to Merauke under the leadership of Jouwe, Marcus Kaisiepo, Arfan and many other leaders, some of whom sought refuge in the Netherlands after the transfer of sovereignty to the United Nations in 1962.

But in the early 1950s when the New Guinea conflict was being brought repeatedly to the United Nations, Papuan feelings were more anti-Indonesian than pro-New Guinea, let alone pro-Dutch. When the self-determination policy of Luns and Bot took shape under Governor Platteel, social consciousness and dissatisfaction increased at the same time. Dismissal of labourers in Sorong (mostly Indonesians) and unsatisfactory payment in Hollandia and other places resulted in a major demonstration on 4 February 1960, inspired by the Protestant labour union C.W.N.G. *Persekding* (Christian Workers of New Guinea — the Papuan, as distinct from the European branch). So there was clear social tension, resulting only in a reinforced will to achieve independence.

The most typical and probably the most important Papuan political party was established on 10 August 1960. Its centre was the Papuan urban centre Hamadi, where it was easy for social unrest to take root; the founders were H. Wayoj, the initiator of the harbour strike, and F. Kirihio, a pro-Indonesian university student, both from anti-Dutch and anti-Biak Serui, and the party was strongly backed by the union *Persekding*. The party's name was 'Parna', short for *Partai Nasional*, and any tribal movement was put aside. The party had as its principle 'Love for God and one's neighbour', thanks to the influence of the capable Numforese pastor Rumainum, chairman of the Indonesian-oriented Protestant church and one of the most influential men among the Papuans. But within two weeks the *Demokratische Volkspartij* (D.V.P.) was founded. This party, which had Rumainum as its chairman, could be seen as the successor of the *Gerakan Persatuan Nieuw-Guinea*, with broad support from the common people, not very sophisticated, but clearly enunciating its vision of a political future in a 'Melanesian federation. It represented the evolution of ideas among the average Papuan, if not of the urban élite. At the beginning of the 1960s the Indonesian claim was sharply rebutted, but in the second half a strong accent was laid on a Papuan citizenship and Papuan representatives in foreign affairs, in short a Papuan identity, and by the end of the decade New Guinea was seen as part of Melanesia. The leaders Jouwe and Kaisiepo remained aloof from both parties, although Jouwe was connected mostly with Parna and Kaisiepo with D.V.P.

In Sentani a party named *Kena U Embai* (strength in unity) was founded under the influence of an Indo-European settler called Holleman. This type of party was also found in Manokwari, where a settler called Gosewisch founded 'Epang' (*Eenheids partij Nieuw-Guinea*). This was partly a reaction to the leftist Parna in Hollandia and its orientation was anti-Indonesian and anti-nationalistic, its aim being co-existence among the different races. Gosewisch obtained the support of some thousands of voters from the Arfak mountains who, making use of their right to the whispering ballot, whispered the unpronounceable name of Gosewisch in the election committee chairman's ear. The procedure was simple; Gosewisch had come to an arrangement with the *Kepala perang* (warlords), the Mandachans and the warlord Iroge Meidedotka whereby all the Meags, the Mentions, the Manikions and the Hattams from

the Arfak mountains were to vote for their Indo-European representative. This outcome came to Gosewisch as a considerable surprise!

But it is not very likely that he earned any votes among coastal Papuans, among whom Johan Ariks had his following. Ariks too was in favour of a racially mixed society, although he thought it inopportune to promote the idea at that time. His party *Partai orang Nieuw-Guinea* (P.O.N.G.), also open to all inhabitants, was strongly anti-Indonesian and moderately nationalistic. The drama of the decolonisation of the Congo took place at that time and in the peculiar atmosphere of the decolonisation taking place near at hand, that event had a terrific impact on Europeans and Papuans alike. Thus the common Papuan shied away from more leftist parties. The P.O.N.G. was nearly as successful as 'Epang' in the elections for the New Guinea Council, but then they had the most competent leaders in Ariks and Obeth Manupapami. Ariks, who was sixty years old and had represented the Papuans as early as 1949 at the Round Table Conference, was a descendant of the Arik clan in the Kebar valley in the Bird's Head, but his mother was born in Windessi, the coastal plain in the neck of the Bird's Head. He had been brought up in a preacher's household and was exceptionally gifted; he spoke Dutch impeccably, played the organ and had the most charming manners. He was wise enough to push Manupapami forward, one of the most articulate young Papuans and an opponent of Gosewisch. He betted on the modern Papuans, fragmented though they might be. In principle he was a moderate, but the future of New Guinea according to him lay in a Melanesian federation with the eastern part of New Guinea, and possibly even the Solomon islands. A few years later, he was beaten to death by the Indonesians in Manokwari prison.

In Sorong the same political struggle was going on, but strangely enough the tension in more primitive parts was expressed in a different way. The year 1960 saw the start near the Wissel (Paniai) lakes of a renewal movement called the Wegebage, and in the Muju area, on Frederik Hendrik island and near Merauke of a cargo-cult. A few years earlier as a district officer I had to suppress cargo-cults in Mimika (1954) and in Nimboran (1957). So the western part of the island, backward and primitive as it may have seemed, was teeming with political and social disturbance.

WEST NEW GUINEA AND THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

As had already been said, the Australians were not in a hurry, and did not take the lead either in their foreign policy or their native policy, but the determination, based on sound self-interest, that expansionist Indonesia should never rule New Guinea, either the whole or even the western half, was not lacking. The switch in Australian foreign policy, however, was not as definitive as one might expect. In the first place it was a consequence of home politics. The socialist régime of Dr. Evatt, that had had so adverse an effect on Dutch interests, was followed in 1949 by the Liberal government of Robert Menzies, a powerful statesman who was to be Prime Minister for the next twelve years. His Minister for Foreign Affairs (later his ambassador to the United Nations) was Sir Percy Spender, who actually wanted Australia to become trustee of Western New Guinea, either alone or in combination with the Dutch. This was considerably different from the opinion of Australia at the time of the United Nations Commission on Indonesia (U.N.C.I.) in 1949, which had been that the Dutch would reach an agreement with the Federal Indonesian Republic (R.I.S.) and might for instance claim trusteeship over New Guinea on condition that the territory would in the end become an integral part of Indonesia.

Different again was the view of Mr. Casey, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1952, when he favoured the idea of shelving the problem, but in 1955 in Jakarta he released the Casey-Anak Agung statement, which was not unfavourable to the Indonesian aspirations. This statement was contradicted by the Australian government, where Menzies had a different view of the problem from Casey. Menzies was convinced that Australia was primarily a Western country and part of the Commonwealth, while on the other hand Casey saw Australia as part of the Pacific and therefore a South-East Asian country, very dependent on a good-neighbour relationship with Indonesia.

In its turn, because of President Sukarno's anti-colonialist and imperialist ways, Indonesia never paid much attention to Australia's attitude, being much more oriented towards the densely populated countries to the north.

But in 1950 Percy Spender had the very straightforward opinion that the Netherlands and the United Republic of Indonesia should still cling to the results of the Round Table Conference and try in good faith and by peaceful means to reach an agreement. But the negotiations and the *Paritaire Commissie*, which could not even produce a joint report, failed, and the prospect then was continuing Dutch sovereignty and internalisation of the problem.

Obviously the Dutch did not realise that they would never have the opportunity of winning the Australians over, both politically and militarily, to their policy of self-determination. At that time the Australians themselves had no intention of speeding up the pace of development and consciousness in the eastern part. It was the Dutch policy itself that put off the Australian promise of support. In the early 1950s the Netherlands still had faith in United Indonesia, and in that situation an agreement with Indonesia was not altogether out of the question. And after all New Guinea had not been included in the famous declaration of independence in 1945 'from Aceh to Ambon'; it was not 'from Sabang to Merauke', as was later claimed. Only when President Sukarno founded a unitary state and repeatedly claimed the whole of the pre-war Netherlands East Indies in the United Nations, while stepping up his actions first by refusing to pay Dutch debts, then by taking reprisals against Dutch property and nationals in Indonesia and by uttering more and more vehement military threats — only then did the Netherlands lose faith and find itself alone, and even without the political will to defend New Guinea against massive aggression. It countered the Indonesian threat in 1965 by internationalisation, the Luns plan, but by then the problem was out of its hands and at the disposal of the United States and Great Britain, which could still muster some power at the U.N. and could appeal to Indonesia not to resort to a major military assault.

In the meantime, however, Sukarno's position had deteriorated considerably and it was approaching the point where he had to play the role of the heroic liberator of his people again, completing the revolution, in order to keep his grip on the

masses. So he had evoked war and like the sorcerer's apprentice there came a moment when he could no longer master his own threats. The ridiculous landing in Hollandia of 15,000 Indonesian troops, exceeding the number of inhabitants, on 1 May 1963 against an enemy which had left the scene was a mere consequence of preparations for war that had been going on for years. It kept the generals busy — those who some time later were to overthrow President Sukarno after his endeavour to kill them off with the help of Communists within the country. But before this token victory, a diplomatic struggle took place, the outcome of which opened the eyes of Robert Menzies: Spender's policy of slow development had no chance at all. Papua New Guinea had no time left to spare.

There were other arguments which convinced the Australians that something more had to be done about Papua New Guinea. The general climate of decolonisation, especially in Africa, could not escape the attention of the policy-makers. The Spender doctrine that the security of Australia depended on the security of the island of New Guinea was not tenable as such. The Dutch refused to wage a war and the Americans would have prevented them from fighting anyway, so West New Guinea would become Indonesian and then Eastern New Guinea would lie open to aggression from any quarter. On the other hand the Dutch native policy based on self-determination proved to be a viable policy, both nationally and internationally. At that moment, in 1959, when it was still not clear that President Sukarno would win and the Dutch still had some cards to play, a Dutch-Australian conference in Hollandia decided that the two nations would co-operate and back each other's actions. The Dutch admired the Australian economic efforts in P.N.G., and the Australians were surprised to see that political consciousness and the ban on any discrimination did not produce an unbalanced barbarian. So co-operation started and communication of many kinds was established. All this culminated in 1961, with the inauguration of the New Guinea Council. We have mentioned already the ominous absence of the U.S., but the Australian presence had little significance for West New Guinea, since the Netherlands had forfeited the Australian military support proposed in 1950 by trying to arrange the New Guinea affair on its own after the disappointment it had experienced at the hands of the Labour administration of Evatt.

The Dutch opened the Australians' eyes in the process of a

deteriorating position at the U.N. General Assembly and the ongoing decolonisation of Africa. An Australian military intervention became impossible after a refusal by the United States and Great Britain to intervene. The Dutch policy of self-determination could only succeed if Dr. Luns were able to mobilise African and Latin American support for the Papuan claim. Whether the initiative of Luns succeeded or not, it was in any case to the advantage of Australia provided that Australia also followed a self-determination policy for P.N.G.

At the moment when the Australians were speeding up their development programme for P.N.G., the Dutch were abandoning their territory. The process of democratisation and political education had been brought to an advanced level there; the pro-Indonesian trends were revised in an independence movement, and the Papuanisation was such that all jobs could be occupied by Papuans within about ten years. But the diplomatic battle did not succeed. The trump card of self-determination was played well, but the Americans would not play; they proposed the Bunker plan, and its essence was the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia. Up to the present, the Americans have the impression that they did a great job in extracting the Dutch from an untenable position, but that opinion obscures the fact that they acted out of sheer self-interest and very short-sightedly at that. Intervention from President Kennedy himself — seconded by Robert Kennedy, who visited Indonesia in 1962 — brought to an end the Dutch endeavour to stick to the principles of the United Nations. The United States was pursuing a policy of encircling and isolating Communist China. To this end there was a South Pacific Commission,* which dealt with the development problems of the Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian islands; the Netherlands was one of the members together with other colonial powers like France and Britain, and Pacific powers like Australia and New Zealand.

*The South Pacific Commission consisted of a representation of Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian islands, brought together for the development of a native policy in these areas. Headquarters were in Noumea; the governments were both independent and colonial, and representatives of the Netherlands were officials of the New Guinean office for native affairs. The plan for a development project in Nimboran near Hollandia (Jayapura) was supported and to some extent shaped by the S.P.C., because the project authority was supplied with a tractor to open up an agricultural site. The S.P.C. expected the development process to succeed by stimulating private initiative.

There was also a military organisation, Anzus, consisting of Australia, New Zealand and the United States. This military treaty was not a follow-up of old colonial relations; but indeed it was the backbone of American defence in the South-East Asian context. The rest was diplomacy. By supporting friendly governments the United States tried to neutralise the situation, but the development it feared most was a take-over by Communists of a national government. In the former Indo-China the domino theory was developed, and Indonesia was a similar case. Whatever the cost, the United States had to prevent Indonesia from turning Communist, and seemingly President Sukarno was the best bet. The shrewd but shallow mind of Robert Kennedy did not fathom the depth of President Sukarno's *Nasakom*. He simply believed in Sukarno's outright claim to the former Netherlands East Indies and nothing more. To him Javanese imperialism was a closed book.

After Sukarno's confrontation policy in Malaysia and Suharto's take-over the interpretation might have been slightly different, and after Vietnam it might have occurred to the Americans that it is not such a good idea to support corrupt régimes, but in 1962 this was all still in the lap of the gods, so the Netherlands had to give in. In the late 1940s the Netherlands was pressured out of Indonesia by a threat (with considerable later political repercussions at home) to stop Marshall aid; in the late 1950s it was sufficient for the U.S. to limit potential humanitarian aid and help in the evacuation of Dutch nationals; even logistic support for the transport of Dutch forces was not allowed — K.L.M. planes carrying marines in civilian clothes were forbidden to land on American soil. This was sufficient effectively to settle the question. The Dutch, who bore their losses in silence, soon felt Sukarno's first blows: the end to the Union, the disappearance of the federal state, the repatriation of Dutch nationals from Indonesia and the expropriation of their property, and an end to the payment of debts. This was no more than the expected consequence of the loss of a colony — a loss which did not appear insurmountable, for the Netherlands had become industrialised and was no longer the traditional agrarian, trading and transporting nation. After all, it had never been warlike, and war was therefore out of the question. So if the United States was not willing to use its deterrent diplomatic power, but on the contrary, by the word of the President's brother as a special ambassador, supported

Sukarno's claim, then the Netherlands had no choice but to give in. But the Netherlands had doubts about the substance of Sukarno's military threats; New Guinea had a tremendous coastline and it was always possible for infiltrators to land somewhere. The islands near the westernmost point, not only the Raja Ampat but still more the smaller ones between Indonesia and New Guinea, were so mixed in population that there was doubt about the reliability of some of them. On the other hand, in 1960 inhabitants of the Indonesian Kofiau islands came to New Guinea, attracted by the relative wealth of Sorong and refusing to be conscripted by Sukarno to fight their Indonesian Christian brothers over the international frontier on the New Guinea islands. The political mood in New Guinea, supported by the propaganda of a number of radio stations with modern, attractive programmes and a keen information service, was doubtless not in favour of Sukarno.

Regular reconnaissance surveys by Dutch naval aircraft and the existence of Papuan forces that were willing to fight, were at the very least discouraging to a policy of infiltration and mock attacks. However, the Dutch were not very well informed about the Indonesian plans. They refused only to be bluffed by Sukarno's propaganda, his infiltrations and the mock sea-battle on the south coast near Vlakke Hoek, when Commodore Sudarso's torpedo boat was sunk. In case of a major assault in which the Soviet military build-up in Indonesia seemed to threaten — it would back out.

Only recently have we known what were the exact plans of the Indonesians. Whether or not their plans were viable (and after the drama of East Timor it is permissible to doubt the organisational capacity of the Indonesian military), they were at least big. Instead of infiltrations and mock attacks on nearby coasts to get at least a foothold in New Guinea, President Sukarno's speeding up of the effort to obtain West Irian was obvious. His goal and his motives were clear, but the means were still uncertain. Minor measures such as not paying debts or expropriating property have been mentioned already; these backfired economically on the Indonesians. President Sukarno had shown a remarkable lack of interest in the economy of his country before, so why should he care much at a moment which was crucial politically? After his fall it was up to President Suharto to build up Indonesia's credibility, and it was only after the founding of the intergovernmental group for Indonesia under the

chairmanship of the Dutch that the Indonesians gained access to the world's credit facilities.

Meanwhile President Sukarno in 1960 broke off diplomatic relations as another means of pressure, but the critical point was war. There were differing views among Sukarno's advisers: first, a policy of steadily increasing infiltration; secondly, the establishment of a foothold or bridgehead to strengthen the diplomatic and propaganda position; and thirdly, the possibility of an all-out attack on the Dutch military stronghold in Biak, later to be called 'Operation Jayawijaya'. The provocation of a minor armed conflict with the Dutch naval or air forces would strengthen the Indonesian position; this was the opinion of Anak Agung, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. These tactics had been in preparation for a long time. The early infiltrations in 1954 and 1955 could be seen as part of this operation, which was based on the supposition that Indonesians who landed in New Guinea might find local support from some Papuans and Indonesians, but it later decreased.

At the United Nations, Indonesia was quite unable to muster a two-thirds majority. In 1954 the outcome was 33 pro, 23 anti and 4 abstentions, in 1956 it was 40, 25, 13; in 1957 it was 41, 29, 11. So even at the 1957 session the outcome was only a bare majority (41-40). To show its military resoluteness in response to the breaking off of diplomatic relations and the infiltrations, the Netherlands sent the aircraft-carrier *Karel Doorman* to the scene in 1960. Its defeats at the U.N., recent political and economic developments, and the showing of the colours in New Guinea by the Dutch forced Indonesia's hand.

Seemingly Indonesia succeeded in obtaining West Irian without using major force, but the threat of it was necessary, and preparations for a major assault were known to the United States through their intelligence, in this case the U2 reconnaissance aircraft. The Dutch were kept in the dark and up till the very last moment they expected the assault on the south coast, but the major assault was planned on Biak, the island off the north coast, where the Dutch aircraft and marines had their base. It is important to recall that in this situation President Sukarno forced his generals to prepare a massive attack, premature though this might be. That decision came in response to the so-called Luns plan. It has to be recalled also that the Dutch had been very active both in developing New Guinea and in trying to find a solution to the political problem that would be

acceptable internationally. The crucial point in this political problem was whether or not self-determination could be reached either by maintaining Dutch sovereignty or by internationalisation. The former strategy was a new element and in the end it appeared to be disastrous. It became a failure exactly because it was such a promising approach.

This contradiction has to be explained. Basically the fate of West New Guinea depended on international negotiations, the players here being Luns, the Dutch Foreign Minister, and the Australian Minister Sir Garfield Barwick; Dr. Luns presented the Luns plan which nearly succeeded but then the road lay open to the Bunker plan, which was seemingly an American plan but actually initiated in Australia.* If only the Papuans had been heard, the Bunker plan could have been amended in an acceptable way; such an amended plan was presented by Marcus Kaisiepo, the most authoritative spokesman for the Papuans, but his words were ignored even if 'self-determination' held a central place in the discussion. The basic differences in approach come down to this. The Luns plan provided for the Netherlands to transfer their sovereignty to an international authority or to a trustee, other than Indonesia, if only the right of self-determination for the Papuans were maintained. A visiting United Nations mission could keep the parent organisation informed. In the meantime the Netherlands was willing to provide a grant-in-aid at the rather high level (for 1962) of 100 million guilders per year. The Netherlands had interested twenty countries in supporting this plan.

On 26 September 1962, during the sixteenth session of the United Nations, Luns presented the plan and although the

*On 20 March 1962 informal talks between Indonesia and the Netherlands started in Middleburg, Va., 50 km. from Washington, D.C., under the chairmanship of Ellsworth Bunker as a neutral mediator. The meeting's goal was to prepare the ground for a formal conference on New Guinea. However, on 2 April Bunker presented a nearly complete proposal for an agreement. The gist of it was the establishment of a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority to take over sovereignty for one year. During this period a date had to be fixed for the use of the right of self-determination by the Papuan people.

Bunker's proposal was very specific on the transfer of sovereignty and very vague on the issue of self-determination. In February, however, the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick, raised in a talk with the Dutch ambassador de Beus the question whether, and if so under what conditions, the Netherlands would agree to temporary rule by the United Nations until the right of self-determination could be exercised.

Dutch were reasonably certain that it would attract a two-thirds majority, it did not come off. On one side there was a resolution from the so-called Brazzaville group of francophone African states, and on the other a resolution from India. The Brazzaville resolution called for bilateral negotiations with the assistance of the Secretary General U Thant and a visiting U.N. mission to prepare an international interim régime, safeguarding the right of self-determination. The India resolution was also in favour of bilateral negotiations, but did not mention the right of self-determination. (The unheard voice of Kaisiepo pleaded for a plebiscite at any time, provided it were held under the supervision of a fair authority, i.e. not Indonesia.) According to either the Brazzaville or the Indian resolution, the Netherlands, could hand over New Guinea to Indonesia, if only an international interregnum were established for the period of choice. The result of the vote was that the Brazzaville resolution obtained 'only' 53 votes pro, 41 anti and 9 abstentions, and the India resolution 41 votes pro, 40 anti and 21 abstentions. The latter result was a devastating blow to Indonesia, which in 1957 still had a narrow majority. So it was clear that Indonesia was fighting a losing battle on the diplomatic front in 1962.

The fact that the United States had voted for the Brazzaville resolution made defeat even less tolerable for Indonesia, so President Sukarno made even more vehement speeches, and more and more war threats were heard. In the debate during the sixteenth session, the Foreign Minister Subandrio declared that Indonesia would use all possible means to prevent the Netherlands from partitioning West Irian, including war. On 1 December he announced his final command at short notice and on 19 December *Trikora* was a fact. This acronym meant a threefold command (*Tri Komando Rakjat*): to prevent the creation of a mock Papuan state with a Dutch colonial fabric; to hoist the red and white flag (*Sang Merah Putih*) in West Irian; and to be prepared for total mobilisation to defend the unity of People and Fatherland. A national defence council was formed and commando 'Mandala' was established under General Suharto, subsequently President. He also commanded the land forces, Admiral Sudomo the naval forces and Colonel Wattimena the air force. 'Mandala' would cover three years of action: infiltration up till the end of 1962 by which time ten companies of the Indonesian army would have penetrated West Irian to prepare the ground for major invasions; then at the beginning

of 1963 a major assault on Biak would follow, and finally the penetration of the whole of West Irian would be completed.

On the diplomatic front, on 30 December 1961 Indonesia sounded out the mood of Australia. This was the last time Australia flatly condemned the Indonesian plans to use force in flagrant contravention of assurances given by President Sukarno, General Nasution and others. Ambassador Suadi had to swallow the fury of Robert Menzies, and the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick, declared that Australia was shocked and dismayed. Then followed certain events which sealed the fate of New Guinea. The Dutch government contacted the American government and U Thant and declared its willingness to negotiate without preconditions. Then on 15 January 1962 three Soviet-made Indonesian motor torpedo boats tried to land near Vlakke Hoek, 45 km. from Merauke. They were detected by a patrolling Dutch Neptune (P2V7) airplane and the Dutch frigates *Evertsen* and *Kortenaer* neared the MTBs. It was about 2000 hours and the MTB shot at the *Neptune*, whereupon the plane dropped parachute flares. Then the *Kortenaer* and the *Evertsen* returned the fire of the MTBs and at 2230 hours the *Matjan Tutul* under the command of Commodore Jos Sudarso was hit three times and caught fire. It stayed afloat for another 20 minutes, then sank, the two remaining MTBs fleeing towards the south. Fifty-two surviving crew and some bodies, including that of Commodore Sudarso, were picked up. This naval engagement greatly upset Australia, all of whose sympathy was on the Dutch side.

Since the inauguration of the New Guinea Council, New Guinea as one of the world trouble-spots was in the focus of world press and so this incident could not escape international interest. Interesting speculations were published about the outcome of a war between the Netherlands and Indonesia. What was the reality? And is speculation of any use *now*, with the outcome seemingly irreversible? It is important to know what happened for two reasons. In the first place it is only fair to scrutinise the facts before giving a judgment on the role of the participants in the sacrifice of the principle of self-determination. In the second place, history has repeated itself and is likely to do so again. President Suharto's conquest of East Timor has followed the same lines as the pressures on West New Guinea, and President Sukarno's confrontation with Malaysia also had the same pattern. In the future, Papua New Guinea and

ultimately Australia will appreciate how dangerous it is to have an expansionist power on one's doorstep. The procedure is well-known: first the expansionist will appeal to the close ties he has with the victim-nation, then he will provoke unrest and violence of some kind, and then he will interfere in his own interest — whether he does so armed or unarmed is only a matter of tactics. However important the man at the top might be, over-populated Java can prove to be as expansionist as Japan before the Second World War. It was so in the days of Mataram, and if ever President Sukarno was the mouthpiece of his people it was when he formulated the classic empire in terms of the proclamation of 1945. It is no accident that President Sukarno, whose memory and honour are in the process of being refurbished, has recently received the title 'Liberator of Indonesia'. And it may be assumed that he meant to get what he wanted by his *display* of power rather than by actually putting it to the test; even the American ambassador Howard Jones, typified by De Beus as '*plus indonésien que les indonésiens*', could not suppress a feeling of suspicion when he broke the news of the conquest by agreement to President Sukarno and the President showed hardly any enthusiasm.

Could Sukarno have taken New Guinea by force? The incident near Vlakke Hoek showed in the first place the hubris of the Indonesians and the preparedness of the Dutch, but it also brought to a head tensions among the Indonesian military commanders. It is said that Commodore Sudarso heartily disagreed with the hazardous invasion with a few hundred soldiers, but in Indonesia life is cheap. In general the infiltrators were a poor lot, not properly equipped for the occasion; they were too heavily armed and they mainly depended on the hope that other infiltrators would follow. Living in the swamps or the bush, and afraid of the local population, many of them died; most became prisoners if they saw an opportunity to surrender to the Dutch military instead of to the Papuans or the local paramilitary 'mobile' police force, and very few were able to return.

In any such situation, an invasion fleet should outnumber the enemy by three, four or five to one, and this would have meant an enormous logistic problem, even if the Indonesians had not been hampered by enemy naval or air resistance. Admittedly the Indonesians had Soviet support, but there is a difference between having foreign advisers in the army and sending them

into battle in a risky war. What were the facts? 'Operation Jayawijaya' did not aim at the south and west coasts of New Guinea which were relatively near, but they would try to knock out the northern island of Biak, the base of the naval air force; the second target was Hollandia at the easternmost point of West New Guinea at the boundary with Australian territory. Biak was to be attacked by air from ... Madiun on Java, and so 30,000 men had to be landed on Biak without air cover. Indonesia had thirty naval vessels and about 120 merchant ships, so there was no logistic backbone. Admiral Sudomo called this the 'one-way ticket operation'. The Dutch military forces consisted of 9,523 men, with 4,707 in the marines, 720 in the air force, and 4,096 in the land forces. The Papuan battalion and mobile police, and a police force with semi-military training and light armament, added hundreds of skilled jungle fighters to the military nucleus. Poorly armed but highly skilled guerrilla bands — under quite rigid command, as was later proved — at least provided an infallible intelligence service.

So the Indonesians could not muster more than a superiority of three to one, which makes any invasion a risky venture. So from a military viewpoint, the Netherlands had no reason to be over-concerned at President Sukarno's threat. Nonetheless, it gave in. Who was to blame?

Australia, the strongest ally of the Dutch in 1950, was the first to back out of its own Spender doctrine, which put the defence of the two New Guineas on the same line. In the first week of the fatal year 1962, after a strong appeal from Robert Menzies on 30 December 1961, Australia made its reversal of policy, and from that time on, strove slowly for the appeasement of Indonesia. Some believe that India's unauthorised annexation of the Portuguese enclave of Goa had something to do with Australia's lack of courage in asking only for the friendliest relations with Indonesia, but the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs aptly pointed out to the Netherlands ambassador in Australia, Dr. de Beus, that it was not Australia but the Netherlands that had made a *volte face*. This was true: it made all the difference whether self-determination should be under Netherlands sovereignty or under an international authority. Even though the Luns plan failed, it was clear that a return to the former situation was impossible; therefore the Luns plan was a point of no return. In answer to accusations against Australia, it is pointed out that Menzies had suffered an election defeat

and that a new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick, was an adherent to an 'Asian philosophy', but the truth is that in the aftermath of the decolonisation of Indonesia the Netherlands would go to any lengths to avoid a war, and that the death of each Dutchman fighting the Indonesians was publicly decried at home as a waste of human life. The Dutch Labour party, and still more the Labour-oriented press and Dutch television condemned Luns as a warmonger, so the Minister of Foreign Affairs was unfairly treated not by his allies but by the opposition in his own country.

The impact of the Australian change of direction was immense. In a very straightforward discussion between Sir Garfield and Dr. de Beus, the Australian asked the frank question: 'What is your asking price? What is your selling price?' This was the moment of naked truth, now at last emerging: the Netherlands was not willing to fight, so it had to negotiate with Indonesia over self-determination for the Papuans. Then, in Canberra, the Bunker plan was born: Indonesia could negotiate the transfer of sovereignty, and the exemption of New Guinea from the transfer of sovereignty in 1950 was cancelled. The Dutch had given in after the first naval engagement which had ended in a modest victory for them, and after the United Nations debate on internationalisation, which had also ended in a modest victory. So Sir Garfield Barwick inspired the Bunker plan and in principle it came down to a three-part solution: international government, then Indonesian government and then an act of self-determination. The Netherlands firmly refused Indonesian government. As already mentioned, Kaisiepo showed a greater faith in the attitude of the Papuans than did the Netherlands, and less faith in Indonesia than Australia, when he raised no objection to an Indonesian interim government, but resisted totally an Act of Free Choice influenced by Indonesia.

After this agonised reappraisal by Australia, Dr. Luns tried to save as much as he could. A peaceful settlement, partly on the lines of the Brazzaville resolution, was discussed with U Thant and the chairman of the U.N. General Assembly, Mongi Slim. In Canberra, London and Washington President Sukarno's threat of war was discussed, and even the idea of a neutral naval curtain was considered, but that idea did not find favour with the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk.

Anyway exploratory talks were to be opened, but then

President Sukarno refused to discuss an Act of Free Choice for as long as the red and white flag did not fly over West Irian soil. This was the heart of the problem. The Netherlands asked the United States to stop arms shipments and economic aid to Indonesia and the training of Indonesian soldiers, but no answer to this request was given. Self-confidence in New Guinea now broke down, because the civil servants had no great faith in the success of international government. At least, they were not prepared to accept Indonesian blows for the sake of internationalisation.

The Netherlands then asked for permission to make a transit-landing on American soil during the transport of marines to New Guinea according to the 1959 agreement. The United States government turned the request down, which made its treatment of Indonesia and of the Netherlands respectively seem less than evenhanded. The game was lost. The visit of the U.S. Attorney-General Robert Kennedy as the President's personal envoy to Jakarta after President Sukarno's visit to Washington in April 1961 added insult to injury. Although Robert Kennedy was personally convinced that he had made a good deal of progress in bringing the two parties to sit down together on an informal basis, it became clear that the Americans had decided to take an active part in the dispute and to support President Sukarno's claim. Anak Agung had the firm impression that they would not support the Dutch in a military confrontation. Later it appeared that President Kennedy had in mind using the Seventh Fleet to evacuate the Dutch civilian population from New Guinea. On the other hand the United States, in the person of Dean Rusk as Secretary of State, persuaded the Netherlands not to send any troops to New Guinea, but it promised to reconsider in case Indonesia did so; the U.S. was prepared to assume the added responsibility which would be the natural result of Dutch compliance. This was the moment when the United States decided to appoint Ellsworth Bunker as chairman of the preliminary talks to be held in Middleburg, Virginia, in April 1962, but in March President Sukarno twice threatened the Dutch in his famous speeches, and two batallions of mobile police were reported to have left Java with the intention of entering the battle alongside the army. In the Moluccas four task units were formed, the marines on Ambon were alerted, and in short Indonesia went ahead with its invasion preparations at full speed. The Netherlands

government was then prepared to send two naval vessels and two torpedo boats to New Guinea if this build-up continued. In answer to a request from home to notify the State Department, the Dutch delegation to the Middleburg talks dissuaded the Netherlands government from doing so. So even before the Middleburg talks had started, the delegation had already sawn off the leg of its own government's chair. In the meantime, on 25 March, Indonesian planes attacked a Dutch naval vessel and more troops were dropped and landed in New Guinea.

On 2 April Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker revealed his plan to the Netherlands. It provided for a United Nations interregnum of one year to be followed by a transfer of power to the Indonesians and, after a certain number of years, the so-called Act of Free Choice for the Papuans. The Bunker plan was a face-saving device for the Netherlands, but was treason to the Papuans and their right of self-determination. So the promise made by Dean Rusk that the act of self-determination would not be a mockery was broken. The Bunker proposal was presented by President Kennedy to the Netherlands Prime Minister, De Quay. In a frank letter, he expressed his fear of 'active warfare': 'Such a conflict would have adverse consequences out of all proportions to the issue at stake ... Only the Communists would benefit from such a conflict ... The whole non-Communist position in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaya would be in grave peril and as you know these are areas in which we in the United States have heavy commitments and burdens.'*

The Netherlands were, as Luns stated, shocked and dismayed. There was, as he put it, not a single point in this whole plan that the Netherlands could not have reached without outside help. What was most disappointing of all, however, was the fact that

*The secret letter of the U.S. President John F. Kennedy is dated 2 April 1962 and published in De Beus' book *Morgen bij het aanbreken van de dag*, on page 408. The letter was very clear on the point that an all-out war between Indonesia and the Netherlands would clear the field for Communist forces in Indonesia. If Indonesia were to succumb to Communism, the non-Communist position in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaya would be threatened. Because of the Dutch commitment to the Papuan leadership, the U.S. was prepared to render all appropriate assistance to the U.N. when the right of self-determination of the Papuan people was to be exercised. However, it seems clear from this letter that the position of the U.S. in South-East Asia was the decisive factor and that the position of the Papuan people, as represented by the Netherlands, secondary to the U.S. interest.

President Kennedy had missed the vital point, the right of self-determination. This was the true issue at stake. Forty nations in the U.N. General Assembly had voted in favour of it, including the United States; now it had been given up not so much in the face of war — the United States could have intervened with a naval shield and the Netherlands could have coped with the impossible Indonesian adventure — but for the sake of suppressing Communism by supporting a corrupt régime. Not only in Vietnam, but even sooner in Indonesia, did the régime thus support collapse. President Kennedy's letter is obviously a result of the new 'realistic' Kennedy approach, and involved a notable break with the past. The final outcome was surrender to a demagogue-dictator of the Hitler type; not only was it a betrayal of the principle of self-determination, the very essence of the U.N., but it was also indulgence of blackmail by arms. Ambassador van Rooyen had the difficult task as negotiator of extracting as many guarantees as possible for the actual carrying out of the Act of Free Choice.

The Netherlands asked for a U.N. plebiscite administrator, and in a personal note to Dr. Luns, Dean Rusk again gave the assurance that the plebiscite would not be a mockery. At the very last moment President Sukarno refused to go on from preliminary talks to negotiations and so urged his negotiators Subandrio and Malik to withdraw after having tabled new demands such as a shortening of the U.N. interregnum to four or five months. Later, the negotiations nearly broke down over the question of the flags: President Sukarno demanded that the Indonesian flag, *Sang merah-putih*, should be raised on 1 January 1963. Other demands in the form of ultimata were that the U.N. should not act as 'watchdog' over the plebiscite and that the infiltrators should have a formal status, having their own territory in New Guinea and being put at the disposal of the United Nations during the interregnum.

Ambassador de Beus refers to the example of Hitler to show that these demands were once again the tactics of a dictator, who after seemingly agreeing to the principal decision, then invalidated it by making new demands. If these did not succeed, he then resorted to threatening an alternative policy which he had in reserve. Probably the explanation is simpler and more general. President Sukarno, like Hitler, was in his own opinion a man following his fate or destiny by every possible means. Sukarno's answer to the call of fate was his pledge to the Indonesian people literally to raise the holy red

and white flag on unliberated soil. He could not do otherwise. The 'new' demands of De Beus all come down to the object of hoisting the flag 'before the cock crows' on 1 January 1963, as he had pledged. President Kennedy's personal intervention was needed to push through the agreement which nearly broke down on the seemingly insignificant question of whether the flag would be raised before or after 5 o'clock in the morning (when the cock actually crows). It is generally known that both Hitler and Sukarno consulted the stars for guidance on their destiny. If such men feel they are right they can only be dissuaded by hard facts, never by reasoning and even less by bluff.

I was responsible for government propaganda by means of film and radio in the most immediately threatened part of New Guinea at that time. I remember ridiculing on the radio a speech by President Sukarno (we had exactly the same Philips transmitter as Ambon, from where the broadcast came), and by mocking the cock image used by Sukarno I scored a bull's eye as could easily be seen from the reactions. Western observers have showed little understanding of the symbolism of the flag and the crowing cock. If in the negotiations the Dutch had offered Sukarno a state visit to the Netherlands instead of sovereignty over New Guinea, with the *Sang merah* flying next to the standard of Queen Juliana, in my opinion that would have been more effective than any pressure by a United States President. But this was as impossible for the Dutch then as it would have been for the British to receive President Idi Amin of Uganda in 1977. Considerations of this kind throw some light on the misapprehension of Western diplomats, especially the Australians. After the Dutch had agreed to internationalisation, Australia went totally overboard in seeking the friendliest possible relations with Indonesia. In May 1962, while both negotiations and minor Indonesian assaults were in progress, the Australian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence—respectively Sir Garfield Barwick and Mr Townley—visited Indonesia. Townley was ingenuous enough to have himself photographed at an Indonesian military parade wearing an Indonesian uniform coat. Indignant comments in Australia and in the Netherlands followed. Such lack of finesse deserves no words, only contempt. Must not President Sukarno have thought, when he saw that picture, as Hitler thought when he looked at Chamberlain—that his opponents had been stricken with blindness and cowardice and that he was God's own favourite?

6

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATISATION IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

It is clear from the former chapter that Australia was not the initiator of political development in its own part of New Guinea. It was Robert Menzies, however, who signalled that Australia would leave the territory not a week later than the population desired, but this came about because he clearly understood the many symptoms showing why—and how—the territory had to be abandoned.

The first indicator might have been decolonisation in Africa, but the education for self-determination going on in West New Guinea was an eye-opener as well. The endorsement by forty members of the United Nations of the Dutch policy of self-determination and internalisation must have impressed the Australians. During the Dutch-Australian session on a joint development policy in Hollandia in 1959 I happened to be acting as mentor to three West Papuan leaders, among whom Marcus Kaisiepo was one, and I remember the impression made on the Australian delegation by his matter-of-factness, straightforwardness and moderation. Something of the sort happened again during the festivities for the inauguration of the New Guinea Council, when Papuans were as usual allowed to drink beer, dance and celebrate in their customary way. At that time the Papuans of the eastern part still wore their 'lap-lap'* and the drinking of beer was not allowed, an inheritance from the patronising attitude of the Murray period.

But still more important than external events was the fact that nothing now stood between Indonesia and Australia but a

*The 'lap-lap' can best be described in the negative: it was not trousers. However, even though the 'lap-lap' did not stand for backwardness or dependence, it could very well be developed as a symbol, comparable to the Scottish kilt. On the other hand in Netherlands New Guinea no distinction was made in any respect between different races and this made an impression. Probably girls in mini-skirts instead of school uniforms made still more impression, for it is not uncommon to suspect so-called primitive people of uncontrolled drinking and sexual habits.

colony, which presented a constant challenge to its big, expansionist neighbour to decolonise it. So the transfer of sovereignty over West New Guinea left the Australians no alternative to starting as soon as possible a rapid process of education for self-determination in the eastern part as well, with all the risks involved. The Australians followed the successful Dutch example, but their crash action had very little tradition to build on. The first thing to do was to muster international support, so in response to the Australian invitation the United Nations sent a commission headed by Sir Hugh Foot (later Lord Caradon), then chairman of the United Nations Trustee Council, to visit the territory early in 1962. Fortunately for the Australian overlord it produced a rather conservative report. So the problems of a debatable economic model were postponed till after independence, and the problems of decolonisation could have all the priority needed.

The Foot report concentrated on native policy and economics. Conservative on the latter, with a heavy emphasis on agricultural development, and on economic rather than human investment, it was more progressive on native policy, especially on democratisation: several measures were recommended to ban discrimination. The Administrator's Council was done away with. This council of three official and three non-official members under the Administrator had been established in 1960 as an improvement on the Executive Council of 1951 which had had no Papuan members; the latter had a say in the Legislative Council of thirty-six members, one-third of them native, which was partly nominated and partly elected. The election of the six elected native members was by means of a system of electoral colleges, comparable to the Dutch *kiesmannen*,* but with 364 colleges representing half a million Papuan voters to elect six members, this was as minimal a voting influence as possible. The non-native members, in contrast, were elected by direct adult franchise. Hence there was different treatment for different races.

The place of the Legislative Council was taken by a sixty-four-member parliament, the House of Assembly (enlarged in 1968 to ninety-four members), which had forty-four members

* *Kiesmannen* best translated by 'special electors'. The 'electors in a second stage' were elected in different procedures, dependent on the development of the people.

elected from a common open roll. The House of Assembly was a typical Westminster institution.

The Foot mission also abolished discriminatory rules such as the prohibition of native drinking, and it promoted university and higher education for Papuans. In the same way as in the Western part till the mid-1950s, the emphasis in education had been given to primary schooling; secondary and tertiary education, if necessary at all, were taken care of in institutions for European students. By definition language was a main impediment. For a native child to follow even primary school it was necessary for him first to learn the *lingua franca* (*motu* or pidgin*) in addition to his own vernacular tongue, and then go on to the so-called culture language, English. In West New Guinea the *lingua franca* was Malay and the culture language Dutch. The emphasis on economics will be discussed later.

The Foot report received a reluctant welcome. Although in terms of political development the eastern part of the island was about ten years behind the western part and fifty years behind advanced developing countries, where widespread political consciousness had awoken after the First World War, Australia was very realistic in taking appropriate measures. The first general election had to be held in 1964. It meant that people in 12,000 villages had to be informed about it and to some extent had to be persuaded to take part. The burden lay mainly on the Department of Native Affairs. The co-operation between Native Affairs and the Department of Information and Extension Services was sometimes difficult. The Native Affairs department felt itself to be expert in dealing with public relations, while the latter defended its position claiming to have been specially entrusted with native affairs. The same situation happened to show itself everywhere, but in the western part Information was staffed by people from Native Affairs and thus they were related from the very beginning. More important still than the allotting of tasks to the respective departments was the problem of staffing, because an enormous number of important public jobs for native people were being created by the new policy at a moment when in fact there was a complete lack of

* *Motu* and pidgin were *linguae francae* in the former German and British parts respectively. *Motu* was very much the police language and basically a Papuan language, but pidgin-English in my experience was a real *lingua franca*, useful even in West Africa or the Caribbean.

competent people to fill them. So the Information department, in initiating such a development, was more or less automatically called upon to fill the vacancies. There were — again in contrast to the western part, where the Indonesian issue had been discussed for years — hardly any national issues. Regionalism or rather provincialism was one of the main traits of the emerging nation. How could such a fragmented population — given such a small time span — be represented by sufficiently competent people in the House of Assembly? It is good therefore to see how differently development had progressed in the different parts of both Papua and New Guinea. Then again it becomes evident how development and political consciousness not only differ because of diverging interests but also in the stages and levels reached at a given time. Justice requires that provisions should be arranged in such a way that all partners in development have equal chances, but even so, it is very difficult to organise development without becoming discriminatory. From the aspect of social-economic development it is even more difficult still, because economic development, over and over again, is measured in terms of distribution. At least that was the model presented by the Foot mission. So political development had to be organised in such a way that it could exclude the possibility of some regions overruling other more backward ones.

But the House of Assembly was meant not only to represent people, but also to produce competent people to run government when the time came. And that time had to come very soon. However much the Foot mission may have stressed the necessity for improved schooling and higher education, these take time to grow and time was too short. Still there were at least a few members of parliament that made good administrators. Australia chose, as did the Dutch, a system of incorporating some promising Papuan political leaders as under-secretaries of the Departments, in the first place to have the needs of departments represented in the House, and later, by this two-track schooling, to develop responsible leaders. But this was all theory and wishful thinking. Experience shows that nationalism does not grow out of the benevolent preparedness of a colonial power to hand over sovereignty; it grows among striving, dissatisfied young men, who seek their chance to acquire education and give a voice to a more general feeling of unrest, dissatisfaction and discrimination.

In Western New Guinea the politically conscious élite were

mostly members of the discussion clubs that started under Dutch rule and, although the clubs were headed by Dutch *controleurs*, at least the latter were not patronising. In Eastern New Guinea the Bully Beef Club of Port Moresby's Administrative College was the training ground for the small band which, in the years to come, proved to have the real taste for independence. Among the thirteen who formed the membership of the club were Michael Somare, the first Prime Minister; Albert Maori Kiki, Ebia Olewale and Reuben Taureka, ministers in the first national government; Joe Nombri, a district officer, and Oala Oala-Rarua, the first High Commissioner to Australia. It was they who formed one of the first political parties; that took place in 1967, seventeen years after the establishment of *Suara Rakyat* in Western New Guinea in 1950, a party that dealt with the truly national question of whether or not to break loose from the Netherlands, or from Indonesia or from both.

The first political topic that united the members politically was, typically enough, an action to block a bill which aimed at having different salaries for black and white public servants. The matter had clearly been put forward in the wrong way, since a difference in salary between expatriate and native public servants could never cause a serious conflict; it is impossible for any country to pay salaries it cannot afford, but it is very understandable that no politician, who is striving to remove the colonial rulers so that he can take their place, is willing to accept a cut in salary at the moment when he is about to reach the top. Moreover a good deal of the budget had to be put up by Australia. And independence was not around the corner yet; the first stage in the process was home rule or self-government, and the proposal of the thirteen was a chief minister and a cabinet of eight ministers.

The first political party was initiated by two Australian district officers or *kiaps*, Tony Voutas and Barry Holloway. They were elected for Parliament and apparently played a very active role. This kind of participation in the native initiative by public servants, let alone by district officers, was very much discouraged in West New Guinea during the elections for the New Guinea Council. The corps of expatriate civil servants was seen as an auxiliary corps, with no task but gradually to transfer its responsibilities and to encourage native initiatives. Still the initiative of founding the *Pangu Pati* was worthwhile. The

meaning of *Pangu Pati* is Papua New Guinea Union Party, and from the name alone it is clear that the party was truly national both in the combination of territories and in the use of the pidgin word *Pati*.

Pangu can be compared with the West New Guinea *Parna*. In essence the parties are the same — nationalist, native, anti-white in a moderate way, and radical. In the eastern part the same happened as in the western part; the most radical party took no initiative for the violent uprising against the overlord, and it did not even have a flag or an anthem. A few élite Papuans in West New Guinea, who were above party and who had formerly collaborated harmoniously with the Dutch, brought their flag and had it raised during the inauguration of the New Guinea Council. If independence is something (according to the fashionable theory) which has to be wrested from the hands of the overlord, preferably by fighting, neither East New Guinea nor the Western part was ready for it. Anyway the other parties did not give the impression that they were very keen on independence. Within a week after the founding of *Pangu*, the Christian Democratic Party was formed in Wewak, favouring the incorporation of P.N.G. in the Australian state. The same line was taken in West New Guinea by the two parties (P.O.N.G. and U.E.) which were inspired by Indo-Europeans. The home country, however, used self-determination to get rid of the burden, not to keep it permanently. Of a similar nature were the programmes of the All Peoples Party formed by an Australian settler Jim McKinnon, and of Napro (the National Progress Party) formed by Bill Dihm, who was of mixed race. This political development was not welcomed by the Australian governor, Barnes, who considered it premature, but *Pangu* went on fielding candidates, and even if they did not confess to belonging to a party, they had the feeling of doing so.

If it is a precondition for independence that there should be a consciousness, transcending the boundaries of parochialism or tribalism, of sharing a common fate, then great parts of the territory were mentally ready for independence from Australia. And *Pangu* had important members from different regions: John Guise, Tei Abal and Sinake Giregire from the Highlands, Pita Lus and Michael Somare from the Sepik, Paul Lapun from Bougainville and Matthias Toliman from the Gazelle Peninsula. In the new House John Guise was elected Speaker, which was a major victory for the natives. During his inauguration he wore

his Westminster wig together with the Papuan *tapa* cloth and bird of paradise feathers. There was thus a real blending of different political cultures, but there was a definite colonial touch also: he had to resign as a member of *Pangu Pati*, forced to do so by the majority of the members. The anti-political party mood, strongly endorsed by the Administration, had a serious consequence. *Pangu Pati* would not allow its members to become members of the ministry. This of course provided the House with a capable opposition, but on the other hand the available ministerial candidates were very few and the nation, when independence came, would need them badly. One of the reasons why there were so few candidates was the delicate matter of representation, that showed a balance between highlands and coast, New Guinea and Papua and among interest groups such as business and people of foreign descent.

In its abstention from taking too active a part in the Administration, *Pangu* kept its hands free to be able to ventilate a growing dissatisfaction and even unrest, but as always the real things happened in society, not in politics, and how would political parties then represent the native interests? That was the real test of political maturity. Social tensions in the territory, mainly in Bougainville, reverberated in Australian politics and after the relatively easy pace of Spender and Hasluck, the new Prime Minister John Gorton actively engaged himself in P.N.G. affairs and considerably speeded up political development.

In August 1969 a small incident between villagers and surveyors of the mining company Conzinc Rio Tinto attracted much publicity in Australian newspapers; the publicity was unfavourable to the police and rather partial, because the spectacle of bare-breasted primitive women claiming their land and clashing with the police is of the same nature as a mother defending her baby against a wolf. It is strange that Bougainville in the far-away Solomon islands should be the place destined to alter New Guinea policy, but then Bougainville, which in former days was part of German territory when the rest of the Solomon islands in 1899 fell to Great Britain, was in a position for secession, and the land problem therefore had to be handled carefully. The problem was typical enough. Since the 1930s an echo of the gold fever of the mainland was heard there, and the prospectors were probably not the finest examples of the white race to win the confidence of the rather primitive, isolated deep-black population. In 1960 copper

deposits were discovered and although of low-grade quality, exploitation seemed viable because technology had improved and there was not yet any political impediment as in the Western part, where the copper deposits in the Carstensz Mountains had been explored from 1936 onwards but only exploited when the government of President Suharto could guarantee a régime of peace and quiet.

But there is more to it than a conflict between government and population about land, and it is even more than a conflict between customary and Western law. A parallel has to be drawn with the copper exploitation in Tembagapura in West Irian, where a continuous struggle is going on between the Indonesian government and the local population.

In Bougainville the Tolai, living in the copper-rich valley of the interior, are primitive, isolated people, keen on their land, because land is family, tribe and life itself. It is easy to criticise their resistance from the modernising viewpoint and to defend the new society's bigger scale and more centralised administration, but objections also came from Professor Jim Davidson of the Australian National University's School of Pacific Studies and from the Seamen's Unions. The latter emphasised the importance of environment, the former defended indigenous rights against planned seizure, which undoubtedly meant the compulsory expropriation of land, made possible by the Mining Bill of 1967, which referred specifically to the Bougainville Copper Agreement. So there was more to the matter than modernisation alone. This became clear when the mining industry had to acquire coastal land for a port near the village of Rorovana, which involved clearing jungle and cutting down fruit trees. The Rorovanans objected, although the company was legally in the right, and compensation was awarded.

A member of the House of Assembly, Lapun, was prepared to bring the case to the High Court, and the *Napidakoe Navitu*, a local organisation of three tribes, was formed to give support to the objecting parties. It had ceased to be a matter of land loss or legality; it had become a matter of being overwhelmed by a foreign culture, a culture of bulldozers and single men not only surveying as the old prospectors had done but displaying a different, detested life-style, without the local population having sufficient profit to compensate for it.

It was expected that in the first ten years of copper production the Administration would earn about \$40 million per year. In

the final agreement, the Rorovanans received \$300,000 after a first bid of \$30,000, a remarkable difference between bid and buy, but more important was the fact that the land was leased instead of sold and shares at par were included in the deal.

There is another interesting point about Bougainville besides the separatist initiative created by the resources of the island and the land issue in general. In the House of Assembly the representative of the Nasior people, Lapun, presented an amendment to the Bill that was virtually a plea for the introduction of an important piece of customary law, namely the ownership of the subsoil by the landlord. The landlord can then be considered not as a private person, but as the local community or even the island or province, but never as the faraway government in Rabaul, let alone in Canberra. Lapun's amendment came down to a 5 per cent royalty share to the landowners. He had to introduce the amendment twice, and there was some trouble between landowners and prospectors before he was able to win; but he carried it then by a satisfactory majority.

At the end of the 1960s opposition was encountered on the Gazelle islands also, and again the root of the evil was the land issue. *Gazelle* was one of the first territories to have been colonised, and the Germans used every means to expropriate many good pieces of land, mostly by purchase. But according to customary law, land returns to the owner after use, and it is very possible that the Tolai, as the landowners, sold a right of use while the Germans thought they were buying outright ownership. Anyway the Australians kept the 100,000 acres bought by the Germans for themselves after receiving the trusteeship. The Tolai community had increased considerably after nearly a century of contact with white civilisation, and a certain land hunger had grown up. It seems that the trouble arose in 1969 when the black island council became mixed. This was perfectly legal, but behind the problem of council representation was the land issue. And the resistance of the population could be voiced, because a member of the House, Tammur, was ready to do just that. Tammur had some experience in dealing with the problem of resisting the Australians when the game was being played according to their rules. The source of the opposition was the '*Mataungan*' Association (meaning 'Take care'), formed near Rabaul, which together with some *kirung* (villages) had never been represented in the island council. During the elections for the new council only 25 per cent voted, and some

villages did not vote at all. The abstentions spoke louder than the votes.

A revolt of some sort then broke out and there was violence on both sides, but again the clash was a cultural one. A solid basis for the struggle was laid when the Administration decided to hand out to Tolai settlers 15,000 acres of land, part of which had been bought from the trading firm W.R. Carpenter, and part taken from the Administration forest reserve. The land had originally been bought—or expropriated—by a German plantation owner. The *Mataungan* Association claimed that the land was the property of a certain Tirupia, who had given all rights in it to the Association—and this led to squatting in the area. During a tour which John Gorton, the Australian Prime Minister, made in July in company with a member of the House, Kaputin, Gorton tried to mediate and found that 10,000 people were rejecting his offer of talks or a referendum. The government tried to break the squatters' occupation of the land by sending in the police, insisting that the law had to be maintained.

Then a second, more vehement confrontation was staged. First the Administration tried again to negotiate and sent Simon Kaumi, who was married to Kaputin's sister, as an intermediary but without result: Kaputin and Tammur did not give in. That was on Saturday 18 July. All parties, including the squatters, went home for the week-end. It was the lull before the storm. On Monday morning the police started to clear the land but then the squatters started streaming back, a force of about 4,000 men with Tammur at the head. Captain Holloway was in charge of the police. Fortunately a request for assistance to the Pacific Island Regiment (P.I.R.) was refused, although technically there were very good reasons for it: the numbers of the people involved and the danger of starting a chain reaction against the Administration and white people's lives and property. Don Woolford sketches the incident vividly:

At 3.10 the Mataungans appeared. Tammur was at the head of a force variously estimated between three thousand and four thousand men. They walked four abreast with their arms in the air. The main body of police was behind the little bridge while the rest, armed with tear gas launchers, fanned out up and down stream. When the Mataungans were fifty yards from the bridge Holloway ordered them to stop. They shuffled to a halt, then slowly changed formation until there was a phalanx of men about twenty yards wide and thirty yards deep.

Throughout the manoeuvre they kept their hands in the air. Most of their leaders found high points to stand on and flung their arms out as if broken crucified. The Mataungan tableau was formed in silence broken only by bodies swishing through the undergrowth, a helicopter buzzing overhead, and police dogs baying.

Tammur and Kaputin on one side of the river, began swapping insults with Holloway, on the other side. 'Do you respect the traditional rights of our people?' Tammur called several times. Holloway refused to answer. Kaputin shouted: 'They steal our land and will kill us as Australians are killing thousands in their bloody war in Vietnam'. Tammur referred sneeringly to Holloway as 'Mister big commissioner' and Holloway shouted back that Tammur was a 'longlong man' ('lunatic'). Kaputin fired the final verbal shot: 'We will keep going for as many years as we have to. Eventually we will get our land.'

Fifteen minutes later, after a short meeting, the Mataungans began marching back.

Perhaps the most grotesque incident of the whole land dispute occurred on the Monday when, amid all the reports of the swelling Mataungan army, a Mr. Whippy ice-cream truck, tinkling 'Green-sleeves', trundled along the road and up to the police lines, where a queue quickly formed. A few hours later Mr. Whippy did equally good business on his way home through the ranks of the departing Mataungans.*

One gets the impression that the whole event was misinterpreted. Anyone who has been present at tribal wars in the Dani valley or the Paniai lakes region in West New Guinea knows by experience that the confrontation of men in war dress carrying primitive weapons, the shouting match and the simultaneous activities of women carrying wood or food are all part of the scene. It is war, but a confined war with calculated risks and a heavy accent on show, bluff and argument. The incident with the ice-cream truck seems incongruous, but it fits in perfectly. Ordinary life has to go on, even if incidentally somebody gets killed. If the Administration had won the shouting match it would certainly have scored a greater victory than if it had sent in the Pacific Islands Regiment—the Papuan army. It is typical that the Prime Minister, John Gorton, should have given permission to call in that assistance, and it proves the point that two legal worlds, two ways of making policy, two cultures clashed. So the whole Westminster-based system of

*Don Woolford, *Papua New Guinea*, Brisbane 1976, p.58.

democratisation was very much at stake, but a judgment here in terms of political maturity can easily miss the point. For the moment it is the superimposed system that wins. But in the election campaigns and in the events that have marked social unrest new personalities have emerged, not only Australian but from New Guinea as well. The dispute among New Guineans has brought up the problem of national unity: the separatist movement on Bougainville with the copper resources at its core, and the land problem in the Gazelle peninsula where membership of the Council was the crucial point at issue, are not as important as the difference in development between the coastal population and the Highlanders — the less sophisticated but big electorates of the interior.

Australian politicians had some notion of the problems in the territory. Both Gorton, the Prime Minister, and the opposition leader Gough Whitlam were inspired by the events there. Whitlam, convinced that Labour was going to win the Australian elections of 1972, unhesitatingly sided with the Mataungan on the Gazelle peninsula socially and with the *Pangu Pati* politically. Gorton had to play a very delicate game. Having decided that a final date for self-government had to be set, he could do no more than suggest it to the political leaders of the territory. But then he ran straight into problems in the Highlands. In both the eastern and the western parts of the Highlands he had to give his agreement that Australia would not disengage of its own free will without consulting the population of the territory. But even that promise was not to be kept: after the Labour government had taken over in Australia, it was very clearly proved that Australia was not going to remain a colonial power against its own will. The dispute between the Australian politicians of the two main opposing parties took place in the territory before huge crowds of New Guineans, but that was not the only event that fuelled the political flames. In the process of the territory being educated for independence, a national committee on constitutional development was installed. Its members were mostly New Guineans, but there were at least two influential Australian members. The committee would consult not only the different parts of the territory but also some other emerging countries. The consultation procedure itself had its effects on the political process. Paulus Arek, the chairman, himself a man of compromise, came up with a rather ambiguous first report; and in the final report an Australian secretary of the

committee from the Department of Territories phrased the crucial paragraph regarding the date when self-government would be attained in such a way that there appeared to be a clear statement that it could be no earlier than the 1976-80 session of the House, whereas it was desirable that it would happen in the 1972-6 session.

What was strange about this outcome was that the conservative majority had been by-passed by the progressive *Pangu Pati* of Somare. This was all the more important because entering the self-government phase automatically meant the approach of independence and nationalism; the name of the new nation would have to be decided upon, and the flag and coat of arms designed. Even the political party system was spurred on by the hearings of the constitutional committee and the pre-election battle in Australia between Gorton and Whitlam. During the second session of the House of Assembly it was not only the *Pangu Pati* that tried to introduce some discipline among its representatives. Three new parties emerged — the United Party, the People's Progress Party and the National Party. *Pangu's* aggressive stand inspired the organisation of more conservative views on the other side. The United Party and National Party, as can be deduced from their names, were multi-racial parties, largely inspired by white members of the House and therefore not very radical. Somare from the beginning stated that he would prefer opposition to seeking ministerial office. Then the Highlanders organised themselves in the Compass group with Tei Abal as their spokesman, mainly to slow down the process of independence. They opposed the separatist tactics of the Bougainville and Gazelle peninsula people, but they opposed even more strongly the Gorton Government's policy of rapid progress towards a premature independence. Whatever the reason, *Pangu* scored a decisive victory at the New Guinea polls, at the moment when self-government was at hand. The radicals were ready; *Pangu* had campaigned to rule, so after the election victory the opposition side became the champion of home rule and the centre of the Ministerial Nominations Committee, and declared, surprisingly, that the timing of self-government was a less important problem than the type of self-government best suited to the country!

So Somare became prime minister — or, technically, deputy chairman of the Administrators Executive Council. Of its members Olewale, Taureka, Maori Kiki and Lapun belonged to

Pangu, while the conservative parties supplied Chan, Mola, Kavali, Okuk and Guise. The ministers of this cabinet were much more capable than the members of the 1968 House. So four years of politics had tremendously improved the quality of the future home rule team. Of the total of seventeen seats, the remaining two were given to *Pangu*, two to People's Progress, two to the National Party, and the remaining seat to Paulus Arek. There was an equitable regional representation. The islands had three each, and the New Guinea mainland and Papua four each.

THE TRANSFORMATION FROM WEST NEW GUINEA INTO WEST IRIAN

On his way back from Indonesia to the United States via The Hague in 1962, Robert Kennedy, the U.S. President's special envoy, deemed it necessary repeatedly to ask the question: 'How many universities did the Netherlands found in New Guinea?' He did not know that in 1945, when New Guinea became a separate province, the Netherlands had started to build a university. This was the Bestuurschool (School of Administration), which was admittedly not a university according to the American or Dutch definition, but was definitely up to, and even beyond, the standard of an Indonesian university. So the Indonesians had an easy job after the take-over in 1963—they simply converted the Bestuurschool into the Chendrawasih University. The same happened at a different level on Biak where the alphabetisation teams alphabetised villages that had had schools for generations.

No doubt the misunderstanding was genuine. To justify its claim Indonesia had to see the Netherlands as the colonial overlord, an exploiter, intent on its own direct advantage. It was a disappointment for honest Indonesian nationalists to see how hostile the liberated Papuan was towards Indonesia and it was a surprise also to impartial United Nations officials. The Netherlands, always boorish in public relations and suspected for its mercantile attitude, had never been able to put across the results of a short period of intensive rule.

In terms of mere figures, by 1 October 1962, when the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) took over from the Dutch, a significant level of political and democratic development had been attained. The New Guinea Council and the installation of Papuan under-secretaries (see above, pp. 62ff) made New Guinea in 1962 comparable to what Papua New Guinea was to become by 1972. The problem of setting a date for home rule had been all but solved. The Dutch Minister for Internal Affairs, Dr. E. Toxopeus, had refused to set

a final date, but 1970 was accepted as the target date and its fulfilment depended only on the level of Papuanisation in administration. The administration was the key factor in the whole development process. New Guinea itself had never been a factor of economic importance in the Netherlands East Indies, and the actual economic position in 1962 was as weak as ever, only the agricultural prospects being favourable. On the other hand, because of the lack of plantations, hostility on the side of the Papuans over ownership of land was virtually non-existent. Only in Manokwari and Merauke did some land disputes have to be settled; but the post-war Indo-European settlers in Manokwari departed along with the Dutch government, and the Javanese people in the south had been there since before the war.

A land problem began to appear in 1969 at the moment when Indonesia first transplanted Javanese migrants to the Nabire plain in Teluk Chendrawasi and the Grimé plain near Jayapura. Even more serious was the problem of founding a town in the Carstensz (or Sukarno) Mountains to extract copper without a fair share of participation on the part of the population. So in the very first years of Indonesian colonisation the lack of economic development of the land became a major problem.

Even if the Papuans were encouraged to take part in economic development it is clear that the political uncertainty in the Dutch period was a heavy drawback on development and investment. So progress was very unbalanced and even became risky when the Dutch policy of self-determination misfired. On the other hand, the development of a national consciousness allowed West New Guinea to escape the danger of separatist movements such as the one in Bougainville. The difference in the level of development between the coast and the Highlands did not create such a gulf as in East New Guinea.

Robert Kennedy's remark about education may have been right for the period of colonial rule, viewing West New Guinea as part of the Netherlands East Indies. After the war there were only 531 elementary schools with a total enrolment of 25,883 native pupils, six trade schools and one training centre for the junior civil service for a population of 267,447 who were under effective rule out of the estimated 1 million inhabitants; in 1949 the first middle school was opened. But at the end of the Dutch period the figures had drastically changed: the population was now estimated at only 530,000 people, and of these two-thirds

had been reached by Dutch rule, and the target was to have all of them under rule by 1964. Half the children would then attend primary school and 4 per cent post-primary institutions, a marked stress being placed on the forming of an élite.

The government budget amounted to 142 million guilders in 1962, the Dutch grant-in-aid being 101 million. The European Economic Community made available development aid totalling 133 million guilders over the whole period of Dutch rule. New Guinea's own share of the budget was 37 million guilders in 1961, excluding defence costs. The Department of Social Services, especially Public Health, could boast of good results. Over 200,000 people profited from the malaria eradication campaign, and 400,000 from an anti-yaws campaign.

In this period there were altogether 8,461 government jobs, and 52.5 per cent of them were taken by Papuans, who played an active part especially in the opening up and development of new areas. Emphasis was shifted from primary to secondary education. There were four secondary schools in 1958, and seven in 1961. Three Papuans were studying in Holland for university degrees, and seven others were at the Medical School in Port Moresby.

The main feature, however, was the creation of an infrastructure of basic facilities. Communication had improved considerably. Biak was an international airport. There were seven secondary and forty-six tertiary airfields, and a national airline, *De Kroonduif*, an affiliate of the Dutch K.L.M., had eleven aircraft. Moreover two missionary societies had their own airlines with six planes. International shipping connections existed, with Papua New Guinea *inter alia*. Coastal and river traffic had a fleet of some 100 vessels. There was about 500 km. of roads but not yet any traffic between towns. Radio communication, for both administration and mission stations, was excellent.

The New Guinea Council, installed on 5 April 1961, was not at all the same as what had been conceived by the regulations of 1949. The tripartite feature was dropped, and there was universal suffrage. The Council had the right of initiative, of amendment, of petition and of interpellation, but not of budget. Elections were held in fourteen districts: the voting in two of them was direct, while in the others it was by two removes. Twenty-three of the twenty-eight seats were taken by Papuans. The level of voting varied between 53 and 86 per cent. During the election for the Biak-Numfoor community 80 per cent was

reached. It was the responsibility of the Council of this community to run its own domestic affairs and they could dispose of their own funds; hence it could issue local laws and levy local taxes.

This development came to a sudden standstill at the moment when UNTEA took over, and never regained its momentum under Indonesian rule: indeed the reverse took place.

During the last days of crisis, Governor Platteel had cabled already that after the evacuation of Dutch women and children from the south coast, Dutch officials would not have sufficient morale to stay on. They were disgusted with the process of selling out the Papuans. The Dutch government doubled the salaries of its officials who did stay, but too many of them were not interested any more and decided to make a new life elsewhere. (They were never paid better than officials in the home civil service of their own country.) Business did not stay either; everyone was disillusioned and went. Buildings and stock were turned over to the missions. Papuan servants got more movables and furniture than they could store. UNTEA was unable to handle the country, and it had to replace Dutch by Indonesian officials during its one-year term. Indonesia had the good taste to send some of its best officials to New Guinea, and there was a remarkably good rapport between Indonesians and Dutchmen, a second surprise to U.N. officials.

Despite the fact that Indonesia had to demolish the image of the Dutch as effective and well-intentioned administrators, and therefore purposely neglected and sometimes actually destroyed a number of installations that were obviously of Dutch origin, nobody could deny that the New Guinea rupiah, at par with the Dutch guilder, was a very hard currency and shops in West New Guinea were full of valuable merchandise. After all, at the beginning of the 1960s the purchasing power of the Papuans alone already amounted to 35 million guilders a year.

So Indonesians of great ability were the forerunners of the crowd that was to appear in the next decade. The UNTEA period was never very important, as there was heavy reliance on some remaining Dutch officials, mostly young men. The locals of Indonesian extraction, for centuries the backbone of Dutch rule, virtually maintained the *status quo*; no top echelon was really needed because the only policy was a non-policy. The take-over happened on 1 October 1962, and UNTEA was able to walk out in May 1963. The U.N. authority did not appear fit

to put up effective resistance to Indonesian hubris such as was displayed from the start by the occupying paratroopers. The Indonesian take-over became visible already during the concluding negotiations in New York, when the Foreign Minister, Subandrio, already claimed that Indonesian infiltrators should have a region designated for them where they could exert some provisional sovereignty. The UNTEA produced only a token protest, but the clashes between Indonesian soldiers and Papuans were violent. In Biak and Sentani some Papuans who did not show sufficient respect (*hormat*) were brutally knocked down and beaten or kicked to death. The arrival of some 25,000 Indonesian troops ready for battle, when the enemy had already lost at the conference table, did not make a favourable impression.

After the departure of the U.N. officials the curtain fell and the Papuans went into their night of occupation. There was still a glimmer of hope while the U.N. still had no proof of Papuan willingness to belong to and stay in the Indonesian empire. Indonesia failed dismally to win the sympathy of the Papuans. The poverty in Indonesia, for instance in Jakarta because of President Sukarno's failing economic policy, directly affected the behaviour of Indonesian officials, who literally took away everything that the Dutch had brought. There had always been a black market, from Sorong to the Kofiau and Aju islands in Indonesia, in transistor radios, gramophones, refrigerators and other luxuries, which were traded for rice and other food, but now every shop sold out. When Adam Malik visited Jayapura and planned to give one of his speeches about *Indonesia-*raya** and the victory over colonialism, the Papuans, as usual clever in an inconspicuous way, managed to slip notes to him to draw his attention to the empty shop-windows. Malik cancelled his speech and after having seen with his own eyes the truth of the Papuan objections, promised to end the situation. He kept his promise, and within about a year stocks were more or less back to normal, even though prices were very high. But the situation was at an absolute low: the new hospital of Jayapura was dismantled, loaded ships entered the port of Jayapura and returned still loaded.

If only the New Guinea rupiah had not been kept at par with the Dutch guilder and thus automatically in a fixed relationship to the U.S. dollar and the Straits dollar, the Papuans would have been saved quite some misery, and the Indonesians a

fast-growing anti-Indonesian mood. The exchange rate of the Indonesian rupiah decreased rapidly due to the soaring inflation under President Sukarno's rule; so in West Irian all sorts of commodities could be imported and re-exported to Jakarta at a huge profit (because the Irian rupiah and the Indonesian rupiah were convertible). The black market for foreign exchange rose to 350 per cent in 1966-7.

In 1965 a new Indonesian rupiah was introduced, the Irian rupiah was devalued and convertibility was suspended.

	<i>Irian rupiah</i>	<i>Indonesia rupiah</i>	<i>U.S. dollars</i>
1963	1.00	62.25	0.275
1964	1.00	142.00	0.275
1965 (1 Dec.)	1.00	1000.00	0.10
1965 (31 Dec.)	1.00	1.00	0.10
1966 (Oct.)	1.00	2.76	0.10
1967 (April)	1.00	18.90	0.10
1970 (April)	1.00	18.90	0.05
1971 (Aug)	1.00	18.90	0.045

So 1965 was the peak year for 'exports' to Jakarta, but by then the former New Guinea had been stripped of almost all capital equipment, machine parts and movable commodities. The Papuans, with their tradition of cargo-cults, felt themselves betrayed and robbed, and years before the Act of Free Choice had to be held in 1969, the outcome was clear: Indonesia would not have the slightest chance of winning. But inevitably the Indonesians kept the Papuans — as the U.N. representative, the Bolivian Ortiz Sanz, put it — 'under tight political control'. In the meantime their purchasing power decreased visibly. Papuan officials who remained loyal to the former government were dismissed. They had no income at all. Some got their pensions in devalued Irian rupiahs. Only the Papuan military, who still earn their pensions in guilders, are the new millionaires.


Difficult as it may be to gain insight into what occurred during the dark days at the beginning of Indonesian occupation, some major facts are clear. For analytical convenience it would be easier to split up the period since the end of Dutch sovereignty into the UNTEA period, the subsequent period up till the Movement of the Act of Free Choice and the period of Indonesian overlordship. It is understandable that Indonesians should have arrived in West Irian in a fighting mood; after all, an invasion force of 25,000 battle-ready soldiers was being landed to take what it could never obtain from the U.N., and

now it had to behave itself again under the authority of U.N. officials, a difficult obligation. Even in the second period before the Act of Free Choice, it made sense to force the Papuans into a brainwashing process about independence, but the unjust rule went on. The gulf is now deep and the hatred cannot easily be removed. For the Papuans in both periods the outcome was the same: injustice and insult. The Indonesians make a strong point of not giving the Papuans preferential treatment, because all Indonesians are equal and the Papuans claim a status denied to all other Indonesians. Moreover West Irian is a primitive country and the Dutch also had a problem in suppressing a revolt at the Wissel lakes in 1956; in 1960 a Dutch district officer killed a Papuan tribesman during a pacification action in the Baliem valley and a Dutch district officer was killed in 1962 near Genjem by Nimboran people who were settling an old score.

Still West Irian from 1963 until now has been the scene of continuing insurgency and repression. It was only to be expected that the few sophisticated Papuans who represented their people in the period of negotiation between the Netherlands, the U.N. and Indonesia would, after the failure, establish a government-in-exile. There even turned out to be more than one in the Netherlands, because even minor differences, especially over finance, could cause a split. But it was worse that on 1 July 1971, nine years after the departure of the Dutch, in an uncontrolled area of West Irian north of Jayapura, 'free Papuans' proclaimed the 'Republic of West Papua New Guinea' in Markas Victoria/Port Numbay (a fictitious name for the secret headquarters). The proclamation was signed by Zeth Rumkorem among others, one of the Biak or rather Supiori clan, mentioned already in the chapter on Papuan resistance to Japanese occupation in the Second World War. Both in Dakar, Senegal, in 1976 and in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1972 'offices' to represent that republic have been opened.* In P.N.G., both near the border and in Port Moresby, there is mutual understanding and liaison.

For years contacts at the U.N. in New York have been nurtured, relations with the Brazzaville countries in francophone


*The Stockholm office is closed at the time of writing, mainly because the representative had insufficient means of support. More important, however, is the fact that high-ranking academic staff of Stockholm University are backing the liberation movement.



8. Governor P.J. Platteel with Johan Ariks, leader of the *Partai Orang Nieuw-Guinea*, who was killed in Manokwari prison in 1967.

9. Two West New Guinea leaders: left Nicolaas Jouwe, right Marcus Kaisiepo.






10. Indonesian rule:
President Suharto
welcomed by Papuan
dancing on a visit to the
new oilfield on Salawati
island.



11. Javanisation and
Islamisation in Jayapura: a
Balinese settler family
with, behind, a mosque
under construction.



12. A boatyard and ferrocement boat nearing completion, both financed by FUNDWI.



13. Mrs Walter Mondale, wife of the U.S. Vice President, visits the West Irian pavilion at the 'Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park' in Jakarta, 1978.



14. Seth Runkorem and a resistance group in West Irian, c. 1975.

15. At a conference arranged by the Papua New Guinea government at Port Moresby in 1975, the West Papuan leaders (l. to r.): Herman Womsiwor, Amos Indey, Seth Runkorem, Filemon Jufuway and Eli Marjen.



Africa are loosely kept up, and, most important of all, Papuans in Jakarta as well as in the Highlands, in the bush and in Indonesian service have developed a sense of loyalty and a common understanding which transcends tribal and linguistic differences. The resistance has become a movement.

Dr. Ortiz Sanz noted in 1969 that Indonesia exercised 'tight political control over the Papuans', and the same expression was used again in 1971 by Australian observers. I still feel sick at the recollection of personal stories I have heard of Papuans known to me for years when I returned to the country after a sixteen-year absence, but it is difficult to assess what really happened and happens. But there is no doubt that in Biak in the days of the Act of Free Choice some 400 Biak people were executed, some of them in a horrible manner. Houses on Mökmer ridge near the airfield were destroyed, and in 1967 the Indonesian air force strafed Manokwari, reportedly killing forty people. Behind this was the Mandachan rebellion, dating back as far as the take-over of sovereignty in 1950. As mentioned before, the people in the Bird's Head, especially in the upper region of the Aifat river, never agreed to Indonesian rule till the Indonesians succeeded in persuading Lodewijk Mandachan and Ferry Awom* to surrender and invited Mandachan Jakarta to visit President Suharto who made him a colonel in the Indonesian army. ** The coastal group in Manokwari, who are ethnically of Biak, Numfoor and Wandammen origin, also did not agree to Indonesian rule; they were long opposed to the sultan of Ternate (Indonesia's shadow-governor of West Irian in the days of confrontation with the Dutch).

A second vast rebellion took place in 1969 in the Kamu plain near the Paniai (formerly Wissel) lakes, where the Danis quietly

*Ferry Awom, a former sergeant in the 'Papuan Battalion' was not a member of any tribe in the Bird's Head, but he was trusted by the leading warriors of the Mandachan tribe. Lodewijk Mandachan was doubtless the most powerful of them, and other warlords such as Barend Mandachan and Meidedotga would follow him, but there is no hierarchy of ranks. At the moment the commissioner in Manokwari Onin is a Papuan and certainly there is some understanding between civil administration and tribal people. On the other hand, links with the P M O still exist, and basically the mood in the Bird's Head is anti-Indonesian.

**Lodewijk Mandachan has died, and is buried in the 'heroes' cemetery' in Manokwari, where all the military who took part in 'Operation Jayawijaya' and have died in New Guinea are buried. In 1976 Barend also died, but he has been buried in the bush.

forced all foreigners to leave, closed the airfield and let the local Franciscan Father Coenen handle the transmitter at fixed times. They kept the crystal of the transmitter to themselves. Order was restored when paratroopers were dropped near the lakes, who in a few days penetrated into the Kamu plain. According to the Papuan who related this event, only two or three Indonesians were killed; the most remarkable feat of the Papuans was that they had only a few guns with bullets to match, so they fired only if a plane tried to land and they did not waste bullets.

In the 1960s over and over again Indonesian soldiers disappeared or were killed near Arso, south of Jayapura. This area near the Australian border was the hunting-ground of the *Papua Merdeka* organisation. The movement claims to have hundreds of members, which is true potentially, but it has no more than a few dozen rifles and a few sten-guns. It is also clear that it regularly obtains Indonesian guns and the know-how needed to handle them. It ranges from the Arso area, both west to the Meer plain and as far as the P.N.G. border in the east, but the most remarkable thing is that in 1977 they moved north across the mountains to Tembagapura, where in a concerted action they aroused the local mountain people to sabotage the pipelines of Freeport Indonesia,* so that copper production was brought to a standstill for months. Indonesian forces have tried to penetrate the villages, but the effort has brought them little success.

More attention was given to the kidnapping in the same area of the military commander of Jayapura, a brave man, who was trying to talk the resistance fighters out of their actions. His fate is still not known, but his underestimate of Papuan feelings might well have cost him his life.** This incident provoked a violent armed reaction from Indonesia; one battalion penetrated the jungle, supported by the air force, while another was held in reserve. Papuans freely cross the eastern border in the north, but they are also hunted across it by the Indonesian military. The border with Papua in the south is also crossed by hundreds of Papuans seeking greater safety.

A Marind-anim tribesman visiting Merauke for the golden

*Freeport Indonesia is a consortium of U.S. and Japanese capital, with Freeport U.S.A. owning 87 per cent of the shares. Exploration rights in the Carstensz area, mainly for copper, were granted in 1967.

**It became known that the prisoners had been released in exchange for weapons. In 1979 the Indonesian Foreign Minister declared in Port Moresby that Indonesian military actions against the rebels would cease.

jubilee of the Mission of the Sacred Heart in January 1978 was asked why he did not stay in the land of his birth, and he simply answered: '*Kami tidak bisa tahan*' ('We cannot stand it'.) So it is not only the political repression or military occupation of the towns that makes the Papuans disappear, it is the whole climate of contempt and unfair competition which makes them strangers in their own country. The number of military in the Dutch period — about 12,000 — has been more than doubled, concentrated in a few towns. The civilian Indonesians are also concentrated in the immediate surroundings of the towns. Anyone wishing to travel in the country needs a special pass and even then the gateway to the interior, Nabire, is not easily opened. A visit to the copper town of Tembagapura needs another permit again. One may travel from Ujung Pandang (Sulawesi) to Biak, Jayapura, Sorong or Manokwari, but beyond there one has to report to the police for legitimisation.

It is clear that the Indonesians do not have much more grip on the country than the Japanese had. It is due mainly to the Missions that the country is still open. It is also true that individual Indonesians play a role comparable to that of the Chinese traders in the early days. When, for instance, colonisation by Javanese in the Baliem valley did not succeed, some of them remained because Wamena and Jayapura, connected by a direct flight, are also closely connected for tourism and small trading. So Irian Jaya has become the land of enclaves. Two thousand Javanese colonists near Sentani lake in the Grisee plain and near Nabire live under the protection of the army or rather in a form of co-existence with it, but the native population is grumbling about the land that has been taken from them, and it is not easy to see how this can be settled for as long as the landlords have a poor living themselves. Only in one place, Manokwari, where the agricultural station has been completed with E.E.C. aid and where the Eurasian settlers have abandoned their possessions, have Papuans from the Bird's Head, Karoon people, settled themselves nicely. So the right of ownership has restored itself there. But development among the Papuans makes no progress; one *Bupati* (district commissioner) asked me during my visit how we (the Dutch, for I had been his predecessor in that area) had managed to govern and I gave him a very short recipe: '*Jangan busuk*', 'Don't be corrupt'. He understood.

The Indonesians cover up the insurgency by claiming that what is going on is a clash of different cultures, but they have

explained too much; they explained the insurgency in Biak, which has a higher percentage of literacy than Java, by blaming the primitiveness of the area. So it is certainly not the primitiveness of the country that makes it uncontrollable, nor even the deep political gulf; it is corruption, which is everywhere. Indonesian officialdom is corrupt in a customary way, but for Papuans there is an extra handicap on top of it: ethnicity. I saw a Papuan boy being taught to make a *sembah* — it was like trying to teach a boxer to conduct a symphony orchestra. In the beginning of 1978 one of the Javanese Catholic bishops visited West Irian because a Catholic mission in the south had to be transferred owing to the phased withdrawal of the Dutch missionaries — preferably to the Catholic Church of Indonesia. When he landed in Biak he said before he reached the Hotel Irian, 100 metres away from the airfield: 'It is clear who is the colonial master here.' When he returned to Jakarta a few weeks later, he confessed: 'I have met the Irianese, but till now I have not been able to force myself to touch one of them.'

The civilising efforts of the Indonesians often seem to miss the mark. The action '*Operasi koteka*', launched in 1971 by the Indonesian government, particularly by the military commander, Brigadier Acub Zainal, to make the Highland Papuans wear trousers and dresses — 'decent clothes' — is more patronising and in essence more repugnant than the anti-veil campaign of the French in Algeria which the Algerian women, supported by Frantz Fanon, rightly rejected. One can hardly expect a native policy from a military commander who writes of his army as *Bapa Tentara*, Father Army.

The best proof of lack of understanding of Papuan culture is found in the Jakarta museum. The collection is very poor; the best pieces are still those that date from the Dutch colonial period, and the pieces added after the take-over all have the quality of kitsch. One of the main tasks to be done is to open to Indonesians the numerous books and articles on New Guinea written in Dutch after the take-over. The 1976 'cultural agreement' between Indonesia and the Netherlands could be of significance in this respect. The new Hotel Horizon, decorated with so-called Irianese art, is as eloquent for Papuan culture as the casino, the massage-parlour and the fish-restaurant for ancient culture. The *Papua bodoh*, *Papua bina tang* attitude is as much alive as ever, only the Papuan does not necessarily agree himself.

So the relationship between Indonesia and West Irian is handicapped by a groundswell of growing Papuan national consciousness and by a definite feeling of ethnicity, even of *négritude*, that was first fully awakened when black soldiers in the Allied forces landed in New Guinea in the 1940s. That feeling was further enhanced by the leap forward which took place during the short twelve-year period of intensive Dutch rule; the response of the Papuans to that challenge was very clear and eighteen years of Indonesian contempt have hardly been able to alter that.

But grievances are more tangible and more universal than frustration and maltreatment alone. One of the main problems has been the influx of people from other islands, mainly Sulawesi; the Makasarese are the most numerous. Van der Kroef mentions figures of 5,000 for 1970 and 10,000 for 1971. Official migration schemes aim at agricultural production to relieve overpopulated Java; no more than a few thousand people are involved, and if there is a land problem in Nabire and Nimboran, there is at least no problem of the settlers elbowing each other out of jobs and houses. However, this does happen in the urban areas; the Papuans are literally pushed back into the bush.

At Jayapura in 1976 I watched a school parade in honour of the United Nations day for children, *Hari kanak kanak*. I stood near the harbour for about an hour and saw many hundreds of little children pass by. I counted the Papuan children, and there were no more than six of them. In the beautiful masquerade the teachers had even dressed up three of the darker, more frizzy-haired Indonesian children as cannibals to play Papuan children. I do not believe those poor kids liked that much, because their companions were not only dressed in the most beautiful *adat*-costumes — exquisite small Javanese dancers, bridal couples and warriors — but there were also very modern expensively clad little generals in full uniform. It is probable that the whole festivity was organised by kindergarten schools, and Papuans are not sufficiently sophisticated to pay school fees for that sort of education, but then there were not even many Papuans among the spectators, and they do not easily miss an opportunity for *ramai* (fun) if it is free. Van der Kroef cites a foreign commentator who observes that in Jayapura 'almost overnight sharp-witted Sulawesians from Makasar have taken control of the waterfront markets'. As early as 1961 it was

possible for a contributor to the *Far Eastern Economic Review* to write: 'large-scale migration of Indonesians from other provinces to West Irian seems to be deliberate and official policy'.*

In 1976 the process had become aggravated. By then the Papuan population had been stripped *de facto* of its fishing rights; the Makasarese had not only taken over the market place in the harbour and in Hamadi, but the fishing itself was done by them too. Indonesian prostitutes, even though harassed by Islamic feminist movements, have some housing in the harbour area, but Papuan girls roam the street in out-of-bounds areas.

According to the last U.N. figures, issued in 1961, the urban population was as follows:

Hollandia	8,400
Biak	5,800
Manokwari	8,500
Sorong	3,100
Fakfak	1,200
Merauke	2,500
	<hr/>
<i>Total</i>	29,500

According to Indonesian figures, the situation in 1971 was as follows:

Jayapura	45,800
Biak	21,500
Manokwari	14,700
Sorong	23,800
Fakfak	13,600
Merauke	21,400
	<hr/>
<i>Total</i>	140,800

There could easily be a difference here in the definition of the urban boundaries or in the people numbered in the census. For instance, in the U.N. figures the Dutch military (12,000 men) were not included and the Indonesian census may have been rather inaccurate, but still the fact of a rapidly increased density is very conspicuous.

In 1976, according to the Indonesian estimate, the number of inhabitants in West Irian was 923,000. In 1961 the number of

*Bob Hawkins, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 22 May 1961, p.67.

Papuans in West Irian was 717,055 according to the report submitted by the Netherlands to the United Nations. It can be safely assumed that the population increase of the Papuans is about 2 per cent a year.* So by 1976 the native population in West Irian should have stood at a figure of 969,000, nearly a million. Apart from that it is clear that the population of the towns — from which, as we have seen, the Papuans have virtually disappeared — has increased from 29,500 in 1961 to 140,800 in 1971.

If one estimates the number of Indonesian military and officials and their families plus the immigrants, official and unofficial, the increase of over 100,000 in the towns can easily be explained, but what has happened to the Papuans? About 150,000 of them are missing. The liberation movement claims that between 1963 and 1975 over 30,000 men, women and children of West Irian have been summarily executed by Indonesian firing squads.** It is an accusation which is extremely difficult to prove, but on the other hand it is impossible to explain away the disappearance of 150,000 Papuans without highlighting the considerable measure of neglect shown by the Indonesian authorities towards the Papuans.

The 'strict political control' ordered by the Indonesians in the period up to 1969 and thereafter, which in the first instance was caused by the Washington Agreement of 1962, needs to be looked into. The wording of the so-called 'Act of Free Choice' already raises doubts. The English text differs from the Indonesian version, the '*Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat*' (*Pepera*); the latter means a process to decide the conclusion or the findings of the people, usually translated as 'Declaration of the People's Opinion'. This ambiguous phrasing made possible the Indonesian way of consulting the people: '*mushawarah*' until consensus — *mufakat* — was reached. In the debate on the Resolution of 19 November 1969 (2504 [XXIV]), when the General Assembly took note of the report of the Secretary General on the outcome of the Act of Free Choice under the auspices of UNTEA, it was already clear that several states had doubts about the method itself and about the way in which it

**Leiding, Demografisch Onderzoek Westelijk Nieuw-Guinea*, The Hague, 1962/1964.

***Zwartboek Nieuw-Guinea*, issued by the Provisional Government of West Papua-New Guinea, The Hague.

had been applied. However, the matter was considered to be the concern of the two nations involved — Indonesia and the Netherlands — and of no others. The Dutch opinion held that the *mushawarah* method did not contravene the provisions of the agreement of 1962 'in itself'.

How this method had been applied, however, was outside the control of the Netherlands and even of the representative of the U.N., who had no apparatus, let alone experienced officials, to exercise effective control over the process used. The draconian measure of executing 400 people on Biak has already been mentioned. If in other places the Indonesian approach was perhaps less vehement, it was no less effective. At Enarotali in the Paniai lakes region, men assigned by the people to represent their opinion were simply replaced by Indonesian substitutes, if it was suspected that they would not make a pro-Indonesian choice. In Kokonao on the south coast, the representatives of the people were told by Indonesian soldiers that their wives and children would be killed if they did not vote in favour of the Indonesian claim. This threat was made at the moment when the Kokonao representatives were leaving by boat on their way to Fakfak, the place of gathering.

Similar stories are told of every place where the people's voice was to be represented, and if true they would easily explain why the Papuans were unanimous in their pro-Indonesian choice. The very unanimity of the choice also explains why so many countries (excepting the Netherlands) were hesitant about giving their approval to Resolution 2504, which accepted the report of the Secretary General (A/7723 24th Assembly) which fulfilled Resolution 1752 (of 1962) authorising the carrying out of the Act of Free Choice.

Garnaut and Manning give another sidelight on the manipulation used by the Indonesians to gain complete control over West Irian. They noted how shopkeepers in Jayapura, the capital, received a substantial credit from a secret fund to fill their stores with consumer goods that were not usually available during the period of carrying out the Act of Free Choice.

Thus there must be serious doubts as to whether the Papuans had a fair chance to exert their right of self-determination. The outcome has been accepted but new doubts arise now that accusations of genocide seem to have some basis of truth.

8

WEST IRIAN: THE DEVELOPMENT POLICY

From the population figures given in the last chapter, it is clear that an overall Indonesian policy is taking precedence over a special policy for the Papuans. Development policy is in general too broad an expression to describe the activities which have gone on in West New Guinea. They are indeed numerous and important, but to a great extent they are aimed at the economic sector and to the extracting industry in particular. In the years after the Second World War, when the Resident, Van Eechoud, tried to open up the country, he defined its economy as a collecting economy — thus characterising the production of copal, damar, timber, crocodile skins, fish, pala, nutmeg and so on. The Dutch governors Van Baal and Platteel followed a policy of increasing agricultural production, and to this end introduced coffee, cocoa and rubber; stimulated copra and rice, planted timber — in short it was an organised production. But it did not come off: Indonesia preferred not to follow this policy, but rather to run it down by a combination of neglect and deliberate action. It had no policy, except for one governor's idea of stimulating tobacco-growing, since he had done the same successfully in Bali.

But one has to make a distinction. Since Sukarno's downfall, Indonesian economic policy had changed; President Suharto turned for assistance instead to the West, and the International Group for Assistance to Indonesia was installed under the chairmanship of the Dutch and consisting of all the interested Western powers and Japan. Moreover, Western technocrats — mainly American — started again to play an important role in Indonesia. President Suharto had no objection to changing his investment policy and attracting foreign capital. The Dutch farewell gift, which had been lying dormant at the U.N., was more welcome than ever and so the U.N. was able to suggest some lines for development. The FUNDWI (the Foundation of the U.N. for the Development of West Irian) was the result, and within this foundation there was real concern for the fate of the Papuans.

But the main factor of change for West Irian was of course that political stability had arrived — at least so it appeared to the outside world, since the country was no longer a bone of contention between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The political situation prevented the Netherlands from attracting capital investment for the exploitation of resources. In 1936 the geologist Dozy had explored the Carstensz Mountains, not without results, and in the 1950s the New Guinean Oil Company and the University of Delft had resumed exploration.* Both the Tamrau and Cyclops Mountains and Waigeo were to some extent promising for minerals, mainly nickel. One of the last things the Dutch did before they left the country was to conclude a contract with the Pacific Nickel Company on 7 March 1962, a contract that had been under way for over twelve years. The Indonesian claim to the territory had not been the only political stumbling block; there had also been, in the first place, the problem of exploitation costs, because the nickel and cobalt resources were of low grade, and secondly in the interests of the local people it was important whether or not the minerals should be processed in New Guinea.

Among the many subjects brought forward in the New Guinea Council, exploitation of the mineral resources never reached the agenda. Marcus Kaisiepo, one of the most prominent Papuans, and now president of the government-in-exile in the Netherlands, stated at that time in the New Guinea Council: 'Economically the population is similar to a pig — if we have eaten enough, we go and sleep. The Department of Economic Affairs has a difficult job to stimulate a population which can not easily be set to work. Even the continuous production of copra is very unfamiliar to us.' He, like many other Papuan leaders, was in favour of stimulating production by all sorts of ways and he thought the Dutch Administration much too permissive. As he said very characteristically, 'It lets the population play on the palm of its hand without even making a move to close its fingers.'

*The exploration of ore resources in New Guinea dates back to the period before the First World War. In 1907-15, military exploration was systematically promoted, but only in 1936 did the geologist Dr. J.J. Dozy discover the ore mountain, Ertzberg. During the Second World War, a method was developed in Cuba to exploit low-ore resources, but the political situation in New Guinea prevented such investment from taking place, which would have resulted in Ertzberg being exploited.

This statement was only too true. When the Indonesian migrants undertook all sorts of economic activities, the Papuans stood by and had no idea what to undertake themselves. Thus in no time they lost what little economic opportunity they had.

During the last four years of Dutch rule there were easy credit facilities for starting a taxi business, opening a restaurant, cultivating a small plantation, and all kinds of small private enterprises, supported by advice from the provider of credit. But after the take-over it all collapsed. Only in 1967 when the FUNDWI money became available was some of it restored. Still it is worth noting how the population saw its economic future. Admittedly the process of arousing political consciousness has been a success, but it had been of no practical use as the will for economic advancement proved too weak; still, the economic topics discussed in the New Guinea Council show that the Dutch-inspired plans did not accord with the people's will. The idea of increased agricultural production did not appeal to the more advanced Papuans; they rather favoured industrial development. After some years' experience of development one is inclined to say that the New Guinea Council was right. But the Council did not quite understand the importance of exploitation of mineral resources (oil production had decreased to a mere trickle). Bakker* gives a list of points that were under discussion, were feasible and would have made an immense improvement in the economic situation. If only the Indonesian overlord had paid attention to these points the rapid disappearance of the Papuan would never have happened, even under the pressure of Indonesian immigration. *Inter alia*, these points were:

1. A strong emphasis had to be put on improved connections, both *inter-island* and with the Central Mountains. FUNDWI is still vainly trying to restore the inter-island connections, but in general the coconuts and copra rot away in the coastal villages. Small harbours needed to be improved and a number of small coasters made available. Air traffic in the Central Mountains had to be intensified, as both the Missions and the Administration had realised fully at the end of the 1960s. Since Nabire became the district capital of the mountain area, there has been a shuttle service of one- and two-engined aircraft, which makes

*J.C.M. Bakker, *Strategie van het economische ontwikkelingswerk in het voormalige Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea*, Tilburg 1965, p.155.

the air route very crowded in the morning hours before cloud closes the numerous small airfields.

2. Improved connections with the Central Mountains imply the promotion of tourism. In the Baliem valley it is promoted strongly, but as was mentioned above in connection with *Operasi Koteka*, it is done with little understanding of or respect for the autochthonous culture. The inhabitants of Baliem will change out of trousers into their *kotekas* and perform some uninteresting dances, playing the monkey in tourism's worst traditions.

3. The distribution of imported articles and fish in the Central Mountains should be improved, and production there should be stimulated: a special air freight tariff should be fixed for the transport of damar (resin) from the interior.

4. The plea for the Central Mountains ran parallel with a development policy for Biak, where control of resin production had to be transferred from the Government to the regional council. And in general there was a definite desire that balanced political and economic interests in the different areas should be promoted.

5. On the whole one could say that interest in both the agricultural and the industrial sectors of the economy was growing. Over and above development aid, foreign investment would have been welcome to stimulate economic initiatives, but the native economy appeared to be the principal focus of interest: co-operatives should be promoted as well as private enterprise, and a Chamber of Commerce and a credit bank established. It seems that the native economy is completely sunk in debt at present.

6. Native agricultural production had to be stimulated, eventually being forced upon the community. Sago production had to be improved, and plant diseases eradicated. Fishing in the Humboldt bay had to be encouraged by fixed prices, and export of agricultural products, such as cocoa, had to be increased by a price stabilisation fund. Petty trade in souvenirs and ethnograpica also deserved promotion.

In this summing up of aspirations attention is paid to the relation between the mountains and the coast; there is a clear division of functions and only road communications are not taken care of. It is easy of course to say that subsidy has to be paid for the air-freighting of products, but the feasibility of growing certain products mainly depends on transportation

costs. In the Dutch period, even the products of the very fertile Nimborean plain near Hollandia were transported by plane. Only the Americans have really opened up some areas; MacArthur's forces saw no problem in landing on the beaches and then living in the hills near Sentani lake, a distance of some 40 km. through mountainous country, but penetrating another 40 km. to open up the hinterland for agricultural production proved too much for the Dutch.* Until their departure, the connection consisted of no more than a track, the upkeep of which was the responsibility of the population as a service to the community.

The Indonesians certainly showed more vision in bulldozing a road to the Javanese rice-growing settlements in the Grisee plain on the way to Genjem. Till now the coastal towns have been no more than enclaves in the jungle, totally dependent on sea and air transport, but at the moment an effort is being made to inter-connect the towns and some areas of the hinterland.

The same broad vision is opening up the mountain area by making Nabire on the coast of the Bird's Head the capital and central post of the mountain area. It is true that to build a road from the coast to the mountains is almost impossible, but the idea is sound and in principle the Indonesian administration is connecting the different enclaves wherever possible. On the other hand it is not only economically desirable, but a strategic necessity as well, because it has become impossible to penetrate the hinterland as was done at the time when the inhabitants were still loyal to the Administration; in the bush the Indonesian government is on enemy territory and not even a division of paratroopers can change that. But whatever the motives, West Irian is different from P.N.G. because both coast and interior are less accessible. The mountain valleys are separated by a broken bottle landscape, and land connections between the

*The road from lake Sentani (Boroway) to Genjem in the Nimborean plain had to be kept up by local funds. It was a sound idea to make the population familiar with the idea that a local community had to guarantee the maintenance of local roads. It was plain for all to see that the road was a source of profit for the whole area. On the other hand, it took a lot of persuasion to have this 40-km. stretch of road maintained. The population was willing to build the road, but it was just too complicated to keep it in shape. Instead of providing funds, the central government decided to have an air connection with the capital Hollandia. As a district officer I was in charge of the maintenance of both the airfield and the road. Neither was easy, and the population just looked on.

growing centres and the agricultural hinterland are inevitably slow. A second point of interest in the development approach of the Papuans is the small scale of activities; behind their wishes and proposals is the sound idea of a small entrepreneur scale of operating, and this idea again is better understood by the down-to-earth, practical Indonesians than it was by the academic and distant Dutch officials. Again one can object that, strictly, Indonesian administrative care is almost exclusively directed at Indonesians, but true as this may be it is better to have natural development for the wrong population group than artificial development for the right one. If a Papuan representation could be restored it would be possible to have both: the right approach for the right people.

A final striking point in the agenda for discussion in the New Guinea Council is the comparison between production in West New Guinea and in the Australian territories respectively; it shows how close the two parts of the islands are in the minds of at least some Council members. It is clear of course that the two parts have to play complementary roles, but the fact remains that in the New Guinea Council this was brought up for the first time in a practical, economic setting by the Papuans themselves.

The main change in development policy, which was deliberately neglected by the Papuans in the New Guinea Council and never promoted by the Dutch except in the Van Eeoud period after the war, was that New Guinea was regarded as part of Indonesia. Van Eeoud's choice of Hollandia as the capital of New Guinea could never be undone, but the importance of Sorong, as the town virtually reaching out into the sea of the Moluccas, was increasing fast, and Manokwari, the natural port and former capital, had changed roles with Nabire, a poor harbour but the key to the hinterland and situated centrally in relation to Teluk Chendrawasih, the former Geelvink bay; even a splitting-up of the province of Irian Jaya into a western part with Sorong as its centre and an eastern part with Jayapura as capital would not be unnatural. Anyway, Irian Jaya is now a part of a vast and rich archipelago, and however misused, lives up to the standard of the rest.

Some other pertinent events coincided with Irian Jaya becoming part of Indonesia. General Suharto became President in 1967, and he changed Indonesian development policy by attracting foreign investment. Moreover he cashed in the

farewell gift of the Netherlands to New Guinea, and founded FUNDWI to restore basic facilities. He also proclaimed Irian an area with a first claim to aid, allotting the special *Inpres* funds* to establish schools and mosques. The demolition and neglect of Dutch infrastructural provisions was stopped after the takeover by President Suharto, and above all, other multinationals besides Pacific Nickel (now Indonesia Nickel) were attracted to extract oil and minerals in the island. When the Dutch negotiated a contract with Pacific Nickel, it was clear already that gold, nickel and cobalt resources could be exploited and that exploitation would be feasible if the so-called Cuba process were used. The mineral resources of the Cyclops, Waigeo and Carstensz Mountains were estimated at 120 to 200 million tons.

But that was not all. New techniques of oil drilling had been introduced and the oil crisis provided a nice price-rise. So almost overnight poor New Guinea became rich Irian Jaya.

The production of nickel and copper ore and concentrates in 1976 for the Carstensz Mountains alone was 216,828 tonnes, with a f.o.b. value of \$86,161,488. The production of crude oil in 1976 was 2,755,935 tonnes, with a f.o.b. value of \$245,523,993. The production of the first half year of 1977 was:

<i>Products</i>	<i>Exported to</i>	<i>kg.</i>	<i>\$</i>
Copper ore and concentrates	Japan	90,833,000	38,006,196
	Germany	18,289,000	7,544,965
Petroleum oils, crude	Japan	819,486,000	78,502,555
	Taiwan	439,542,000	41,664,115
	Singapore	112,228,000	10,649,103
	Philippines	585,365,000	55,930,269
	U.S.A.	194,886,000	18,342,310
		<u>2,151,507,000</u>	<u>205,088,352</u>

* *Inpres* funds are allocated according to the instruction of the President, who is in charge of funds for development activities in the real sense of the words — mainly education, road building, etc. West Irian is one of the areas that receive a good share of these funds. On the other hand, the *Inpres* funds are often used very inefficiently. Thus many government schools are built in villages which already have a mission school.

<i>Products</i>	<i>Exported to</i>	<i>kg.</i>	<i>\$</i>
Salt water fish, etc.	Japan	5,316	3,189
	Singapore	1,305,000	786,000
Shrimps, prawns	Japan	1,595,580	8,336,263
	Singapore	1,000	1,000
Molluscs	Japan	867	1,500
	Singapore	1,492	492
Troca and lola shells	Singapore	26,700	11,342
Nutmeg	Singapore	239,829	235,099
Mace	Singapore	56,738	70,014
Loba	Singapore	8,201	112
Copal	Singapore	18,800	7,846
Natural rubber	Singapore	84,407	59,952
Crocodile skins	Singapore	39,700	703,310
	Belgium	9,800	200,687
Logs	Japan	3,663,304	229,262
	Taiwan	3,476,440	91,257
Other woods	Japan	8,500,000	292,500
	<i>Total</i>	<u>2,279,689,174</u>	<u>261,669,338</u>

Source (also of export table opposite): Buro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta 1977.

The collection economy had changed to an extraction economy, and Sorong became a port of major importance for Indonesia. The commodities are exported mainly to Singapore and Japan, but Taiwan, the Philippines and the United States are also important for oil exports. The Japanese presence is very tangible in the production of fish, shrimps and logs. It is remarkable that the Netherlands imports no part of Irian Jaya's production whatever. If one counts what the province is producing for Indonesia, the total amount earned annually for its products easily exceeds \$500 million.

Government expenses are slightly more than \$30 million, therefore it can be said that Irian Jaya is a profitable province of Indonesia. Its exports constitute about 5 per cent of the Indonesian total. After East Kalimantan, North and South Sumatra and Riau, it is the most profitable province and easily exceeds Java without Jakarta.

Indonesian exports by province (US \$ millions)

Province	1976		1977
	Jan-Dec	Jan-Jun	Jan-Jun
Acheh	19.8	9.4	12.7
North Sumatra	604.3	282.6	388.4
West Sumatra	62.1	25.9	51.7
Riau	3,687.8	1,858.3	1,986.4
Jambi	70.5	27.7	40.3
South Sumatra	378.4	151.9	290.4
Bengkulu	0.1	0.1	0.9
Lampung	127.4	58.5	136.9
Jakarta	956.5	412.8	600.0
West Java	150.4	49.5	87.2
Central Java	61.0	24.9	34.1
Jogjakarra	0.8	0.4	0.3
East Java	136.4	58.6	117.3
Bali	9.5	4.5	2.4
West Nusa Tenggara	2.1	0.9	1.2
East Nusa Tenggara	5.8	1.4	1.1
West Kalimantan	106.3	51.8	58.5
Central Kalimantan	84.1	33.3	47.0
South Kalimantan	97.4	33.3	56.4
East Kalimantan	1,499.8	669.0	1,104.9
North Sulawesi	14.9	7.3	8.0
Central Sulawesi	14.5	6.6	8.5
South Sulawesi	25.9	10.6	19.8
South-East Sulawesi	33.9	12.2	23.4
Maluku	50.6	18.9	29.6
Irian Jaya	345.6	134.4	261.7

Education

Indonesia claims that Irian Jaya has made considerable progress in education since its rule of the island began. At first sight this is true; the numbers are impressive. In educational enrolment we see the following increase over selected years:

Level	1963	1967	1970	1974	1975
Kindergarten	716	1,401	1,592	-	-
Primary	58,913	81,014	107,058	118,923	129,622
Secondary	3,232	6,947	13,473	-	-
Tertiary	104	546	632	-	559
Junior high school (gen.)	1,232	-	4,788	9,478	11,169
Senior high school (gen.)	184	-	952	1,313	1,484
Junior vocational training	397	-	3,910	3,924	4,044
Senior vocational training	63	-	748	2,322	2,920

The increase in enrolment, however, has mostly taken place in the urban centres, and because it is clear that the increase in high school enrolment and in vocational training can hardly be the result of enrolment at lower levels of previous years, it is therefore probable that the Indonesian immigrants have taken the opportunity offered to them; especially in an economy where, as Garnaut and Manning* state, most opportunities for unskilled wage employment and self-employment are taken by immigrants.

The same goes for the tertiary level, the Chendrawasih University at Jayapura. This university was founded in 1963 (see page 104, above) and at that time had 104 pupils. In 1970, the only year for which we have a breakdown of the numbers, it had four faculties:

	Enrolment		Staff	
	<i>Irian-born</i>	<i>Non-Irian-born</i>	<i>Full-time</i>	<i>Part-time</i>
Law	163	211	14	20
Education	42	23	6	15
Teacher training	82	69	23	9
Agriculture	28	14	2	29
Anthropology	-	-	6	-

The real facts are that the law faculty is the conversion of the previous *Bestuurschool* or School of Administration. The figures show that the Irian-born are far outnumbered by immigrant Indonesians; but even among the Irian-born students there are many whose parents were local Indonesian teachers and assistant district officers during the Dutch period.

The faculties of education and teacher training have merely incorporated pre-existing courses, and the same is true of agriculture, which almost wholly relies on the agricultural school at Jayapura. Anthropology has no pupils at all; it is an Institute with a small staff, comparable to the former *Kantoor voor Bevolkingszaken* in Hollandia, but whether the staff can be compared to men of the calibre of Dr. van Baal, Dr. V. de Bruyn and Dr. Galis, who staffed the Dutch *Kantoor*, remains to be seen. The benevolent remarks of Manning and Garnaut, who give considerable praise to the Indonesian effort, have to be ranked in the same category as Robert Kennedy's remark: 'How many universities have the Dutch established?'

*Ross Garnaut and Chris Manning, Canberra 1974, p.27.

This vital rhetorical question, asked at the moment when his brother was taking a vital decision, can now be answered by history with a second question: 'Of what use is Chendrawasih University to the Papuan people?' And the answer must be: 'None'. It has outstripped the Papuan people, depriving them of the opportunity to take part in public life; it has counter-balanced the effort made by the Dutch in the period 1946-63 to produce Papuan administration; and scientifically it simply cannot stand comparison with the Dutch school of anthropologists, who have produced a complete series of monographs in co-operation with outstanding foreign scholars on Papuan customs, law and language, which form a contribution to the history of mankind.

Manning and Garnaut however have their doubts about the quality of the teaching and the poor way of subsidising schools used by Indonesia. They admit that for instance the missions are responsible for 85 per cent of the schools, but that they are starved of funds and desperately in need of books and teaching equipment. However, they are very enthusiastic about the role of Indonesia in assimilating and acculturating the Papuans into Indonesian culture, and into their economic life as well: 'There are now groups of people in all *kabupaten* [administrative districts] conversant with the national language; the fact that the government is conducted in a language they understand makes it less distant and less alien to many of the coastal Irianese and to increasing numbers of those in the highlands.'*

To this one must comment, in the first place, that Indonesian was the language used in Papuan schools, the vernacular being used only in the first class. So Indonesian was the national language — one of the main objections to every colonial régime was that the language of the ruler was taught only to the happy few. Secondly, the Department of Internal Affairs, which dealt with the Papuans, conducted its affairs at the lower levels in Indonesian, or rather the East Indonesian version of Malay spoken in the Moluccas. The Indonesian language, as taught at the Universities of Utrecht and Leyden to aspiring district officers, was long recognised as leading the way in the development of a new cultural language: Indonesian.

Manning and Garnaut are positive on the economic development: ** 'The markets of the towns are Indonesian, but they have

*Op. cit., p.31.

**Ibid.

been assimilated into Irianese economic life. Like other Melanesian markets, the Hollandia marketplace was once characterised by fixed prices and by relatively limited range of foodstuffs offered for sale. Now Irianese sit at the front of the market, some with vegetables unknown or not valued before recent times and, hesitantly, haggle over prices.'

As for the economic assimilation, I visited Irian in 1977 and 1978 and no Papuan was in the front row of the market-places; they openly admitted to me that they were unable to resist the hard bargaining and forming of *kongsi* [price rings] by the Indonesians; on top of that they felt '*malu*' ('shy'), as they put it, for they had never before had to do such a thing. Their objections went further; they said that they could not obtain loans from the government because of the system of 'dashing' among the Indonesians, and they felt alien in the *tokos* (shops) because the prices were out of their reach and no credit was allowed. One of them made quite a play of it, as Papuans do, waving a few rupiahs and asking to buy a few loose cigarettes: 'They say to you "*pigi*"' (best translated as 'bugger off'). So the impression of Garnaut and Manning is very different from mine, if it comes down to assimilation and acculturation. But, sticking to the facts, no one can deny that the standard of living (with or without fixed prices) has risen considerably, and this is the main factor which makes Papuans vanish from the towns.

FUNDWI

The total budget for West Irian in the past years has been as follows (in billion rupiahs):

	1969/70	1970/1	1971/2	1972/3	1973/4	1974/5	1975/6	1976/7
Routine Expenditure	8.9	10.1	10.6	10.6	10.3	14.3	18.7	19.7
Development Expenditure	2.9	0.8	2.4	3.3	3.3	4.0	5.5	5.0
	11.8	10.9	13.0	13.9	13.6	18.3	24.2	24.7

The central government is supplying 86 per cent of the routine expenditure, and 80 per cent of the latter covers government salaries, departmental services and various subsidies, but under different headings some room is left for 'other' purposes and for the so-called *Sektor Khusus*, or 'Special Sector'. 'Other' purposes can often be read as 'development'. Apart from that

there is a special development budget which is, roughly, half FUNDWI and half Indonesian (*Pelita* and Task Force). On top of that there is the *kabupaten* subsidy to the development budget. From this enumeration of development budgets it must be clear that a number of different institutions are involved in developing West Irian. This is due to the special and delicate position of West Irian (which in one decade had four different sovereign authorities: the Dutch, the U.N., President Sukarno and President Suharto) and it is therefore not surprising to find that the central government — and within it the army — plays the dominant role. We will now describe the period after the Act of Free Choice, when West Irian became a definite part of Indonesia and so theoretically could have had a stable administration.

In 1969 West Irian acquired its status as an autonomous province, and in consequence the Governor, as a representative of the central government, should have all administrative powers except for the powers which are retained at the centre. In reality the situation is different. In the matter of development and development planning the province has its own co-ordinating body *Lakbangda* (*Pelaksana Pembangunan Daerah*), comparable to *Bappenas* (*Badan Pembangunan Nasional*) in Jakarta. The Governor is chairman of *Lakbangda*, but the Commander-in-Chief is vice-chairman. Formally power is with the Governor and the D.P.R.D. (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*, the provincial consultative council), but in practice he is advised by an advisory group of military leaders, of which the Commander-in-Chief is chairman and the Governor deputy chairman. * This group, called *Muspida*, has the effective power and the same goes for lower levels, where local *Muspida* advise the *bupati*. The *bupati* is even more vulnerable, because in the old administrative structure each *kabupaten* consisted of four administrative units (the Dutch *onderafdelingen* with academically-trained district officers and departmental officials). Each district (*daerah* or *onderafdeling*) consisted in turn of three or four sub-districts. The organisation now consists of *kabupaten* with a small number of *kecamatan*, units more similar to the sub-district than to the district; the *chumat* can be compared to the former *kepala distrik*. The villages or *kampungs* are gathered in larger units, the *desa* on the Javanese pattern, and a *kepala desa* is appointed: this

* This illogical set-up illustrates the force of Indonesian 'advice' and the powerlessness of civil administration.

functionary stands at the lower level of administration. The small units are thus centralised. At the top there is to all appearances a civil administrator, but he is in fact constantly overruled by a military group, which also has power at the *bupati* and *chamat* level. Garnaut and Manning rightly observe that the *kepala desa* and the *kepala distrik* 'are merely channels for central government instructions and they are not appointed in many areas'.* The *kepala kampung* in colonial times was exactly the same as the *kepala desa*, and it was only in the 1960s that the Dutch government tried to give the population rights of their own in *kampung* councils.

So the administrative structure is a logical consequence of the development policy and the development policy is a logical consequence of the Javanese dream. The Javanese dream is, at the least, an empire stretching from Sabang to Merauke, or rather what President Sukarno called before the day of the proclamation 'Greater Indonesia'. This dream of Greater Indonesia could not be anything else but the end of the Indonesian-Dutch Union and the end of the United States of Indonesia as well. To keep the empire together, President Sukarno created a military power, and because few were so conscious as Sukarno himself of the centrifugal forces in such an empire, he himself brought into being a military and tightly organised centralised administration to assimilate and integrate West Irian into Indonesia.

This goal was diametrically opposite to the Netherlands development objective of self-determination, self-rule and independence. Therefore the structure created by the Dutch had to be utterly demolished, and President Sukarno needed a new opponent to keep his empire together. It was to be Malaysia. These two factors, the demolition of the image of the Dutch as effective administrators — who had indeed been rather tardy in living up to their ethical obligations — and the need to keep the military engaged in expanding or defending the empire in the face of real or fabricated internal or external dangers, were highly damaging to the indigenous development of West Irian. But when President Suharto introduced the army not only as empire-savers but also as a developmental task-force, development in its true sense was picking up again.

Still the Dutch had left a time-bomb in West Irian, which

*Op. cit., p.23.

was only defused after the Act of Free Choice had been so cleverly won by the Indonesian central government. The revised administrative organisation, the disappearance of the New Guinea Council, the tight police and military control, intimidation and the occasional bullet, the invention of *musjawarah* and unkept promises made explosions inevitable. These came first in an unco-ordinated way, but later with responsibility claimed by the *Papua Merdeka* organisation (O.P.M.), first in Biak, then Manokwari, then the Bird's Head, then the Kamu plain, then the Baliem valley, then Merauke, and so on. The military have nothing to fight, and the two crack battalions, trained in anti-guerrilla fighting in Australia, are allocated to the task of chasing the guerrillas. The other military, on the orders of the President, keep an eye on the implementation of *Pelita*, the national five-year plan and the *Inpres* programme of the Task Force, and in general keep a tight political control on all levels of administration. It has to be admitted that a development programme consisting of activities induced by central planning (*Pelita*), by regional planning for the interior and the highlands (Task Force), by international planning (FUNDWI), by local planning (*kabupaten*) and by provincial planning (Governor) needs a strong military backbone. Yet it must be said on the other side that the native population are suppressed and pushed back, that the military and to a smaller extent the civil servants are in a preferential position, and that Indonesian immigrants are especially favoured. The Christian missions, notwithstanding the preferential treatment of Islam, are not hampered too much, and international capital goes its own regal way under the umbrella of the President.

The administration of the budget is co-ordinated by *Sektor Chusus Irian Jaya* within the Department of Internal Affairs. Falling within the autonomous powers of the province were agriculture, social welfare, health, education and public works. These are the departments where Papuans can have employment. The other departments are under the jurisdiction of the central government, but they also have a special budget for West Irian provided through *Sektor Chusus*, which has a say in staffing and finance.

It is not surprising that the concerted development activities of the different programmes, basically planned by *Sektor Chusus* and controlled by *Muspida* and the provincial military Commander, could not achieve good results. On the other

hand, the budget after 1969 and investment in general were so high that it cannot have been a complete failure.

To assess the results one needs a rough break-down of the total budget into specific programmes. This we have for the Development Fund in the years 1971/2 and 1972/3 (average percentage):

FUNDWI	55
<i>Pelita</i> *	24
Task Forces	<u>21</u>
	100

*Includes counterpart funds of FUNDWI.

So FUNDWI is the most important as it also stimulates *Pelita* to match the inputs. In the period 1969-73 FUNDWI has allocated funds to education, mostly to the vocational training centre in Jayapura and the University.

In 1968 a United Nations mission advised on the spending of the dormant departing gift of \$30 million from the Netherlands and it followed the priorities of *Sektor Chusus*, namely a heavy emphasis on infrastructural provisions (communication by air, road and sea and telecommunication), primary industry and education.

In 1973 \$21.7 million was allotted: Indonesian counterpart funds followed, so the budget was nearly doubled. Overall, the priorities remained the same: communications 56 per cent, primary industry 15 per cent, education 12 per cent, other 17 per cent. The development budget lacks a fund for health; even though *Pelita* has made up for it in one year, the consequences of education getting such priority over health have been drastic. I have seen hospitals in Biak, Manokwari and Sorong where conditions are impossible; preventive care, such as malaria eradication, has fallen right back.

FUNDWI funds have been used for sea fisheries and forestry. *Pelita* emphasised urban services and — a peculiar item — Rp.86 million (\$215,000) for religious buildings (read 'mosques'). The Task Forces budget (\$1,875,000) went mainly into development courses (read 'indoctrination'), the provision of agricultural equipment, advisory or 'extension' services, the supply of teachers to highland schools and the resettlement of highland villages.

The *kabupaten* funds are small, but there is a tendency to increase them both in the development sector and in routine expenditure. They are allocated to necessary infrastructural

purposes. In 1973 the grant to *kabupaten* was already 28 per cent of routine expenditure, but Irian Jaya continues to pay for central departments and for *Sektor Khusus*, and this takes nearly a quarter of the total expenditure budget.

In the FUNDWI budget allocation, \$4 million is allocated to the Irian Jaya Joint Development Corporation. This is a joint venture with the Indonesian government, which has allocated a counterpart fund of rupiahs. It is a development institution, which on the whole gives technical and financial assistance to indigenous persons or institutions. In its first Annual Report in 1972 the Board stated: 'Entering into the next development phase it appears to the Board that the broadening of the production capacity for domestic consumption and export will have an important part to play in the strategy for further development. Apart from activities deriving from government expenditure, only by increased marketable production and related services can new jobs be created and the buying power of the broad population be raised. In order to stimulate such development a co-ordinated effort is required.'

The total disbursement at 31 March 1975 in millions of rupiahs was:

	<i>Disbursement</i>	<i>Number of projects</i>
Manufacturing	314.8	11
Agriculture	312.3	8
Forestry	291.0	2
Primary agriculture	22.0	14
Animal husbandry	56.8	14
Crocodile farms	29.4	3
Sea Fishery	70.5	41
Transportation	6.0	2
Cold Storage	12.5	1
Others	169.9	
<i>Total</i>	<u>1,294.2</u> (= \$325 million)	

The distribution was:

Merauke	12
Jayawijaya	2
Jayapura	228
Paniai	8
Fakfak	4
Sorong	19
Manokwari	17
Japen Waropen	13
Teluk Chendrawasih	12

The report mentions that the most important development project approved by the Board in the course of the year is for the exploitation of existing rubber trees not yet effectively tapped, the so-called 'sleeping rubber trees' owned by the local population and located at the various villages in the interior of the Merauke regency. If successful, this project will benefit some 2,400 families that have little or no other possibility for cash income. The project involves training of the villagers, processing, transportation and marketing. In preparing the project, there has been close co-operation with the government Horticulture Service, and technical assistance has been provided through UNDP by experts from the UNDP/FAO Project for Strengthening Research on Rubber and Oil Palm in North Sumatra. The Board has earmarked funds of up to Rp.170 million for its implementation. FUNDWI has already invested in supplies and equipment that are being distributed to the smallholders. Moreover, the villagers are being trained by the Horticulture Service and by experienced personnel recruited by FUNDWI from Java.

Here we have a perfect example of what can be done when Dutch development activities are followed up by a more or less appreciative Indonesian government. The prospects and problems of this small, but very important programme directed at the indigenous population of West Irian are intimately bound up with the fact that the fund is not a subsidising institution.

We conclude this chapter with an extensive quotation from the report for 1974 of the Irian Jaya Joint Development Corporation:

The Foundation I.J.J.D.C. is not granting credit that normally is the business of commercial banks, e.g. Bank Ekspor Impor Indonesia. This excludes, among others, working capital to contractors and businessmen in trade, and credit for general purpose. ... it is not the function of the Foundation to finance expenditures that are normally financed under the Government's budget. In view of these limitations, the operational area of the Foundation is concentrated on the financing and promotion of projects for marketable production in agriculture, fishery, forestry, industry, and in connection herewith, for transportation.

The possibility of the Foundation to effectively promote economic development rests on its ability to give financial assistance on reasonable terms, to provide technical assistance — either by its own staff or by calling on experts from outside — to take the initiative for project

promotion including feasibility studies, and to act as a promotional link in organizing joint partnership of local and outside capital. The Foundation is well positioned to execute these functions.

Although most of the projects are in the private sector, the Foundation is not excluded from assisting Government owned enterprises, provided they are organized as separate legal entities. In other words, the decisive factor is not the ownership as such, but the purpose and organization of the enterprise.

As far as the Foundation's area of activity is concerned, investment projects can broadly be divided in three categories:

(a) Small projects of farmers, fishermen and small industry. Although a certain practical skill is required in the respective fields, management and administration are simple.

(b) Projects that need more advanced technical and managerial skill, and have higher requirements.

(c) Projects for which there are no private sponsors, and are therefore dependent on the initiative and the promotion by the Government or other institutions e.g. the Foundation.

The number of applications and loans in the first category has increased substantially.

What is needed in these cases is a modest amount of credit on reasonable terms, and at times some technical guidance. Practically all of these small loans are to indigenous entrepreneurs. Although the compounded amount of small loans is not very substantial, the development effect should not be underestimated, and not measured merely by the total amount of money involved. These small loans support 'grass-root' development, which is essential for economic and social development, and in turn increases production and the purchasing power of low-income groups. Moreover, 'grass-root' development is often set in motion by the example of a few individuals that succeed in improving their conditions. This seems now to be happening in fishery and agriculture in the Jayapura area.

At present, it is not lack of funds for credit of small production projects that holds back development in this sector; as important are other factors, in particular the lack of know-how, experience and initiative. This is not to say that the existing possibilities are exhausted, or cannot be further developed. By intensified field service the situation can be improved, and the appointment of local representatives in some other growth centers will also be instrumental in this respect.

Applications for larger and more advanced private projects are few. This is not surprising, considering the present level of economic development in Irian Jaya. The separation of local markets limits the outlets of industrial products, and — with the exception of a few large-scale industries utilizing rich natural resources — exports from Irian Jaya are hampered by several factors.

The price level is high in Irian Jaya for many products, partly reflecting the high sea transportation cost. While this may encourage production for the local market, the effect is opposite with regard to export.

Under the prevailing conditions in Irian Jaya it appears to the Board that there is a distinct need to fill some of the gaps left by the private sector by an institutional initiative. Development in agriculture in particular deserves attention. In a society that to a great extent is based on subsistence farming, the initiation of production of commercial crops for sale will in many places raise problems that the local farmers are not able to cope with. Time may have come for the introduction for some carefully selected projects of the estate concept for marketable crops, whereby guidance for production and assistance for marketing are provided by qualified management. This is economically justified when implemented on a scale that can sustain investment and management. As most of the ground in Irian Jaya is covered with forests, the first phase of any estate project will be land-clearing, which today can be done effectively with heavy mechanized equipment. The Foundation is prepared to take an initiative, provided it is supported by the Government. The Foundation will pursue its activity along two lines which from a development view-point are complementary:

Firstly, encourage and support small projects in the various fields by granting credit and providing technical assistance. Secondly, try to develop some larger projects, which also will benefit the low-income groups. In the latter endeavour the Foundation needs to activate co-operation of other agencies and institutions.

9 CONCLUSION

In an analysis of the present situation in West Irian at least three facts are obvious. First, as a province of Indonesia, West Irian is apparently much more profitable than it was in the past, because resources of oil and ore appear to be exploitable. Secondly, the eastern part has been independent since 1975 although in the 1960s it was still politically backward. And thirdly, because Papua New Guinea enjoys independence, but even more because Indonesia administers the western part, West Irian or rather the Papuans are engaged in a liberation movement in the territory itself and have a government-in-exile with 'diplomatic' relations in various countries. These facts can be placed in a much broader context, but if the analysis sticks to the Indonesian administration, then it is evident that Jakarta's policy on West Irian has both positive and very negative aspects, depending on one's convictions.

Thus education has been promoted during the fifteen years of Indonesian rule in a spectacular way, but quite a number of Indonesian immigrants have entered the territory, officially as military or civilian officers or as Javanese settlers, or unofficially as wild migrants from East Indonesia, and the towns are so swollen with new people as the result that the Papuans have, literally, been pushed back into the bush. Whoever may be profiting from the intensified schooling system, it is not the Papuan children.

The economy has made a remarkable improvement. The mineral resources, especially on the south coast, are being exploited and more is still to come especially in the western part of West Irian, where preparations for the exploitation of minerals on the islands of Waigeo and Gag are in full swing. But the profits are mainly ploughed back by the central government and all that remains for future Papuans, if anything, is a pitch-black, empty hole in their earth. Even as unskilled labourers they cannot expect much.

The Asian bazaar economy which has come into being because of the immigrants, who try to extract a small income by providing services for a community consisting mainly of officials, is not easily accessible to Papuans, who have not

sufficient experience and toughness to compete with the hard-bargaining Indonesians from Makasar, Buton, Tidore and the like.

Essentially, a rich overlord has been replaced by a poor one, to the disadvantage of the Papuans. On the other hand New Guinea was part of a distant European kingdom, and is now part of a very lively South-East Asian archipelago. If one looks at the two parts of the island, West Irian is increasingly integrated within the huge Indonesian system, while Papua New Guinea is awakening, making a rather delicate attempt to establish its own identity under the umbrella of Australia. If the alternative for the subdued West Irian and the shielded Papua New Guinea could have been one single strong New Guinea, the outcome of the present process appears very negative.

It is difficult to analyse the present situation, unless one has a clear basis for evaluation, subjective as this basis might be. Our basis is the wellbeing of the original inhabitants, the Papuans. Wellbeing is defined in such a way that basic human values such as freedom of speech are appreciated at least on the same level as freedom from material want. These values can be obtained by just rule only, and the opposite of just rule in our opinion is imperialism. Colonialism and neo-colonialism are not as bad as imperialism—or, as it is called in Chinese terminology, hegemonism. Colonialism is exploitation of the country only, but imperialism also implies subjugation of the mind. Our yardstick in judging the wellbeing of the Papuans is imperialism. To what extent is Indonesia, centralised upon its capital Jakarta, trying to mould the Papuans in the Indonesian nationalistic fashion? How much identity is left for nearly one million members of a people who have inhabited the island for about 50,000 years? It will be possible to give a verdict after two or three generations have passed, because across the eastern border the test-group can be seen.

Until the Second World War and even for a few years subsequently the situations in the eastern and the western parts were very similar. Only because of the Indonesian claim to the island were the Dutch forced to speed up the pace of development—if one admitted that any development had taken place at all apart from the activity of the Missions.

So the Indonesian revolution in the years after the Japanese occupation became the main reason why Netherlands New Guinea, as it was then called, had to be developed preferably

towards the goal of self-determination according to the principle of the United Nations. After 1950 the Netherlands already started to report to the U.N., admitting by that very fact that New Guinea was not an old-style colony, but stating already that it was fulfilling a task *in foro publico*, before the eyes of the whole world. However, developments in Indonesia at that time were more important to West New Guinea than any other event in the world or anything that might happen in the United Nations General Assembly.

President Sukarno had founded a republic. In the first stage it was a federal republic, the Republic Indonesia Serikat (R.I.S.), united with the Netherlands in a union under the latter's Queen on the pattern of the British Commonwealth. But Indonesia had never been a colony comparable to Canada or Australia or even South Africa — territories where white settlers had found a new home, offshoots of the European 'motherland'; on the contrary, while the Netherlands East Indies, like Algeria, had a good many Netherlanders or Indo-Europeans, who were firmly rooted in the country and in many cases very experienced and loyal to 'Indie', these nevertheless represented colonialism even more than the *moederland* itself. So President Sukarno had to break with the colonial past by severing ties not only with the Netherlands but with the offspring of Dutch rule in Indonesia as well. Even a federal Indonesia was seen as a product of Netherlands Indies rule and both the union and R.I.S. had to be abolished. In his proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945 Sukarno went back to the old Javanese empire of Mojopahit. The much-debated slogans 'From Aceh to Ambon' and 'From Sabang to Merauke', respectively excluding and including West Irian as part of Indonesia, refer only to Mojopahit, when East Java wielded sovereignty over an archipelago comparable to the Chinese or Indian empires, loosely confederated by contracts and treaties. When the Dutch representative Dr. van Rooyen, with the text of Sukarno's declaration in his hand, enumerated the parts of Indonesia, including the Moluccas but not West New Guinea, the Indonesians were quick to react that 'From Aceh to Ambon' indeed included New Guinea. So from this incident alone it is already clear that Irian has and always has had a special position in relation to the islands that constitute the archipelago, but only a very modest one.

But the mention of Mojopahit in this context referred to more

than territory which at that time was considered poor and inaccessible; it pointed to an empire commanding a huge number of islands, unchallenged by any other empire, an empire in its own right and as such a champion against the European colonial empires — not only the Netherlands but Britain and Portugal as well. Such a daring claim explains why in practice Sukarno did not confine the claim to West New Guinea and switched it to North Borneo and Sarawak, both of which belonged to the Federation of Malaysia, and why President Suharto, clinging to the same idea of the Javanese empire, could absorb East Timor without many convincing arguments. It was only from necessity that President Sukarno had to reject a federal Indonesia: the idea of federalism had been born in the minds of high-ranking colonial officials such as Van Mook and Koets,* and President Sukarno rightly thought that only a firm unitary state could resist the centrifugal forces that endangered Indonesia. But in principle the idea of unitarism fitted into his idea of a family of members of a community, guided by Java. Indonesia could be a reflection of the Javanese *dessa*, a community in harmony and balance under the guidance of a just prince, the Javanese President with all the prerogatives of his sacred position.

In the Javanese concept, which is all-pervading in Indonesia, the family of nations as represented by the U.N. and the new emerging or non-aligned states, should be a community where persuasion and delicacy are essential democratic elements — in contrast to voting, which is disliked. The preferred form of authority is one which is unchallengeable due to its intrinsic value of wisdom, morality, tradition and noble descent. This authority is expected to take decisions after hearing the advice of the community. Sukarno used to call himself the mouthpiece of his people — he could not be wrong — and it was as natural to

*Dr. H.J. van Mook had been Lieut.-Governor General of the Netherlands Indies until 1948. He was strongly opposed to the nationalist movement of Sukarno, who had collaborated with the Japanese to obtain independence. So he was in favour of a confederate and against a unitary Indonesia, which would dominate other parts of Indonesia.

Dr. P.J. Koets has been the Director of the Cabinet of the Governor General under Van Mook and the two High Commissioners Beel and Lovink. So until the take-over his was the greatest influence in the shaping of the new Indonesia policy. After his return to the Netherlands he became chief editor of the leading socialist newspaper *Het Parool* in Amsterdam.

exercise this authority in the family of nations as in the natural family. A clash occurred when the U.N. acted differently from the way he had expected over New Guinea. He had convinced himself—and the nation with him—that New Guinea was part of the Indonesian family, a view not shared by the Papuans.

Is such a concept imperialism? If it is, it is imperialism *sui generis*. In any case it is neither colonialism nor neo-colonialism, because although exploitation may be part of it, it is exploitation in favour of a community to which the exploited belong. But the imperialist element lies in the authority that decides what member belongs to the community and persuades that member to take part and to make sacrifices for the common good.

Twice, in a very undemocratic way, Indonesia has decided to incorporate a piece of territory—New Guinea in 1969 and East Timor in 1977—and twice it has done so according to the same recipe: *mushawarah*—persuasion leading to mutual understanding—when the authority, Indonesia, has decided that an agreement, *mufakat*, has been reached. But in both cases very little criticism was heard in Indonesia; on the contrary, when President Sukarno failed to obtain his objective, the take-over of New Guinea, in the U.N. General Assembly he was scarcely blamed at all for withdrawing Indonesia's membership. How could Indonesia be subject to a process of submitting its claims to voting and other formulae for obtaining permission? Indonesia can submit a question to the Assembly, it can debate, argue, even negotiate, but it cannot tolerate repudiation, least of all in public, according to a rigid procedure.

So Indonesia's internal politics is also a balancing act to harmonise the different streams, the *aliran*, again under the guidance of a 'just prince'. And if the prince or president has lost his authority, he has to be removed as silently and in as dignified a manner as possible. President Sukarno was removed by the Golden Spear, *Lembang Emas*; President Suharto's removal is not clear yet, but the process is going on by silent reciprocal understanding. The *aliran* of the military, in Sukarno's time, had every right to put the (unjust) prince aside; after all he had allowed too much room to the Communists, and the military had kept in check the anti-unitary forces of the provinces. In the first years as a unitary republic, Indonesia had been in constant turmoil; all the provinces had rebelled to some

extent, but the most dangerous were the regions adjacent to other countries: Aceh near Singapore, Kalimantan near North Borneo and Malacca, the Moluccas near the eastern border. The military had been following the President when he decided to launch a major assault on the ultimate strongholds of the Dutch in New Guinea in logistically impossible places as Biak and Hollandia. But when the President satisfied the Communist *aliran* at their expense and contrary to the mightiest *aliran* of all, Islam, they felt they had been deceived. The rebellious youth protested and demonstrated against corruption and nepotism, as it is doing now, becoming the mouthpiece of the people against a President who had once been the mouthpiece of the people against colonialism.

If different *alirans* come together, the whole structure of discussion-politics is shaken and a dictator instead of a president is needed to preserve unity; and not every president necessarily has the qualifications to be a dictator. So the Republic of Indonesia is always as was the kingdom of Mojopahit, especially if the position of the President is threatened. It is difficult to say what the chances are for the provinces when the centre Jakarta is in a state of confusion, but one can safely say that Indonesia's stability would increase if the provinces had more autonomy of their own, even though Java's position in particular would decrease in significance.

Overpopulated Java and its capital Jakarta, growing like a cancer at a rate of 2½ per cent each year for several decades, has always been expansionist as Mojopahit was in ancient days. The caste-like stratification of society in a state with a highly developed agricultural sector, which nevertheless could not feed its industrious but numerous population, provided a structure which made diversification possible in all sorts of economic activities — in trade, in seafaring and even in warfare. It has been said that President Suharto, arriving in mid-Sumatra on an official visit, exclaimed on seeing the landscape: 'What a beautiful, vast land for migration!'

President Sukarno aimed at a transmigration of 1 million Javanese each year. The Dutch in their day transmigrated Javanese peasants to the *kampung*s in South Sumatra, to Merauke in Southern New Guinea and even to the plantations in Paramaribo in Surinam first as the British did to Fiji, Mauritius, South Africa and the West Indies from overpopulated, starved India.

Underpopulated West Irian (2 people per square kilometre) naturally attracts immigrants, although there is a shortage of arable and accessible land. So migration is not *per se* to the disadvantage of the Papuan population, but land issues first have to be settled and customary law has to be respected. But with uncontrolled migration from the East Indonesian islands, especially from Ujung Pandang, the number of immigrants in the coastal areas and the towns, official and unofficial, has risen over the years to a number in excess of all the former inhabitants of the territory. This is felt, rightly, to be an assault, because unskilled and semi-skilled labour and self-employment come naturally to the poor, marginal migrants who have left their native islands due to poverty and over-population.

It is easy to point out, as Indonesia has always done, that the boundaries between West Irian and the East Indonesian archipelago are rather artificial, but at a certain point there is a clear distinction between Irian and East Indonesia. As far as living things are concerned it has been proved that Wallace's famous line is rather far to the West and even Weber's line cuts safely through Indonesian territory, but to the east of the former New Guinea border few flora or fauna or human beings of Asian types are left, and gradually, travelling to the east, different questions become more important: when and how many Negrito-Melanesian waves of migrants have populated the island? — and how could they have survived in the interior of a territory which was not even accessible to Asians at the coast?

The nature and culture of New Guinea are apparently of a most peculiar character and only in the eastern part is this singular identity honoured by freedom to exist instead of being inundated by an invasion of poor people who feel no responsibility whatever towards a population who are as different from Asians as American Indians are from white Americans.

Scientific exploration other than that conducted for the sake of exploitation has greatly decreased in the past fifteen years after the series of scientific, mostly anthropological works about people in the setting of a singular natural environment, published in the time of Dutch rule. If one believes in the theory of continental drift it is, scientifically, hard to accept that half the island, a treasure-house of unwritten history, should be left to the mercy of a developing country riddled with problems of its own.

Moreover what is the moral justification of boundaries that

split East and West New Guinea with a straight vertical line and North New Guinea and Papua with a straight horizontal line just because the Dutch and the British made a gentlemen's agreement in 1834 and the Germans and the British made another one in 1887? A separate tradition of similar negligence is a poor reason.

The motives behind colonialism have, however, changed. In the first period New Guinea was passed by, literally because no trading could be done there, no spices could be obtained, and no gold could be found. Thus the almost uninhabited and hostile country had little to offer to early colonialism. Only the Missions could try to find souls, and although there were a few, they were difficult to save.

Even when, at the beginning of the century and still more after the First World War, the Netherlands switched from a *batig saldo politiek* a policy aiming at a net profit, to an *etische politiek*, an ethical policy, which used the net profit for the benefit of the colony, New Guinea had no profit to offer, either to the Netherlands itself or to the Netherlands Indies. Only after the Second World War, when the same happened across the eastern border, did it become the fashion to spend grants-in-aid on the territory; after all, the decades of decolonisation and development aid were approaching. Only then did New Guinea become a moral obligation to the Dutch after being neglected since the unsuccessful exploration of 1906. After Indonesia became independent and New Guinea received its own government, directly under The Hague, in 1950, it became for the last dozen years the most precious jewel in the Dutch crown.

The reaction of the Papuan to the policy of self-determination however exceeded all expectations, although he never had much opportunity to express it except in those last years from 1950 to 1962. Owing to the work of the Missions in the coastal areas, mainly in the north where the Protestant Mission had been active for a century, some 100,000 Papuans at least were not illiterate and they were quick to grasp the opportunity presented by schooling and jobs, and in general by integration in a market economy.

Commissioner van Eechoud and Governor van Baal outlined a sound native policy, balancing between the formation of a politically conscious élite and broad elementary schooling. Health as well as education received all the attention it needed;

infant mortality declined sharply, malaria was eradicated in the coastal areas and progress was made in fighting other endemic diseases. Important, even if not very spectacular, was a physical infrastructure capable of bearing a modest agricultural development, which integrated Papuans into a modern market economy. Understandably, the building of this infrastructure in an underpopulated and exceptionally rough and extensive territory was costly; the opening up of the interior to air traffic could never become an economic exercise, but communications improved if only because Hollandia, Sorong and Merauke were connected in an immense triangle by air or sea traffic.

However, the Netherlands was extremely reluctant to exploit the mineral resources of the island. Although nickel was found in exploitable quantities in Gag, Waigeo and the Cyclops Mountains, it took twelve years for a contract to come into being which guaranteed the necessary investments. Still, the so-called Cuba process that made exploitation of low-grade resources possible had been known since the Second World War.

The construction of a political body such as the New Guinea Council was also retarded; the influence of the colonial past was still tangible, and although the Papuans adjusted themselves very rapidly to the possible outcome of the self-determination process, both approaches — economic self-sufficiency and political self-determination — misfired because of lack of time. But unlike most colonial territories, New Guinea at least derived some advantage from its backward stage of development, as there was no damaging heritage of land issues, white settlers, plantations or nationalised properties.

There was of course a rather high standard of living based on an annual grant-in-aid of 100 million guilders, a very hard currency. To ease the frictions of transition, that contribution to the budget was maintained by a gift of the Netherlands to the province of West Irian. This very gift was to cause a rapid breakdown of equipment, commodities and stock and only when the Irian guilder was devalued to parity with the very weak Indonesian rupiah could integration into a poor Asian bazaar economy slowly begin.

During and after the Second World War, New Guinea had become part of modern history and it was mainly Indonesia's revolution that made it a bone of contention between the Netherlands and its legal successor Indonesia. At the Round

Table Conference in 1950 it was agreed that the two parties would reach agreement on West New Guinea within a year, but the outcome was nil. The joint commission did not even result in a joint report. In 1954 the matter was submitted to the U.N. General Assembly, but after three sessions Indonesia left the international conference-table in 1957, because its position was growing worse in relative terms; it needed a two-thirds majority to alter the *status quo*, but the number of abstentions increased faster than the number favouring Indonesia's case. So Indonesia walked out and took a number of draconian measures against the Dutch to activate dissent in the Netherlands, but succeeded only in evoking stubbornness. Indonesia's only remaining way out was a threat of violence; minor assaults on New Guinea were tried, and a major assault was prepared. At the same time the Dutch established the New Guinea Council in 1960 and proposed the Luns plan to internationalise the self-determination policy in 1961. The Luns plan very nearly succeeded in providing a two-thirds majority, but at the same time it invited a face-saving device on the side of the Indonesians and made clear that the Netherlands would not be willing to fight unless support from the United States, Australia or Great Britain could be guaranteed. An Indonesian invasion was imminent and the Dutch backed out, losing the poker game in the form of President Sukarno's *Operasi Jayawijaya* — an air and sea attack on Biak — which had been a desperate gamble because of the logistic problems.

In 1961 the Bunker plan was realised after the visit of the U.S. Attorney-General Robert Kennedy to Indonesia, and the personal meditation or pressure of President John F. Kennedy.

Seemingly the Papuans still had one trump-card, an Act of Free Choice to be held in 1969 under the auspices of the U.N. some years after their brief caretaker régime from October 1962 to May 1963 following the departure of the Dutch, and an interregnum of Indonesian rule lasting six years. The outcome, a 100 per cent pro-Indonesian vote, made it clear that something fishy had been going on in the execution of the voting. No voting by ballot took place, Indonesian *mushawarah* — backed up by intimidation and corruption substituted different procedures. The U.N. gave their approval to the outcome with reluctance. Indonesia's prestige received a blow, but the Papuans lost much more — their identity — and became Indonesians.

On the credit side, there has been growing understanding and sympathy among the many African states in the U.N. for the brethren in New Guinea, and this process did not stop when Indonesia annexed East Timor following the same procedure. Neo-Marxist states have now started to show interest in harassing autocratic Indonesia.

And there has been a still brighter side to these dark events. Australia, already convinced by the speed of decolonisation elsewhere and by the relative success of the Dutch self-determination policy, decided to lead Papua New Guinea to independence in the shortest time possible; it went even further than the Dutch had done and set the fatal date. In 1975, only thirty years after the unification of the two parts, Papua and New Guinea, the unified state became independent. Naturally this state felt deep sympathy with the Melanesian peoples west of the border; although, being young and vulnerable, it had to disguise its sympathies if only because of the expansionist traits of Indonesian nationalism. Nevertheless, since 1975 West Irian has had a natural ally.

In the meantime, Australia started to learn its lesson. During the Indonesian revolution, its sympathies were clearly not with the colonial Dutch. Socialist waterfront workers showed their solidarity with suppressed Indonesia, and this sympathy was fully in line with the socialist Evatt régime which endorsed Indonesia's policy over the New Guinea matter up till 1949. But then the Liberal government of Robert Menzies, which sided more with the Commonwealth and Western Europe than with Asian countries, did not hesitate to support the Dutch policy of self-determination. Had it not been for a number of ex-Netherlands Indies officials like High Commissioner Dr. H.M. Hirschfeld,* who tried to preserve and nourish the Dutch-Indonesian Union and the United Indonesian Republic, and Dutch commercial interests and traditional ties, the New Guinea policy would have been more radical and of greater consequence, but nevertheless in the end Dutch self-respect was saved, after most of it had gone down the drain.

Australia, in the person of Spender, the Foreign Minister, inclined to take its fate into its own hands to protect both parts

*Dr. H.M. Hirschfeld, High Commissioner in Jakarta in 1950, was strongly opposed to the New Guinea policy of the Netherlands government, and already in 1950 predicted the negative outcome.

of the island as a shield for its own defence in the South-East Asian hemisphere. It learned its lesson well. At the moment when the Dutch overplayed their hand with the Luns plan, it ventured to take a basically anti-Indonesian stand and to stand by an independent, if unreliable Papua New Guinea. This act of courage yielded a valuable reward.

At the moment when a liberation movement started to gain momentum near the borders with P.N.G. after the suppression that took place at the time of the 'Act of Free Choice' Australia was out of the danger-line and more determined than ever not to give in to the expansionist desires of Indonesia. So West Irian won another natural ally in disguise, even if an opportunistic one.

As for the United States, up to this very day it has the impression that it rendered a valuable service to its good friends the Dutch in extracting them from a position which was more dangerous than was warranted by 'the issue at stake', as President Kennedy put it in his letter to the then Dutch Prime Minister de Quay. But he misjudged the fatal outcome of the United States policy of supporting corrupt régimes in the American interest, and he certainly under-estimated the sincerity of a good number of Dutch people, among them the subsequent Secretary-General of NATO, Dr. Luns, who swore after the Second World War never again to give in to the armed blackmail of a dictator. Moreover it is the conviction of many Dutch people that if the United States had only stuck to the policy of John Foster Dulles and used its deterrent diplomatic influence, the Netherlands could have fulfilled its historic task.

The Papuans never at any stage had a voice in the dispute. But they certainly have an opinion, and a policy is beginning to develop. This policy is neo-Marxist, and it is only so because the older leaders of the government-in-exile, Marcus Kaisiepo and Nicolaas Jouwe, are very pro-Western, while the younger generation is looking in a different direction. The Fourth World congress in Berlin in 1978 saw representatives from the Netherlands — both young Moluccans and a young Papuan of the same family as Nicolaas Jouwe — pleading on behalf of the suppressed minorities in Indonesia. The Netherlands has had its share of kidnappings and highjacking by Moluccans; but as long as minority problems remain unsettled and discontent in Indonesia continues to smoulder, then the danger of violence and sabotage will continue. Proof of this is to be seen in the

Papuan Liberation Movement, *Operasi Papua Merdeka*, which has developed into a national movement. It is not difficult to prove that the continuous uprisings in West Irian are caused by the same factors and are to some extent co-ordinated. Under the repression of the Indonesian government, a nationalistic consciousness is growing in West Irian, encouraged by outside assistance from the office of the Papuan Ben Tangghama in Dakar, which is provided by President Senghor of Senegal, and a similar office in Stockholm, backed by left-wing Swedish academics.

The Americans aimed at peace and quiet to strengthen an anti-Communist development, but all is very far from quiet. The annexation of East Timor by Indonesia was not approved of by the United States, Australia or Papua New Guinea, and Indonesia once more lost face in the family of nations. Moreover, the Indonesian army made a bad showing when they attacked the dispersed neo-Marxist bands. Pockets of resistance and discontent are also alive not only in East Timor and West Irian but in the Moluccas, North Borneo and North Sumatra, waiting for an eruption if other streams like Islam, Communism or student movements start to move.

The main cause is Indonesia's poverty, painfully displayed by the affluence of the happy few — the military, senior officials and Chinese businessmen. The take-over by the generals and the new government of President Suharto certainly put a temporary stop to a corrupt régime and a disastrous economic policy. The new order, the *orde baru*, attracted investment and wealth, but the change brought more profit to the rich than to the poor; the gulf was deepening and Jakarta at the centre spent more than the provinces. On top of it all, the overflow of Javanese migrants in all sorts of settlement schemes in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and West Irian is injurious to the indigenous population.

Moreover in West Irian a tight political control is maintained. The Papuans are declared to be Indonesians, but that does not necessarily mean that their feeling of identity has gone; on the contrary. But in fifteen years Indonesia has brought about remarkable development. The economy is self-evidently moving ahead and more activity is to come. *Per capita* of population Indonesia's grant-in-aid to the West Irian budget easily exceeds those made to other provinces. The expansion of education, the promotion of religion, the intensification of traffic and

communications together constitute a remarkable performance for a developing country which has to develop a very backward region. But all these successes work to the advantage of the central government and the Indonesians, both from Java and East Indonesia — officials, military, self-employed and labourers. So the country is developing, and the Papuan is disappearing. The *controleur*, obliged to look after the wellbeing of the population in the country, has disappeared from the civil service organisation; in his place is the commissioner, the *bupati*, as the point of co-ordination for a number of departmental services, and the former assistant district officer, the *chamat*, a civil servant of modest capacity and jurisdiction. The mortality rate, especially infant mortality, has increased, endemic diseases have returned, malnutrition is the rule, and protein deficiency is common. Price differences of commodities between West Irian and other provinces are steep: beef, salt-fish and wheat cost twice or three times more than elsewhere; only rice has a fixed stable price.

So Indonesia has a development policy but no native policy, and a policy of 'unintentional genocide' could be proved if research into the living conditions of urban Papuans were carried out. The activities of FUNDWI, mainly in upgrading and repairing existing facilities, have at least restored a number of vital functions, and one FUNDWI project has attained more. The Irian Jaya Joint Development Foundation, a joint venture of Indonesia and the U.N., is aiming at the Irian-born Indonesians and has developed a real native policy; the drawback, however, is its self-sufficient economic character. On the one hand this is very sound, but on the other it can make no contribution to pilot projects. So a government has to give support on a more generous and broader scale, and West Irian after all is now producing the means itself. It can be compared to P.N.G., which can allot its funds as it sees fit — a comparison which is not very favourable to Indonesia. It would be a different matter if the province of West Irian had sufficient autonomy to allocate its own budget according to the views which it already displayed in the democratic and representative New Guinea Council of 1962, and could regulate the irresponsible immigration from East Indonesia which has pushed the Papuan out of all economic activity and out of the centres of development, the towns, which as a result have become centres of over-urbanisation themselves. But more autonomy and authority

would mean less dominance for Jakarta, and it is the very essence of imperialism to attract power and keep it.

More autonomy for the province of West Irian is by no means the only alternative in the view of the Papuan population. The eastern part of the island became independent at about the same moment as the western part became part of Indonesia. In West Irian a nationalist feeling among the Papuan population is growing. The Papuans feel their backward position and the immigration of tens of thousands of Indonesians from the East Indonesian islands is felt as a threat to their very existence. Connections with fellow-Papuans across the border have been established and highlight the difference in their respective situations. Liberation movements are active both in West Irian and outside: Papua New Guinea, Europe and Africa. A federation of the eastern and western part of the island is attractive from an economic point of view, but politically too it is viable in the long run. Oppression is the surest way to stimulate the resistance of the Papuans in West Irian, and Papua New Guinea only needs time to develop a sense of a national identity.

West Irian can count on support of many African states, because of the strong feeling of *négritude* that grew up in the process of African decolonisation. The former 'Brazzaville' group of countries has shown its sympathy for the Papuan cause already, but the support given by Senegal to the 'Revolutionary Provisional Government of West Papua New Guinea' implies the sympathy of other African states. Indonesia's take over of East Timor, understandable as it may have been, has met with silent disapproval in many South Asian and Western countries. Australia, a strong backer of Indonesia in the years when it was struggling for independence, can hardly have any sympathy for the eastward expansionist ambitions of its northern neighbour.

The final result of the Papuan liberation movement will depend very much on Indonesian native policy in West Irian. It seems clear that no armed suppression can hold down the growing hostility of the Papuans; nor indeed can the great influx of Indonesian immigrants. So one of two alternatives has to come about: more autonomy within Indonesia for the province of Irian Jaya or an independent West Papua New Guinea, probably united with the eastern Papua New Guinea in a Melanesian federation.

It is to be hoped that the Indonesian government will steer as soon as possible away from its present, disastrous course. Rightly

or wrongly, West Irian was separate from Indonesia from 1950 till 1963 under Dutch rule, and it even had a special status under the United Nations till 1969. In that period of nearly twenty years the Papuan people of West Irian have developed at least as much political consciousness as their independent brothers across the eastern border.

APPENDIXES

A

FUNDWI Development Programme, West Irian: Projects and Budget Allocations

Project	Budget allocations						Counterpart (Rp.m.)	
	United Nations (\$000) ^a					Total esti- mated cost (cash & kind)		Cash disburse- ments (DIP 1969-72)
	Total	Ex- perts	Fellow- ships	Equip- ment	Sub- contracts			
Infrastructure								
Air transportation: ^b provision of 3 Twin Otter aircraft, equipment, repair of existing aircraft and general assistance	4399 ^c	301	95	2616	—	7141	1790	
Coastal and river transportation: provision of coasters, motor barges and service vehicles; repair of ships, slipways and ports	5899	550	53	3203	1152	2777	1310	
Land transportation: equipment for rehabilitation of Jayapura-Sentani road, passenger buses and trucks provided for towns, equipment for rehabilitation of workshops	1404	278	24	890	—	1481	576	
Electricity: rehabilitation of diesel power stations in major towns	1138	77	31	546	133	122	113	
Telecommunications: main work in rehabilitation of Jakarta telephone and telegraph systems and repairs elsewhere	1281	267	25	414	—	733	230	
Meteorology: rehabilitation of existing meteorological stations and establishment of 2 agricultural meteorological stations	203	27	—	93	7.6	212	— ^d	
Primary Industry								
Forestry: (i) main efforts in establishment of sawmill at Hamadi near Jayapura and minor research on copal and resin resources;	1148	67	23	471	267	307	189	
(ii) research into prospect of forest industries in Irian Jaya and forestry projects in Warsaw Valley for Irian Jaya Forest Industries Development Corp.; rest of project abandoned and funds allocated to other projects	162							
Marine fisheries: research into tuna and skipjack resources, assistance in setting up pole and line fishing enterprise and finance for building and equipment for fishing school at Sorong	1669	150	12	167	1159	239	113	
Inland fisheries: management and demonstration at government hatcheries, provision of fish for Lake Sencani and inland lakes and rivers	184	76	—	83	—	90	62	

^a Includes reallocation of \$2,747,000 at program review, July 1971.

^b An additional \$175,000 and \$80,000 was granted by the Canadian and British governments.

^c \$1 million from Review meeting in 1971 not yet allocated to different uses.

^d Included in Air Communication allocation.

Source: Fundwi, Jayapura, 1972.

Project	Budget allocations						Total estimated cost (cash & kind)	Cash disbursements (DIP 1969-72)
	United Nations (\$000)					Counterpart (Rp.m.)		
	Total	Ex-perts	Fellow-ships	Equip-ment	Sub-contracts			
<i>Primary Industry (continued)</i>								
Agriculture: seed trials and distribution, technical reports (soil market surveys)	585	229	54	201	5	326	105	
Animal husbandry: rehabilitation and expansion of veterinary, quarantine and slaughter facilities	281	109	33	98	—		64	
Asmat handicrafts: stimulation of traditional carvings through organising purchases and markets for Asmat art	131	84	2.6	4	—	5		
Brick and tile manufacture: courses and feasibility studies on brick and tile manufacture to replace imported sources of building materials	58	58	—	—	—	—		
Refrigerator and cold storage: survey of possibility of refrigeration and cold storage fish	0.8	0.8	—	—	—	—		
<i>Human resources</i>								
Industrial vocational training centre: vocational training centres with modern equipment in Jayapura and Manokwari	1561	800	42	457	—	278	298	
Education planning and administration: advice on educational planning to administration	183	116	—	4	—	—	—	
School building and model schools: model school at Wamena	42	31	—	49	—	9	—	
Teacher training and technical and secondary education: construction of new teachers' college, provision of audio visual aids and improvement of curricula	610	230	89.6	208	—	448	244	
University: provision of books and equipment and assistance to anthropology institute	236	—	—	50	152	20	21	
Highlands education: advice on approach to education in the highlands	65	48	—	8	—	—	—	
<i>Other</i>								
Community development: courses and teaching materials for community development programs	105	72	7	11	—	—	—	
Health: equipment and campaigns against malaria, improvement of public health, nursing education and training; control programs and public health advice	615	72	79	321	—	335	186	
Public administration: fellowships to development administrators	5	—	5	—	—	—	—	
Irian Jaya Joint Development Corporation	4000	—	—	—	—	1660	—	

B

Abbreviated report by F.I.J. Jufuway, dated 1 August 1973, in 'Zwartboek New Guinea', Provisional Government of the Republic of West Papua-New Guinea, The Hague, appendix 5.

Starting from 1 December 1969, about 1,000 Papuans have been taken prisoner, accused of being members of Organisasi Papua Merdeka (O.P.M.).

In Jayapura 295 detainees are in 4 prison camps; the majority in Ifar Gunung and C.P.M. (Kloofkamp), where they are ill-treated. Martin Jelmau was executed in September 1969 (head of liberation movement F.K.P.P.B.-A 69). Penehas Torey, executed in December 1969 (ex-member New Guinea Council). J. Ojatouw, executed 23.9.1972 (sergeant-major). 16 people killed, no names.

In Biak there are 189 detainees in 3 prison camps: Alri (Marines), Auri (Sorido) and Auri (Boroku).

In 1970, 568 people were killed in Adadikam in April and May 1970, and in Krisdori and Mundori in June 1971. In Adadikam 20 people were killed on 25 April, among them 18 women and children; a schoolteacher, Miss Bonsapia, was raped by 20 Indonesian soldiers before being killed. On 19 May, 85 people were executed, including Miss Bonsapia's pregnant sister; she was killed after being horribly abused. The Indonesian army commander was Lieut. Rohjadi, Kodam XVI/Udajadi. In June 1971 in Krisdori and Mundori the men were killed by machine-guns, women and children burnt alive in a wooden house, stuffed with firewood.

Nathaniel Awom, secretary of O.P.M., executed in September 1972.

Penehas Awom, commander O.P.M., executed in Manokwari 5 June 1971.

C

Report to Liberation Committee in The Hague, July 1967, appendix 1.

Baliem valley, October 1966: 19 people killed in Bunggiak village by Indonesian soldiers.

28 January 1967: in Gulunu village 80 people, including school-children, killed by Indonesian soldiers. A 10-year-old boy hanged.

30 January 1967: Another 4 people killed.

Sukarnopura (Jayapura), 20 February 1967; Nico Jacadewa, police inspector killed.

22 February 1967: E.J. Bonay (former Governor of Irian Barat), the Rev. G.A. Lanta, the Rev. S. Hay, police-inspector D.R. Hanasbey, Njaro, Fitowen and Amos Th. Pattipeme arrested (in Ifar).

Manokwari, 15 February 1967: Johan Ariks, former Papuan delegate at the Malino conference, killed in prison in Manokwari, aged 75.

16 February 1967: M. Aurey, A. Nusi and L. Kendewara executed.

Teminabuan, 1 February 1967: Mathias Solosa, Saul Kareth and Saul Bleth killed by Indonesian soldiers.

4 February 1967: Otniel Isir, Christian Kareth and Johan Helmaun executed.

Inanwatan, 3 February 1967: Otniel Saffkaur, Albert Saffblembalo and Junus Saffblembalo publicly executed.

Ajamaru, 15 February 1967: during 'Operasi Tumpas' Augustinus Nebuly (teacher in Mefkadjiro village) shot. Villages Semu and Jakwer burnt; population killed and beaten and women raped. Two sixteen-year-old girls Dorothea Hora and Constantine Kambu raped by 50 Indonesian soldiers.

Reportedly in *Ajamaru, Teminabuan and Inanwatan* 1,500 people killed by Indonesian soldiers.

From *Fakfak and Kaimana:* respectively 11 and 14 people arrested and transported to Manokwari prison.

D

GLOSSARY OF INDONESIAN (MALAY) TERMS

- abang*: red, reddish, used in the sense of *tanah abang*, red earth, but also in the sense of Communist small farmers: *orang abangan*
- adat*: customary law
- agung*: great
- aliran*: stream
- babo*: (Papuan) new
- binatang*: beast
- bisa*: can, to be able
- blanda, belanda*: Dutch
- bodo(h)*: stupid
- boneka*: puppet
- (ka)bupati(en)*: commissioner, head of district; with prefix and suffix, district
- busuk*: corrupt
- camat*: head of *kecamatan*
- chusus*: special (*sektor chusus* — special sector)
- copal*: local term for resin
- damar*: local term for resin
- de(s)sa*: village on Java; in West Irian the word for village is *kampung*, so *de(s)sa* has a special meaning, i.e. with a Javanese organisation
- (e)mas*: gold; *lembang emas*, golden spear
- gotong royong*: (also *tolong menolong*) assist each other
- hong*: expedition to punish breach of contract, organised by the Oost Indische Compagnie; also used of raids by local rulers to extract payments (in slaves and birds of paradise) from their subjects.
- kabaya*: woman's over garment worn with sarong
- kain*: tissue
- kami*: we, us; in West Irian the difference between *kami* and *kita* (excluding person who is spoken to) is not strictly regarded
- karkara*: the island of Biak (in the seventeenth century used already)
- kecamatan*: administrative unit, in colonial times called a district
- kiap*: district officer (*motu*)
- kongsi*: price ring, combined group
- koteka*: penis-gourd
- lap-lap*: (Papuan) loin-cloth
- lembang*: spear
- (ke)maju(an)*: forward; with prefix and suffix, progress
- mataungan*: (Papuan) take care

- merah-putih*: red-white; *sang merah-putih*, the flag
(*ke*)*merdeka(an)*: free, independent; with prefix and suffix, freedom
Mojopahit: East Javanese empire, literally 'bitter nut'
moroe: Biak term for village
motu: Papuan language
mufakat, *mupakat*: consensus
mushawarah: palaver
muspida: Indonesian acronym for head of military organisation
orang: men
panshasila: the five rules for Indonesia, as conceived by President Sukarno
(*re*)*pelita*: five-year plan
pergerakan: movement
persatuan: unity
pesantren: see *santri*
raja: chief, king
raya: great
santri: orthodox, faithful; *pesantren*, orthodox people
sembah: courtly Indonesian gesture of greeting
serikat: united
tahan: suffer
tidak: not
timur: east; *Timor Timur* or *Tim-Tim*, East Timor; *kain timur*, tissue from the East
wegebage: local language of the Paniai lakes, exact significance unknown to author; it means some sort of cargo cult

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of mineral resources have made West Irian one of the richest territories under Indonesian control: many thousands of Indonesians, apart from official military and administrative personnel, have flooded into the country: and the indigenous Papuans, unable to compete, have disappeared from the towns in their thousands and literally retreated to the bush. The infrastructure which the Dutch installed before their departure was despoiled by the incoming Indonesians; and the valuable local currency, previously tied to the Dutch guilder, plummeted in value. Down, too, went the educational and work opportunities and the health standards of the Papuans.

To the Papuans the Indonesian take-over of their country was a gross breach of faith—by the Netherlands and its allies, and most of all by the U.N., the arch-guarantor of the right of peoples to self-determination—and they are resolutely opposed to the present *status quo*. They have organized resistance to Indonesia inside and outside the country (their government-in-exile has one office in Holland and another in Dakar, Senegal) but so far the world has taken little notice. But the world should take notice, for the Indonesian-Papuan confrontation is a classic example of struggle between a Third World state and the Fourth World in the shape of a defenceless tribal people which happens to be under its domination—in this case without even the usual historical justification.

The painful story is told in this book, from a deep and long-standing knowledge of both New Guinea and Indonesia, by KEES

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LAGERBERG (*above*), from 1951 to 1962 a district officer and an acting district commissioner in the Netherlands colonial service in New Guinea, subsequently for several years an adviser on development aid to the Netherlands government and now a senior lecturer in cultural anthropology at the Catholic University of Tilburg. The book was commissioned and written to inform the world, as fully as possible, of a very great modern injustice to which no fair solution is yet in sight. Dr Lagerberg's book does not advocate outright independence for West New Guinea as an immediate possibility; but convergence with independent Papua New Guinea, and incorporation in a wider "Melanesian federation," are both well within the realm of what is possible. At least the Western world, preoccupied with the problem of Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and the South-East Asian mainland, should pause to consider the plight of the indigenous Papuan population of "occupied" West New Guinea.

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